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ABSTRACT
The Loss-Processing Framework
by
Lawrence D. Childress
The circumstances of responding to loss due to human death are among the most stressful
experiences encountered in life. Although grief’s symptoms are typically considered essential to
their gradual diminishment, possible negative impacts of complications related to grief are also
well known, and have been associated with detriments to mental and physical health. Grief,
however, can also generate transformative positive change. Thus, albeit ineludible, responding to
loss is not uniformly experienced, expressed, or understood. It is also culturally-shaped, making
attempts to define “normal” grief, as well as to label some grief “abnormal”—and to medicalize
it—possibly problematic. Bereavement (the situation surrounding a death) and mourning (the
publicly expressed response to loss due to death) are changing. Some of these changes (e.g., the
increase in hospice care settings prior to deaths, and alterations in the ritual responses following
all deaths—irrespective of their context) may have important implications for avoiding grief’s
possible complications and for promoting its potential benefits. An improved alignment of grief
theory, research, and practice is warranted; but theories of grief are diverse, and historically have
not been empirically well-supported. This research articulates a new grief model, the lossprocessing framework, featuring three dimensional components (perception, orientation, and
direction). As a first step toward validation of the framework, also included is an empirical study
examining retrospective descriptive reports of adult loss response relating to the first of these
three dimensions (perception). As an interpretive, translational approach to understanding grief,
the loss-processing framework may serve to positively impact grieving, health, and life quality.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Overview
The circumstances of responding to loss due to human death are among the most stressful
experiences encountered in life (Holmes & Rahe, 1967; for brief summary see, e.g., Aoun et al.,
2019; Layne et al., 2017). Scholars have also noted, however, that the symptoms of loss response
are typically essential to their gradual attenuation (e.g., Durkheim, 1915/1965) and have posited
the possible import of loss response in relationship to adaptive functioning (e.g., Caplan, 1964;
Nesse, 2000; Walsh & McGoldrick, 1991/2004), positive personal growth, and creativity (e.g.,
Aldwin, 1994/2007; Elliott, 1999; Fahlberg et al., 1992; Finkel, 1974, 1975; Frankl, 1946/1984;
Gillies & Neimeyer, 2006; Kessler, 2019; Klein, 1940; Marris, 1974; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis,
2002; O’Leary & Ickovics, 1995; Pollock, 1981, 1987, 1989a, b; Rochlin, 1965; Schaefer &
Moos, 2001; Tedeschi, 1995; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Tedeschi et al., 1998; Woodward,
1990, 1993; Yalom & Lieberman, 1991; for summary see also Hogan & Schmidt, 2002). Others
have noted empirical studies spanning the globe that evince an association between certain
complications of loss response and detriments to mental and physical health and well-being (for
summary see Stroebe et al., 2007; see also, e.g., Parkes, 1972).
In the U.S., the prevalence of the predominant form of complicated loss response,
persistent complex bereavement disorder (PCBD)—a condition for further study in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5; American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013)—has been estimated to be as high as 20% (Hensley et al.,
2009; Middleton et al., 1998; Prigerson & Jacobs, 2001; Silverman et al., 2000). Given the death
rate in the U.S. (Kochanek et al., 2016), estimates indicate that as many as 2.6 million people
may develop PCBD annually. With baby boomers continuing to age (Ayers et al., 2004; Jemal et

9

al., 2005), and with the estimated 533,000+ COVID-19-related deaths (through March, 2021;
Center for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2021), this number is expected to increase in
the future—emphasizing the urgency for an improved alignment of loss response theory,
research, and practice going forward (Ayers et al., 2004; Sandler et al., 2005). As Layne et al.
(2017) have noted: “This growing recognition of bereavement as a subject of clinical concern
and study is further demonstrated by the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) inclusion of
Prolonged Grief Disorder in its International Classification of Diseases, 11th revision (ICD-11;
World Health Organization [WHO], 2018), which will reach an even wider medical and
psychiatric audience worldwide than DSM-5…” (p. 267; see also Maercker et al., 2013;
Maercker & Lalor, 2012; Prigerson et al., 2009).
Statement of the Problem
The potential for an increased incidence of complications in loss response in the near
future, and the prospect of negative health consequences as a result, are important to consider in
relationship to current/recent trends regarding the predominant context of bereavement in the
U.S. (palliative/hospice care settings) as well as in relation to possible shifts in the ceremonial
collective rites of mourning following on death’s occurrence (toward less formalized
ritualization—or, in some cases, none at all). The individuality of responses to loss due to human
death, which are not uniformly experienced, expressed, or understood (e.g., Neimeyer & Harris,
2011; Shuchter & Zisook, 1993; Stroebe et al., 1994), must also be stressed. Furthermore, loss
responses are typically culturally-shaped (e.g., Bonanno, 1999; Rosenblatt, 2001), making
attempts to define “normal” grief, as well as to label some manifestations of grief “abnormal”—
and to medicalize it—possibly problematic.
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Concerns regarding the appropriate labeling of loss response (and the possible
pathogenesis of some loss responses) are perhaps being exacerbated by the challenge of
discerning how and why certain aspects of responding to loss may be maladaptive for some
individuals while for others they are not. Ascertaining what is “normal” grief from what is
simply divergent or from what is possibly aberrant can be fraught (see, e.g., Bisconti et al., 2004;
Nesse, 2005; Rubin, 1993; Shapiro, 2001; Zisook & Shuchter, 1986). It is difficult to excavate
grief’s underlying mechanisms and their potential ramifications (positive, negative, and
otherwise) with absolute precision. After all, “Grief is a process, not a state” (Parkes, 1970, p.
445); and, as Stroebe et al. (1993) note: “…even one individual’s grief varies from moment to
moment” (p. 5). It is also important to remember, especially when attempting to avoid possible
complications in loss response, that its symptoms are normally considered to be requisite to their
gradual diminishment (e.g., Durkheim, 1915/1965), and that grief may enhance adaptivity, foster
transformative personal growth, and generate creativity (see previous citations, p. 9; for
summary see also Hogan & Schmidt, 2002).
If grieving well can help make one’s life better, then explaining the dangers of complex
bereavement may serve, however inadvertently, to diminish understanding(s of) grief’s
restorative, adaptive, and creative potential. Of course, the opposite may also apply: emphasizing
grief’s transformational and generative features could risk the prospect of missing signs of
possible complications related to it. Shapiro (2001) has observed the need to clarify
“…paradoxes of grief and growth” via “a comprehensive conceptual approach,” noting that “the
grief literature lacks agreement in conceptualizing and operationalizing pathological versus
successful bereavement” (p. 302).
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But conceptual models of grief are diverse, featuring variegated (yet sometimes
overlapping) and oft-debated research perspectives (see, e.g., Childress, 2015; Papa et al., 2014),
with roots in different disciplines (Rothaupt & Becker, 2007; Stroebe et al., 1993), and
professional understandings that are typically based on “alternative discursive frames of
reference” (Neimeyer, 2001b, p. 264). Although in recent decades bereavement research has
“burgeoned internationally, giving rise to a greatly expanded trove of models and methods which
have increasingly been subjected to empirical scrutiny” (Neimeyer, 2014, p. 125), historically
evidential support for grief theories has remained shallow (Archer, 2008; Bonanno, 1998, 2009;
Bonanno & Field, 2001; Bonanno & Kaltman, 1999; Breen & O’Connor, 2007; Center for the
Advancement of Health, 2004; Davis et al., 2000; Lindstrøm, 2002; Stroebe & Schut, 2005;
Stroebe et al., 2002; Wortman & Silver, 1989, 2001). As Stroebe et al. (1993) note: “…research
on bereavement typically has not been guided by an integrative theory base” (p. 7). Thus,
consensus regarding a possible path toward an integrated, unifying, and empirically wellsupported approach to loss response remains elusive.
Significance
Multiple factors underscore the need to enhance understanding of human response to
loss due to death, or grief. Stroebe et al. (2007) have drawn attention to the adverse effects of
certain complications of bereavement on health, including an increased risk of mortality—
particularly for certain groups (see also Boyle et al., 2011; Christakis & Iwashyna, 2003; Moon
et al., 2011; Prigerson et al., 2009; Raphael, 1993; Rees & Lutkins, 1967; Schultze-Florey et al.,
2012; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1993). In the relationship between loss response and health, persistent
complex bereavement disorder (PCBD; APA, 2013) is at the negative end of the loss response
continuum and has been associated with an increased risk for cardiac disease, hypertension,
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cancer, immunological deficiency (Chen et al., 1999; Irwin & Weiner, 1987; Prigerson et al.,
1997; Prigerson et al., 1999), and suicide ideation/completion (Hill et al., 2019; Latham &
Prigerson, 2004). It is commonly comorbid with major depressive disorder (MDD),
posttraumatic stress disorder, and substance use disorders (APA, 2013).
Of these three, PCBD is most frequently comorbid with depression (Maercker & Lalor,
2012; see also Brent et al., 1994; McDermott et al., 1997; Pasternak et al., 1993; Zisook et al.,
1997), which is one of the most prevalent, costly, and challenging mental health concerns today
(Berto et al., 2000)—and the leading cause of disability worldwide (World Health Organization,
2018a). Both grief complications and MDD are accompanied by an increasing incidence of
neuropharmacologic interventions (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007; Brody & Gu, 2020); possible
impacts of these drug-based treatments for complex grief and depressive symptoms on the course
and outcome of subsequent response(s) to loss are not yet known (see, e.g., Nesse, 2000).
Other ill effects of complications relating to bereavement may include the disruption of
neuroendocrine systems (Fletcher, 1996; Goodkin et al., 1995; Pasternak et al., 1994), a
substantial worsening of activity-limiting pain (Bradbeer et al., 2003), insomnia (Marris,
1958/2004; Parkes, 1970), somatic disturbances (Shahane et al., 2018), weight loss (Marris,
1958/2004; Shahar et al., 2001; Shulz et al., 2001), subjective distress (Maciejewski et al.,
2007), an increase in rates of surgery and hospitalization (Glick et al., 1974), and elevated rates
of chronic inflammatory conditions, such as cardiovascular disease (Carey et al., 2014; Chirinos
et al., 2019; Stahl et al., 2016)—which is the leading cause of death both within the U.S.
(Kochanek et al., 2019) and globally (Finegold et al., 2013).
Aoun et al. (2019) have noted that adverse outcomes related to complicated grief can
span emotional, physical, behavioral, and cognitive domains. Raphael (1993) summates the
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possible negative impacts from grief’s complications to include “…increased presentations for
medical care, increased substance use and abuse, significant mental health problems, [an]
increased risk of death for some groups, and, for all, substantial human suffering” (p. xi). As
Morris and Block (2015) assert: “these [impacts] are not insignificant and have important
implications for how our society as a whole cares for the bereaved” (p. 915).
Historically empirical data regarding both positive and negative, or (mal)adaptive, loss
responses (including—but not limited to—possible complications, their causes/consequences,
and potential preventions/treatments) have been considered insufficient (see, e.g., Kato & Mann,
1999). Studies on which to build effective strategies for caring for all those who are bereaved are
sparse, and appropriate tools for the assessment of loss response may be underdeveloped (Agnew
et al., 2010).
Varied theoretical understandings of loss response, an historical paucity of robust
empirical evidence supporting grief theories, ongoing disagreement regarding bereavement’s
typical or “normal” course(s), the prospect of labeling (and treating) atypical grief as
“abnormal,” cross-cultural differences in mourning, and the propensity to medicalize grief are
some of the factors that have made loss response research especially challenging. The difficulties
of conducting research on populations experiencing loss due to human death have also been well
documented (see, e.g., Cassileth & Lusk, 1989; Grande & Todd, 2000; Hudson et al., 2005;
Hudson & Hayman-White, 2006).
As noted above, the identification and implementation of comprehensive bereavement
measurement instrumentation can also be problematic (see, e.g., Agnew et al., 2010), but is not
insurmountable (for review see Hudson & Hayman-White, 2006; Neimeyer, 2015a; see also
Burnett et al., 1997; Deeken et al., 2003; Kristjanson et al., 2005). Although advancements in
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thanatological research have been a focus for some time, Neimeyer (2001a) has lamented that
“fervid developments in research…have not been matched either by a consistent sophistication in
our conceptual models of loss or the generation of new insights into clinical practice” (p. 2).
Primary Aim
Assessing loss response is more than looking for possible indicators of a need for
prevention and/or treatment for maladaptive grieving; it is the concomitant search for positive
indications of adaptive loss response, which includes the possibility that grief can—and often
does—effect generative, transformational change. Thus, it is pivotal that research into loss
response be approached through an appropriate conceptual framework, one grounded in a full
range of possible manifestations rather than, for example, limited only (or primarily) to those
considered to be “abnormal”—or to those deemed “normal” when its operationalization has
proven fraught (see, e.g., Uren & Wastell 2002 for support of viewing grief typology along a
continuum rather than as dichotomized). Relatedly, cultural variations in grief, and the
propensity to medicalize it, must also be considered.
The primary aim of this research is to describe a new framework of loss response and to
explore the retrospective descriptive reports of bereaved adults relating to it. The loss-processing
framework consists of three inter-related elements: 1) perception, 2) orientation, and 3) direction.
In contrast to the longstanding, conventional (mis)conception that components of loss response
follow one another in a stage- or step-like progression, these dimensional elements intersect,
interact, and (may) influence one another (for a brief summary of intersectionality, see Warner &
Shields, 2013; for refutations of stage grief theory, see, e.g., Bonanno & Boerner, 2007; Center
for Advancement of Health, 2001, 2004; Hall, 2014; Neimeyer, 2014; Osterweis et al., 1984;
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Stroebe et al., 2017; Rothpaut & Becker, 2007; Silver & Wortman, 1980, 2007; Weiner, 2007;
Wortman & Silver, 1987, 1989, 1992).
Chapter 1 Summary
The posited loss-processing framework’s three components of perception, orientation,
and direction (see Figure 1) may be useful in the assessment of numerous indicators of both
positive and negative outcomes in the grief-health relationship. From this larger set of possible
indicators, a provisional, perception-related subset was examined for this paper; however, future
work could also benefit from the proposed modular framework, including with respect to
indicators relating to its other two dimensions (orientation and direction). An accessible,
interpretive approach with enhanced translational applicability may aid in streamlining grief
research, thereby increasing the empirical evidence bases surrounding loss response, its possible
interventions, and their efficacy. These include techniques to perhaps help prevent complications
due to bereavement as well as methods to possibly reinforce grief’s beneficial aspects. As such,
improving this empirical knowledge base should have the potential to positively impact grieving,
health, and life quality.
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Figure 1
The Loss-Processing Framework
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Chapter 2. Perception
Perhaps the only way to overcome a traumatic severance of body and mind is to come
back to the mind through the body. (Hartman, 2004, p. 541)
The experience of living can change in response to the death of a loved one. Certain
expectations regarding how the world does and does not work may no longer be met. Thus, life’s
reality seems different; it may even feel unreal. As Butler (2003) notes: “…loss fractures
representation itself” (p. 467), and as Davis (2001) has posited, responding to loss can often
result in “severe threats to how people perceive themselves and how they perceive the world” (p.
137). Similarly, Lindemann (1944/1994) concluded that in grief “the sensorium is generally
somewhat altered” (p. 188). Since perceived sensory alterations are potentially a key component
of loss response, an assumption of the proposed framework is that perceptual processes can seem
to be impaired or are in some way(s) altered by grief. Even so, the precise mechanisms
underlying possible changes in perceptual processing in response to loss are understudied.
Likewise, and in part because changes in sensory perception in the context of grief are typically
(assumed to be) transient, little is known about the possible permanence and/or the longer-term
impacts of perceptual alterations in relationship to loss due to human death.
The first dimension of the proposed loss-processing framework, perception, therefore
primarily refers to the perceptual processing of sensorial information. This dimension (herein
also alternately termed sense-making) encompasses the core functions of sensation (stimuli
detection) and perception (organizing, identifying, and interpreting what has been detected) as
well as the liminal space between them (see, e.g., Hochberg, 1956; Kolb, 2009; Schacter et al.,
2012). Possible changes to sensory processing in the context of loss may occur in the following
related areas: 1) shock-like symptomatology; 2) intrasensory processing; 3) intersensory
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processing (a.k.a., multimodal integration or intersensory coordination); 4) extrasensory
processing (including hallucinations, illusions, and other post-death experiences of the decedent;
dreams; threshold consciousness; and transliminality); and 5) time.
Shock
In summarizing Shontz’s (1965, 1975) crisis reaction theory, Silver and Wortman (1980)
underscore that shock “…occurs to some degree in virtually every crisis state” (p. 287); Parkes
(1970) views this “state of numbness…blunting, or shock” (p. 449) to be the most frequent
immediate response to death (see also, e.g., Bowlby & Parkes, 1970; Eliot, 1943; Tyhurst, 1958).
Similar to shock—as an acute reaction to (dis)stress (which is often crisis-related)—perceptual
processing in the context of loss can also generally feature symptoms of anxiety, agitation,
restlessness, fear, helplessness, confusion, dizziness, light-headedness, and/or faintness (for
reference, see Summary of Diagnostic Features of Acute Stress Disorder [ASD], Appendix A,
APA, 2013; for review see also Bryant et al., 2011). More specifically, clinical symptoms of
dissociative acute stress reactions (ASR’s) may include a sense of numbing and/or detachment
from emotional reactions; a sense of physical detachment, such as seeing oneself from another
perspective; decreased awareness of one’s surroundings; the perception that one’s environment is
unreal or dreamlike; and an inability to recall critical aspects of the stressful event (in this case
death—or news of its imminence), which is also known as dissociative amnesia (APA, 2013;
Bryant et al., 2011; Bryant & Harvey, 2000).
Symptoms of acute dissociative reactions to stressful events are typically transient,
beginning within one month following the event and lasting up to one month after onset.
Duration may be longer, and/or onset more delayed, in the context of loss (APA, 2013).
Additional symptoms include: “constriction of consciousness; depersonalization; derealization;
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perceptual disturbances (e.g., time slowing, macropsia); micro-amnesias; transient stupor; and/or
alterations in sensory-motor functioning, such as analgesia [and] paralysis” (APA, 2013, pp. 306307; see also Bryant et al., 2011; Bryant & Harvey, 2000; Kavan et al., 2012). With respect to
two of these shock-related symptoms, Lindemann (1944/1994) notes exceptions to macropsia
(with other people seeming shadowy and small rather than appearing larger) and analgesia
(citing, e.g., evidence of specific somatic complaints, such as constriction of the throat and/or
other respiratory problems) in loss contexts (see also, e.g., Goldstein, 2015). Regarding the latter,
somatic complaints related to loss response may include symptoms that were experienced by the
decedent prior to death (APA, 2013; see also, e.g., Parkes, 1970).
Unlike shock, it should be noted that in some cases perceptual processing can seem to be
in some way(s) enriched in response to loss. Although this felt acuity may bear some
resemblance to sensitization in non-associative learning, in this context the sensitizing
emphasizes awareness of, rather than reaction(s) to, stimuli relative to exposure to a sensory
input (in this case one of significant loss). It also bears mentioning that over time certain
individuals experiencing losses in this way may come to view perceptual processing as having
been honed, intensified, or somehow enhanced by them. For example, following her older
brother’s sudden death at the age of 40, Elizabeth Feldstein described her sensory perception as
follows:
“It’s like all of a sudden a pair of glasses were strapped to my face and I can’t take them
off. Ever. And these glasses make me see the world differently than I did before. The
colors bleed together more vividly. But they are somehow more than they ever were
before. More visceral. More vibrant. More present. Simultaneously more awe-inspiring
and more aching.” (Deerwester, 2019, p.1)
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It is also possible that features of sensory perception may alternate during loss response, perhaps
tracking an oscillatory pattern similar to the one outlined in Stroebe and Schut’s (1999) dual
process model (DPM) of coping in grief (see also Stroebe & Schut, 2001, 2010).
Finally, with respect to shock-like symptoms and their relationship to perception in the
context of loss, changes are not mutually exclusive; they may be neither discretely dulled nor
sharpened, but could be differently altered instead. An example of this—albeit from an extreme
circumstance of loss—is evinced in a soldier’s recounting of his sensory perception following
the realization that his participation in drone warfare may have caused a civilian casualty (taking
the life of a child). After making the drone strike, stepping out into the daylight of the desert
landscape from the bunker where he was stationed, the soldier reported that “The light was too
bright, and the dark places were too dark” (McEvers, 2013). It is therefore possible that in loss
certain aspects of sensory perception may be exaggerated while others are simultaneously
diminished. In this case the contrast of perceptual visual processing was heightened, while the
ability to discern tacit colors and other nuanced visual detail was simultaneously lowered.
Intrasensory Processing
As indicated in some of the shock-like symptoms related to (dis)stress, the perception of
each sense (or intrasensory processing) may be impacted by loss. In severe cases (e.g., in the
context of brain injury, dementia, or nervous system illness) this has been termed agnosia (Greek
for “lack of knowledge”), or “a neurological recognition deficit that affects a single [sensory]
modality” (Burns, 2004, p.1; Freud, 1891/1953; Lissauer, 1890). First described by Finkelnburg
(1870; for translation see Duffy & Liles, 1979) using the term asymbolia (the inability to
understand previously familiar symbols), and also referred to as mindblindness (Munk,
1881/1960), typically agnosia disturbs or disrupts one’s ability to understand, recognize, or
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appreciate the identity or nature of sensory stimuli (e.g., sights, sounds, or somatosensations), but
no specific sense is impaired—only its perception—and there is no significant memory loss (e.g.,
Joseph, 2018; Puente & Tonkonogy, 2009). Thus, agnosia reflects challenges in accurately
assigning meaning to detected stimuli (Bauer, 2006); as Burns (2004) posits: those experiencing
associative agnosia “perceive the stimuli but [are] unable to attach meaning to [it]” (p. 2).
Here it should also be noted that an inaccurate overvaluing of the meaning of sensations
in relationship to one another has been termed apophenia (Conrad, 1958; see also, e.g., Mishara,
2010), and that delusional perceptions have been defined as instances where normal occurrences
are perceived to have special meanings (see, e.g., Martin, 2015). That being said, for the
purposes of this discussion, agnosia is used to refer to any/all perceptual meaning assignment
disparities that possibly relate to or result from grief—including both under- and over-valuations.
In general, grieving individuals have compared agnosia-like perception alterations to
experiencing the world as if “in a fog” (e.g., Hodgson, 2016; Shear et al., 2011). This can even
feel as though one’s sense of gravity has been altered; for example, as one daughter reported
following her mother’s COVID-19-related death in April, 2020: “[I was] crying so hard that it
actually hurt me. I couldn’t hold a thought. I was like, what the hell is wrong with me? Why do I
feel so heavy?” (Fisher et al., 2020). More specifically, Lindemann (1944/1994) documented
gustatory examples of agnosia-like symptoms surrounding loss in an inability to recognize or
appreciate the taste of food, which one griever noted “tastes like sand” (p. 188). Or, as a grieving
mother stated following the death of her 14-year-old daughter: “[I was] so shattered I could not
see my own hand in front of my face” (Starr, 2012, p. 63).
This is not limited to the senses of vestibulation, taste, or sight. For example, Alfred
Wilson described his experience when receiving news of the sudden death of his friend and co-
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worker, Heather Heyer, as follows: “Everything was so quiet…like somebody had shut the
volume control off on the world” (King, 2018). Similar examples may be found across the senses
(e.g., sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. etc.), with variant subtypes categorized within the visual,
auditory, and tactile senses (Bauer, 2006; Burns, 2004), as well as with respect to the perception
of time. Time-perception-related agnosia in relationship to loss is covered at the end of this
chapter.
Agnosia can also be present in social-emotional perception; more broadly, this has been
referred to as emotional, social(-emotional), or expressive agnosia (Joseph, 2018), which may be
grief-influenced and “has only begun…to be described in a systematic manner” (Puente &
Tonkonogy, 2009, p. 21). As related to loss, assessing possible agnosia-like misalignment(s) in
emotional meaning assignation (e.g., with respect to anger, sadness, or other emotions) could be
particularly salient. This may include with respect to gauging the emotional response(s) of others
as well as of oneself (or alexithymia; see Sifneos, 1972, 1973). For example, a new type of
agnosia, affective agnosia, has been described as “an impairment in the ability to mentally
represent…what one is feeling” (Lane et al., 2015, p. 594)—which can apply in grief contexts.
Finally, also noteworthy to the discussion of potential intrasensory alterations in grief is
simultanagnosia, which refers to challenges in appreciating the overall meaning of a complex
picture or stimulus—even though the perception of isolated details within the picture or stimulus
is maintained (see, e.g., Coslett & Saffran, 1991). Although initially identified in relationship to
vision, it could be beneficial to consider possible experiences of simultanagnosia in grief with
respect to other sensory modalities (e.g., hearing, smell, taste, and touch); such a consideration
hints at grief’s potential impacts on the sensorial assemblage requisite to intersensory processing,
which is discussed in the next section.
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Intersensory Processing
Perception through intersensory processing is “something else than” (Koffka, 1935, p.
176) the sum of its intrasensory perceptual processing modalities (e.g., vision, audition,
olfaction, gustation, somatosensation, etc.). The dimensionality of sensory perception may thus
be enhanced when understood in dynamic(al) systems theory (DST) terms. In a DST context,
movement itself is considered to be a separate, additional perceptual system that is essential to
multimodal integration and intersensory coordination. As Thelen and Smith (1994) assert,
“…there is little or no learning or development that is strictly within modality” (p. 194), and
“…intersensory coordination is the very mechanism of development—not a product, but the
process through which intelligent commerce with the world is selected and maintained” (p. 192).
Intersensory selection and maintenance processing may be temporarily affected or in
some way(s) altered in relationship to loss. It is therefore possible that grief-related changes to
the underlying coordination and integration mechanisms of multimodal perceptual processing
point to a source of the “fog” (as noted in the previous section). For example, multisensory
integration’s import to development is illustrated in the requisite collaboration of the perceptual
processing modalities of vision, haptics, and audition (as well as the perception of time, balance,
joint position, and muscle memory) in the integrated discernment of the body’s movement
through (and orientation within) space, or proprioception—also sometimes known as kinesthesia
or “movement sense” (see, e.g., Buonomano, 2017). As Wolbers and Hegarty (2010) note:
“…spatial navigation is particularly complex because it is a multisensory process in which
information needs to be integrated and manipulated over time and space” (p. 138).
But what if one’s self-assessment of one’s perception of one’s own state of conscious
awareness is considered to be uncertain, untrustworthy, or inaccurate (i.e., as if one is “in a
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fog”)? As Freeman (1991) posits, “[Consciousness] enables the brain to plan and prepare for
each subsequent action on the basis of past action, sensory input, and perceptual synthesis….
[Thus,] an act of perception…is a step in a trajectory by which brains grow, reorganize
themselves, and reach into their environment to change it to their own advantage” (p. 85). When
consciousness itself is in question (such as may be the case—even if only episodically,
sporadically, or spasmodically—within a context of loss), then how might such an “advantage”
be impacted: how might this growth or learning trajectory be altered?
Extrasensory Processing
Hallucinations
In contrast to agnosia, when present stimuli are not fully or accurately perceived,
hallucinations involve the perception of absent stimuli. Whereas both are recognition
disturbances (Puente & Tonkonogy, 2009), agnosias are present absences and hallucinations are
absent presences. Hallucinations of the decedent, when the deceased’s presence is (temporarily)
sensed, felt, or perceived, have frequently been reported by those experiencing loss (e.g.,
Baethge, 2002; Sacks, 2012; see also Barbato et al., 1999; Conant, 1992, 1996; Cook &
Dworkin, 1992; Grimby, 1993; Jung, 1969; Kalish & Reynolds, 1973; Marris, 1958/2004; Olson
et al., 1985; Parkes, 1970, 1971; Rees, 1971a, b; for summary see Berger, 1995; Castelnovo et
al., 2015; Cooper, 2017; Krippner, 2006; Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005; Nowatzki & Grant
Kalischuk, 2009; Shear et al., 2011; Streit-Horn, 2011; Troyer, 2014). Datson and Marwit (1997)
have concluded that these occurrences are frequent enough “to be considered a relatively normal
correlate of bereavement” (p. 132).
Hallucinations in bereavement and related phenomena have alternately been termed
“post-death encounters or events” (PDE’s; Nowatzki & Grant Kalischuk, 2009), “after-death
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communications” (ADC’s; Guggenheim & Guggenheim, 1995; Streit-Horn, 2011); “post-death
contacts” (Kalish & Reynolds, 1973, Klugman, 2006; Troyer, 2018), “sensing the presence” or
“sense-of-presence” (Conant, 1992, 1996; Marris, 1958/2004; Simon-Buller et al., 1989; Rees
1971a, b; Steffen & Coyle, 2010, 2011, 2012), “post-bereavement hallucinatory experiences”
(Castelnovo et al., 2015), “extraordinary experiences or encounters” (LaGrand, 2005; Parker,
2005); “perceived presences of deceased loved ones” (Datson & Marwit, 1997), “hallucinatory
wishful psychoses” (Freud, 1917/1957), “hauntings” (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005) and
“perceptual ‘sets’ of the lost person” (Parkes, 1970). Irrespective of terminological differences,
these experiences: 1) are not accompanied by psychotic symptoms (e.g., Krippner, 2006; Troyer,
2014); 2) are often considered indicators of the bereaved person’s absence-mindedness, or
preoccupation and strong yearning to be with the person who died (e.g., Conant, 1992, 1996;
Gilbert, 2006; Lindemann, 1944/1994; Parkes, 1970; Rando, 1988; Sacks, 2012; Schnell, 2004);
and 3) are typically thought to be normal responses in the context of significant loss due to
human death (Klass et al., 1996/2014; Worden, 2009; see also, e.g., Parkes, 1970; for summary
see Datson & Marwit, 1997).
PDE’s can involve auditory, visual, olfactory, tactile, and/or “sense of presence”
perceptions of the decedent (Barbato et al., 1999). They may also have kinesthetic features, or
“sensations such as falling or floating, sometimes experienced as out-of-body-experiences”
(Soffer-Dudek & Shahar, 2009, p. 892).
Baethge (2002) notes that grief (also alternately termed bereavement or postbereavement) hallucinations: 1) are normally present in only one sensory modality; 2) may
persist for years or even decades; 3) are more often seen as comforting, but in rare instances may
be viewed as stress-inducing (or even dangerous); and 4) “…probably comprise a heterogeneous
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group of disturbances of perception and thought processes” (p. 296). Relatedly, bereavement
hallucinations are often “deeply tied to emotional needs and feelings [and] tend to be
unforgettable…” (Sacks, 2012, p. 233); for many, they can also be “comforting and [even]
transformative” (Krippner, 2006, p. 176).
The healthfulness of hallucinations surrounding loss—as well as their possible link to
psychological distress—has been debated (e.g., Castelnovo et al., 2015; Hagman, 2001; Kamp et
al., 2019; LaGrand, 2005; Parker, 2005; Pollock, 1987; Volkan, 1974; Volkan & Zintl,
1993/2015; for summary see Datson & Marwit, 1997; Steffen & Coyle, 2012), but most often
they are seen as having therapeutic utility (e.g., Cooper, 2017; Krippner, 2006; Nowatzki &
Grant Kalischuk, 2009; Steffen & Coyle, 2010, 2011; Streit-Horn, 2011; Troyer, 2014). For
example, Jayson Greene recounts experiencing the presence of his 2-year-old daughter, Greta—
some months after she died (when a loose brick fell from an 8th-story windowsill above her,
striking her in the head)—as follows:
She stepped out from behind a tree, and I was deeply aware that no one else could see her
but me, but yet I ran over to her because it was so overwhelmingly real, and I picked her
up, and she told me to go for my run. And so I ran into the park and tears were just
coming down my face, and I got to the edge of the park, and that is where I wrote down
this sentence: “There will be more light upon this earth for me.” (Neary, 2019; see also
Greene, 2019, pp. 82-83)
Terminology identifying survivor perceptions of the decedent post-death is often
overlapping, with some researchers discriminating bereavement hallucinations from illusions—
which include instances where survivors report having sensed the “felt presence” of the decedent
“…even in the absence of any visual, auditory, tactile, or olfactory perception” (Castelnovo et
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al., 2015, p. 271; see also Baethge, 2002; Conant, 1992, 1996; Rees, 1971a, b). With respect to
term differentiation, Conant (1996) notes that although “The vividness of the experience amazed
[the widows interviewed],” and “The comparison to hallucinations was voiced spontaneously
five times,” these widows emphasized that their experiences “were not hallucinations” (p. 186).
Given their reluctance to apply this term, and its relationship to the possible
stigmatization of those who report having had hallucinations (see, e.g., Barbato et al., 1999;
Stevenson, 1983), Krippner (2006) stresses the importance of classifying these as “‘experiences’
(subjective verbal reports) [rather] than as ‘events’ (verifiable outcomes and activities)” (p. 177;
for more regarding the discussion of controversial and/or sensitive phenomena, see also Glik,
1992; Grimby, 1993; Streit-Horn, 2011; Zusne, 1985; Zusne & Jones, 1989/2014). As
Castelnovo et al. (2015) have asserted, “…the [precise] phenomenological nature of these
experiences remains elusive… ranging from hallucinations, pseudo-hallucinations, [and]
illusions, [to] felt-presences” (p. 271).
Oliver Sacks (2012) describes an additional type of grief-related illusion, one where
bereaved individuals mistake, often fleetingly (perhaps at a distance and/or in a crowd), someone
else for the person who died. He suspects his own illusory experiences of this sort were related to
a state of “hyper-alertness [and] unconscious searching” (p. 231) for his mother over a period of
months following her death, and contrasts these sorts of illusions with bereavement
hallucinations—noting the following example, wherein Marion C., a psychoanalyst, recounts a
(pseudo-) hallucinatory experience of her husband, Paul, after his death:
One evening I came home from work as always to our big empty house…. Paul…greeted
me in his familiar way: “‘Hello! You’re back! Hi!’ His voice was clear and strong and
true; just the way it was when he was well. I ‘heard’ it…, I ‘saw’ him, I ‘saw’ the
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expression on his face…, I ‘saw’ him greet me. That part was like one sees in a dream; as
if I were seeing a picture or a movie of an event. But the speech was live and real. (p. 232)
Although her recollection of the aural portion of the experience better meets hallucinatory criteria,
Marion’s recounting of her visual memory as “like one sees in a dream” is more akin to sleeprelated sensory perceptions—including dreams—which are discussed in the next sections.
Dreams
Scientific understandings of why we dream vary considerably (Olsen et al., 2016), and
theories regarding their purpose are wide-ranging, from “Jung’s…theory of dream function, a
dynamic, open-system approach… to Freud’s mechanistic, drive-reduction model… sprinkled
together with a Darwinian emphasis on adaptation as environmental mastery” (Dallett & Deese,
1973, p. 408). Similarly, perspectives on dreams in the context of loss response are varied,
including analyses of their content with respect to loss-related cognitive schemas for complicated
grievers (Germain et al., 2013) as well as their (possible) therapeutic utility (see, e.g., Black et
al., 2014; Cook & Dworkin, 1992; Garfield, 1996, 1997; Moss, 2005; Nicholson, 2016; Noronha,
2014; Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005; Wray & Price, 2005; see also Parkes, 1970 on the role of
dreams as part of an ongoing effort to recover a lost “object”—that of the relationship to a
deceased loved one).
For many, dream content in grief may focus on the survivor’s memories of—and/or their
ongoing relationship with—the decedent. An example from Sobol (2017) is as follows:
I dream that I press the button on the old telephone answering machine and I am
surprised to hear my father's voice, saying my name, just the two syllables of my name
but in a long, drawn-out, plaintive tone. I feel guilty and apprehensive—is he ok? Why
have I forgotten to call him, it feels like an awfully long time—and I try to call him back
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but I'm ashamed to realize I've forgotten the number. I go frantically rummaging through
every drawer in the bedroom, and as I do I look at the furniture—the old bedroom suite
that they got when they were first married, a chair from Pier One, the wall to wall carpet,
bits and pieces left over from their lives that I know we will have to somehow dispose of,
and somehow the button on the answering machine is pressed again and I hear my father
leaving a long slightly surreal and inconsequentially rambling message that sounds
something like, "Hello? Everybody? I'm here at this resort, and it's a last resort, and
they're taking pretty good care of us, there's plenty to eat and they keep us entertained. It's
like a cruise but we aren't going anywhere and it's comfortable enough but I miss our old
friends. They keep us busy. Does anyone think about me? There's always things to read,
and the weather's pretty good, and I will die some day. I just wanted to say hello. Bye bye
for now." And the message machine issues its long conclusive beep, and I suddenly
realize, oh yes—he really IS dead. And I wake up, alone in my bed, in Barry, in Wales, in
September, 2017. He would have been 95 this month. RIP, Dad.
My personal recollection of a dream about my maternal grandfather (Childress, 1992)
features a conspicuous component of emotional expression:
Last night I dreamt that I saw my grandfather for the first time since he died nearly 10
years ago. I was with another man, perhaps not so old as my grandfather. I knew they
were friends, and I knew that this man was taking me to see my grandfather. I also knew
that my grandfather was dead, even in the dream. We were outside the funeral home
where my grandfather used to work. The other man led me around the corner of the
building and there he was. My grandfather greeted the other man and shook his hand.
Then he turned slowly to me. Smiling, he said “Son.” I ran to him and embraced him. I
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could feel the coarseness of his black wool suit, the chain of his pocket watch draped
across his vest. I breathed in, smelling once again the shoe polish and starch, the hard
soap and peppermint candy. To me this was the essence of all things old and wise…. I
wept uncontrollably, more so than I did the day he died, at his funeral, or any time since.
I sobbed into his coat, crying so loudly that I awoke from the dream…. Though he lived
90 years this is all that I have…a glimpse in a dream eclipsed by the sheer joy of
experiencing even that much.
Others may perceive dreaming differently when grieving. For example, there are some
individuals who report a sort of consciousness inversion surrounding a significant loss; in these
cases reality is perceived more as a nightmare, one from which they are certain they will soon
awaken. Larry Treadwell reported such an experience following the sudden death of his wife,
Amanda: “I was convinced it was just a bad dream, and I argued with people…I was like, there's
no way this is real. I'm gonna wake up here in a minute" (McEvers, 2017). Similarly, Parkes
(1970) recounted the words of a recently widowed Londoner who stated: “I feel this is a different
life…as if there’s another life going on somewhere else and I’ll wake up” (p.457).
Musician Peter Gabriel (1998/2002) captures the interplay between dreaming and awake
during grief somewhat differently in the lyric to his song I Grieve: “Did I dream this belief / Or
did I believe this dream?” (from the album Up), and the novelist Donna Tartt (2013) describes a
son’s (mostly) asleep experience of his dead mother as a “mysterious dream that felt more like a
visitation” (p. 8). Such perceptions of dreams—how realistic they seem and their possible
intrusion into waking life (see Solms, 1997/2014; for summary see also Domhoff, 2003)—may
relate to threshold consciousness and transliminality (see subsequent sections).
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Although interesting to consider in relationship to maladaptive grief (e.g., Germain et al.,
2013), for the purposes of the posited framework, dream content is mainly considered from a
processing perspective—with particular emphasis on the possibility that “dreams [may] function
to balance and complete waking consciousness” (Dallett & Deese, 1973, p. 408) or attempt “to
restore through the unconscious what has not been satisfied in waking life” (Rochlin, 1965). This
relates to the next category of perception, that of threshold consciousness, which has similarities
with the perceptual processing of hallucinations as well (see previous section).
Threshold Consciousness
Often referred to as “half-asleep” (hypnagogia) or “half-awake” (hypnopompia), the
transitional states of threshold consciousness can include the related mental phenomena of
hallucinations, waking and/or lucid dreaming (see previous sections), and sleep paralysis (see,
e.g., Mavromatis, 1987; Ohayon et al., 1996; Schacter & Hernstein, 1976; Sherwood, 2000).
Hypnagogia refers to the transitional state of decreased wakefulness (Maury, 1848; Müller,
1826/1967, 1848; see also Vihvelin, 1948), or “the drowsy interval between waking and
sleeping” (Schacter & Hernstein, 1976, p. 452). Its mirror image, hypnopompia, is the state of
consciousness leading out of sleep (Myers, 1903/1918). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H)
hallucinations have been categorized as visual, auditory, and/or felt-presence (McCarthy-Jones et
al., 2011), and primarily differ from hallucinations/PDE’s in that they do not occur in a state of
(full) wakefulness (Waters et al., 2016).
It should be noted that although the terms hypnagogia and hypnopompia are often
conflated, they differ phenomenologically (Warren, 2007). Whereas a hypnagogic state is
typically a rational cognition in wakefulness, focused on making sense of non-linear images and
associations; hypnopompic states are more emotional and dream-like in nature, focusing on
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sense-making in relation to real-world stolidity (Warren, 2007; Waters et al., 2016). Irrespective
of their differences, disentangling these twilight states may sometimes be challenging,
particularly in instances when sleep is briefly interrupted and subsequently re-instigated. In these
situations, differentiation from remnants of dream imagery can also be difficult (see, e.g., Vaitl et
al., 2005; Waters et al., 2016).
In the context of loss response, threshold consciousness phenomena are salient in several
ways: 1) Response to loss may interfere in hypnagogic states, impairing their utility in enabling
the onset of sleep and possibly resulting in sleep deprivation. 2) Similar to the previous section
on dreams, the content of hallucinations/PDE’s (in this case during hypnagogic and
hypnopompic states) may relate to the person who died. 3) The quality and duration of
hypnopompic states bears additional scrutiny during loss response. This is evinced by the wavelike realization—on/during awakening—of (remembering) the reality of the loss. As Bowler
(2018) recounts after being diagnosed with cancer:
Ever since the diagnosis, there has been a moment, in the minute between sleeping and
waking, when I forget, when I have only a lingering sense that there is something that I
am supposed to remember. In the warmth of my bed, I am caught in webs of dreams. And
then there is the flood. I am dying. I am dying. I am dying. I am my son’s first goodbye.
(p. 66)
Moving from unconsciousness (during sleep) to consciousness (when awake), the felt
magnitude of the impact of (re-)realizing the loss typically attenuates over time, and the duration
of the (re)realization process usually contracts. The process can, however, contribute to the
possible occurrence(s) of: sleep inertia, or “decreased performance and/or disorientation
occurring immediately after awakening from sleep” (Tassi & Muzet, 2000, p. 341); para- and/or
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dyssomnias (Waters et al., 2016); and other sleep-related disturbances (see, e.g., Chirinos et al.,
2019). It should also be noted that although the precise impacts of grief on dream quality are not
precisely known (see previous section), it is possible that dream quantity suffers due to loss
response’s negative impacts on sleep duration (due to interruption) by influencing the H&H
states of threshold consciousness (for an assessment of the possible impacts of auditory/visual
intrusive thoughts on H&H modalities, see, e.g., McCarthy-Jones et al., 2011).
Lastly, it must also be mentioned that for some grievers moments of threshold
consciousness can be very meaningful. As John Bare (2020) recounted following his wife’s
death: “During the night and early mornings, in the state between asleep and awake, Betsy and I
still talk. In our bed, I reach over and rub her arm. I wake up stroking a pillow. I am grateful for
these encounters” (p. 1).
Transliminality
Transliminality refers to “differences in the threshold at which unconscious processes or
external stimuli enter into consciousness” (Fleck et al., 2008, p. 1353; see also Thalbourne &
Houran, 2000; Thalbourne & Maltby, 2008). Anticipated by James (1902/1982), and for which
there is a measurement scale (Lange et al., 2000), transliminality also relates to alteredconsciousness tendencies, which may include Watson’s (2001) construct sleep-related
experiences (SRE’s). SRE’s encompass “…a variety of…altered-consciousness phenomena,
such as nightmares, narcoleptic characteristics, recurring dreams, dream recall, vivid dreams,
problem-solving dreams, [and] dreams confused with reality or ‘waking dreams’” (Soffer-Dudek
& Shahar, 2009, p. 891).
Thus, transliminal experiences in the context of loss response refer to a range of possible
grief-related changes in the interplay between unconscious and conscious sensory-perceptual
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processing. As such, transliminality aptly summarizes both the challenge of discerning states of
(un)consciousness in grief (as outlined above; note sections on dreams; hallucinations, PDE’s,
and illusions; and threshold consciousness) and their possible relationship to an experience of
enlightenment—what some have termed “magical thinking” (see, e.g., Krippner, 2006; Zusne,
1985; Zusne & Jones, 1989/2014) or a “mystical state of consciousness” (Teasdale, 2019)
surrounding loss (see also Didion, 2005).
Time
Previously noted above (in the section on shock) as a perceptual disturbance symptom of
acute dissociative reactions to stressful events (APA, 2013)—as well as in the section on
intrasensory processing—the perception of time (sometimes termed chronoception, perceived
duration, or temporal awareness; e.g., Brown, 1985; Le Poidevin, 2011; Phillips, 2010; PrietoGonzález et al., 2014) may feel altered in response to loss. These distortions have been referred
to as temporal illusions (e.g., Allen & Gibbon, 1994; Nakajima et al., 1991). Although posited in
DSM-5 (APA, 2013) as being experienced as slowing in the context of (dis)stress, agnosia-like
changes to one’s sense of time during grief may also include its perceived acceleration and/or
(perhaps more commonly) an inability to accurately gauge time’s passage at all, a disengagement
from the tracking of it—what Greene (2019) describes as being “…in the time that is no time”
(p. 16).
For example, Neimeyer and Anderson (2002) note that “time itself seems to have
shrunken” (p. 45) for Helen, 32, following the death of her infant daughter; as Helen states: “I
have learned that we can’t live in the past, nor in the future…. We must only live in the present”
(p. 46). Regarding potential negative impacts of these alterations, consider the known adverse
effects of circadian clock misalignment(s), such as jet lag (e.g., McHill, 2020; Sack et al., 2007).

35

The import of a “time-locked” understanding of development’s construal in dynamic(al)
systems theory (DST), where it is linked to the exact circumstances of “when” each experience
occurs, should also be considered in relationship to loss. In DST, ontogenetic processes are a
coordinated relationship between/among past experience(s) and current perceptual context
(Thelen & Smith, 1994; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991). Developmental processing is therefore more
about “through which” (an integrative and ongoing process) than it is about exactly “where” (a
specified location or “seat of sensation” for sensory perception). Thus, within a DST framework
one is not looking for a precise place where the developmental mechanism of
sensation/perception resides, but more for a process that is “time-locked” to the exact
circumstances of each moment of experience. In DST terms, then, every moment reveals the
history of past experiences and contributes to the pattern of future ones (Thelen & Ulrich, 1991;
see also Clark, 2013; Thelen & Smith, 1994); but what if time itself is perceived as being out of
sync (also note previous discussion of intersensory information perception, above)? What are the
possible (negative) developmental impacts of grief-related dyssynchrony?
Buonomano (2017) asserts that there is no known, consolidating mechanism in the
human brain for sensing/perceiving time: “Unlike vision or hearing, we do not have a sensory
organ that detects time” (p. 21). Instead there are multiple “clocks” for different purposes. It is
possible, then, that the exact circumstances of a death may exert particular influence on the
perception of time vis-à-vis one or more of these clocks, depending on expectancies and other
factors—such as when a child dies before a parent (typically a less-expected or “nonnormative”
event [Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002], and one often resulting in an outcome of more
complicated bereavement [see, e.g., Craig, 1977; de Vries et al., 1997; Miles & Crandall, 1983;
Rubin, 1993; Sanders, 1980]). That being said, little is known regarding the precise impact(s) of
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loss response on the perception of time, such as whether or not the mind/body may have any sort
of specific, built-in clock that is designated to in some way respond to and/or track time
(differently) in relationship to the death of a significant other.
Chapter 2 Summary
For survivors, if the death of a loved one is viewed as the doorway between the
experience of life prior to and then after loss, then grief is the threshold of this door. Perception
at and around this threshold can seem unfamiliar, or even feel unreal, in multiple ways. For
example, Jayson Greene (2019) describes waiting with family and friends at the hospital
following his daughter’s tragic accident: “We know Greta is going to die…[and] glance around
us, realizing this is the last we’ll ever see of the world as we’ve known it. Whatever comes next
will raze everything to the ground” (p. 13); later, he describes her death as a “rip in the universe”
(p. 77). Similarly, soon after his father died, Freud wrote of feeling “quite uprooted” (Freud et
al., 1985, p. 202), and Grossman (2014) has posited that subsequent to a significant loss “…all
that is will now echo what is not” (p. 51). Or, as K.T. Nicolaides recounted following the sudden
death of her husband, Aaron: "I can feel around me that he's not here, and I know he's not
coming back, but it's not quite real yet." (McEvers, 2017, emphasis added). And, finally, as
described another way by Handler (1999):
It is a curious thing, the death of a loved one. We all know that our time in this world is
limited, and that eventually all of us will end up underneath some sheet, never to wake
up. And yet it is always a surprise when it happens to someone we know. It is like
walking up the stairs to your bedroom in the dark, and thinking there is one more stair
than there is. Your foot falls down, through the air, and there is a sickly moment of dark
surprise as you try and readjust the way you thought of things. (pp. 96-97)
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In responding to loss, this “moment of dark surprise” can sometimes seem to feel both
magnified and protracted. It may be more akin to (but not necessarily exactly like) the queasy,
kinesthetic sensation felt when descending rapidly in an elevator, except in this case the floor of
destination is not known; thus, the duration of the sense of unease is likewise indeterminate.
Such alterations in perception may relate to what leads many grieving individuals to later
report that they thought they were “going crazy” or “losing their minds” (e.g., Cook & Dworkin,
1992; DeFrain, 1991; Rando, 1988; see also Didion, 2005). Although likely operating along a
continuum (from less to more severe symptomatology), and/or possibly oscillating in a wave-like
pattern (more similar to DPM; see Stroebe & Schut, 1999, 2001, 2010), this feeling of psychosis,
of a marked departure from reality or “life circumstance that ruptures one’s previous ability to
make sense of the world” (Schwartzberg, 1993, p. 489), has in this chapter been addressed at the
fundamental level of sensorial interpretation or perception.
As a thresholding experience (designating the liminal space between the reality with—
and then the reality without—the prospect of again encountering the actual embodied presence of
the person who has died), response to loss may involve multiple (re)adjustments to how the
world is perceived and experienced. For example, Greene (2019) notes that “…time passes
mostly soundlessly. There are days when I am confused, panicked, like I’ve woken up in a dark
room with unfamiliar contours” (p. 73). Sensing what is real and what is not; what is conscious
awareness and what is not; what are dreams, hallucinations, or illusions and what are not; what is
recognizable and what is not; what is asleep and what is awake; what is present and what is
absent; even what is time and knowing how much time has elapsed: all of these processes are
potentially impacted in response to loss. There can also be emergent alterations in the gradations
of how what “is” is experienced with respect to perceptual processing during grief, with some
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perceptions seeming to be more or less valued in terms of the meaning(s) assigned to them than
was the case before the loss occurred; these changes, for example, may include agnosia-like grief
symptoms in intrasensory and affective perception.
Though of uncertain sufficiency, visuospatial dysgnosia—the loss of a sense of “whereness” in the relationship between oneself and one’s environment “…and in the relation of objects
to each other” (Cogan, 1979, p. 367)—is perhaps an apt term to more generally summarize these
possible changes in perceptual perspective when grieving. This relates to topographical
disorientation, or difficulty finding one’s way in the environment (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999;
Habib & Sirigu, 1987), which is the topic of the next chapter, orientation.
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Chapter 3. Orientation
In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty…. (Freud, 1917/1957, p.
245)
The collaboration of experience and context in (re)connecting the grieving individual to
their environment, now in the absence rather than in the physical presence of their loved one, is
herein referred to as orientation. As noted in the previous chapter, the perception of time and
space—including the stimuli therein, and the rudimentary navigation thereof—can seem
unfamiliar (or even feel permanently altered) following significant loss. Whereas the last chapter
on perception emphasized sensory perceptual processing in grief, this chapter emphasizes
perspectives developed, at least in part, through those sensory perceptions across space and time.
The contextual absence resulting from significant loss is such that survivor perspectives on how
to orient themselves within and to navigate previously familiar experiences, as well as new ones,
may now seem challenging—or (at a minimum) can feel quite different.
Often linked to visuospatial dysgnosia (or the loss of a sense of “whereness” relative to
oneself and one’s surroundings, as well as with respect to the relationship of objects to each
other; Cogan, 1979), an inability to orient oneself to one’s environment has also been termed
topographical disorientation (a.k.a., topographical agnosia or topographagnosia). This chapter
relates more to the latter, topographical disorientation (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999; Habib &
Sirigu, 1987), which is normally the result of focal brain injury. For the purposes of this
discussion, however, its etiology is traced to the impact(s) of loss, its symptomatological
ramifications are usually much less severe, and they typically attenuate over time.
Following the death of a significant other, a new sense of orientation or post-loss
worldview is redeveloped. This redevelopment process progressively “emerges from the
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cooperative interactions of multiple components within a facilitating context” (Thelen & Ulrich,
1991, p. v); these include: 1) what is perceived; 2) the contextual salience of when, where, and
how this perception occurs; and 3) how similar, related, or other relevant perceptions may have
been experienced in the past. As Titelman et al. (2011) posit: “Immediate experience is seen as a
domain in which [a] fusion of the present and the past as well as the organization of human
experience takes place” (p. 296). This fusion, which is continuously updated, is an emergent
(re)mapped perspective of the grieving individual’s relationship to their environment.
Orientation is perhaps better understood, then, in dynamic(al) systems theory (DST)
terms (Thelen, 1992; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991; for brief summary see also
Dixon, 2015): “where” the griever “is” (their situatedness) is redeveloped within the context of
significant loss. This process occurs relationally, is collaborative, and “develops from the
confluence of many participating elements” (Thelen & Ulrich, 1991, p. vi). Now, in a context
that is absent their loved one, a sense of “where” the griever “is” must be reconstrued through the
experience of movement through time/space, a perception-action loop in DST terms (Thelen &
Smith, 1994; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991). For those experiencing significant loss, this loop may need
recalibrating. Thus, the way is in the finding.
Learning therefore occurs “…by perceptually exploring the world” (Thelen & Smith,
1994, p. 170). As Attig (2001) has asserted: “…grieving involves nothing less than relearning the
world of our experience” (p. 33). Just as sensation is typically considered essential to perception,
way-finding (how individuals find their bearings and begin again to navigate their environments)
is integral to orientation. That being said, here it is important to recall the relationship between
orientation and perception: in grief, possible changes to the latter (as outlined in Chapter 2, on
perception/sense-making) can be challenging to orientation/way-finding—and vice-versa.
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Alterations in way-finding during loss response are illustrated in allocentric (object to
object) and egocentric (self-to-object) spatial coding systems (see Figure 2). Often the decedent
would have been pivotal to each of these coding systems, as well as to their integration.
Figure 2
Allocentric and Egocentric Spatial Coding Systems

Note. See Mental Imagery and Human-Computer Interaction Lab (2021)
The integration of allocentric and egocentric perspectives echoes the prior discussion of
macropsia (also known as megalopia) in the previous chapter. Macropsia, one of the shock-like
symptoms impacting sensory processing, is a neurological condition influencing visual perception.
In general, with macropsia objects in the visual field seem larger than normal. This may cause the
perceiver to feel smaller than in actuality. Specifically in the context of loss, however, Lindemann
(1944/1994) notes an alternate report of micropsia-like symptoms, wherein objects appear smaller
than normal; thus, the person may feel larger than is actually the case.
In and through loss, how these “dualing” or bi-fold perspectives of macro/micropsia are
reconciled may relate to the integration of allocentric and egocentric spatial coding systems.
Surrounding the loss of a significant other due to death, a previously prominent point of
reference or landmark is now absent; in this absence spatial interpretation can be(come) (more)
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complicated, particularly with regard to gauging distance—which is also pivotal in order to
accurately interpret the size of objects and/or of individuals within the visual field. Grieving
individuals may therefore feel orientationally challenged in this unfamiliar environment.
As an illustration, consider the immediate, felt impacts of experiencing a world absent
virtually all important, known landmarks, such as is the case in the world’s largest salt flat (the
Salar de Uyuni, in southwestern Bolivia). A prehistoric lake (now a massive layer of salt crust
which sits two miles above sea level and covers approximately 4,000 square miles) the Salar has
been described as “one of the most savage and surreal destinations on earth” (Frank, 2014, p. 1).
[It is also the location where the final battle sequence in Star Wars: The Last Jedi (Johnson,
2017) was filmed.] This vast, void landscape enables what would otherwise be thought of as
“trick” photographic methods (e.g., telephoto lenses), but in the Salar no tricks are needed. The
absence of access to immediately interpretable visual information (at the horizon and otherwise)
makes precise spatial discernment difficult; people and objects can easily seem larger and/or
smaller than they actually are (see photographs in Figure 3). Judging the distance between
objects is likewise challenging, which also negatively impacts the interpretation of how much
time it takes to traverse the landscape from one point to another.
Figure 3
Two “Challenging” Perspectives from the Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia
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Typically taken in jest (and generally interpretable with accuracy after a moment’s
pause), these photographs are obviously not included here as precise representations of what it
may or may not exactly be like to experience the world through the lens of loss. However, the
surreal nature of such images hints at the challenges that might be involved in (re)calibrating and
subsequently navigating one’s environment after the loss of a significant other. Orientation and
navigation are harder in the absence of important landmarks (Van der Ham et al., 2017), such as
may be the case following the loss of a loved one. These situations could be similar to the
navigational impairment experienced by those with landmark agnosia, or an inability to
recognize salient environmental stimuli (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999; Van der Ham et al., 2017).
Not only can the sense of “where-ness” seem to be altered in grief (similar to visuospatial
dysgnosia), but “when-ness” surrounding loss may also feel changed (similar to
dyschronometria—and possibly exacerbating topographical disorientation). Perspectives on
motion and speed, on knowing how much time it should/will take to get from one place to
another, are difficult to gauge when information regarding the distance between objects is either
not clearly evident or is considered to possibly be untrustworthy. Additional data points are
needed for more accurate spatial and temporal interpolation. The resulting uncertainness may
serve to influence one’s sense of the passage of time in general—even in the absence of
movement through space, but also with respect to movement through spaces previously
considered familiar (see also section on time at the end of the previous chapter on perception).
An additional example is available by way of a tool that is indispensable in the Salar de
Uyuni, Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation (see, e.g., Grewal et al., 2007). Given the
wide availability of these technological tools today, including in many vehicles and smartphone
apps, GPS navigation software is now a familiar and accessible aid to guide drivers/travelers
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between and among locations. As was the case with the Salar de Uyuni depiction above, it must
be noted that the following GPS illustration is intended to be analogous—but is by no means
necessarily equivalent—to how it may feel to orient oneself within and begin to navigate one’s
world following on loss.
Using satellite-based information to interpolate exact location/direction, GPS
navigational guidance is typically interfaced from an egocentric orientation (i.e., from the
“driver’s” perspective). Landmarks are not always provided, and the “navigator” (or voice
thereof) advises the driver through the provision of basic directional instructions (e.g., “in 500
feet turn left onto Smith Boulevard…”). On-screen visuals may be available, but often these may
include only rudimentary information, similar to that which is provided audibly.
Thus, albeit enabling, at best navigation with GPS can still feel somewhat constricting.
Although landmarks are sometimes absent or missing, with patient persistence it is usually
possible to reach one’s desired destination. At worst, however, grief can be thought of as
potentially altering GPS navigation; it can seem as if the satellite signal (needed for determining
position and enabling navigation) is unavailable or intermittent, important landmarks may be
missing, and key roads are either permanently closed or are suddenly under construction. In this
sense, it can seem as though loss leads to lost.
There may be times, for example, when the driver (in this case the griever) is slow in
responding, and is unable to make a turn in time—as directed by the GPS software. This can feel
similar to instances when the navigator provides allocentric rather than egocentric information
(e.g., “go northwest on Smith Boulevard,” rather than “turn left…”), which may be
uninterpretable. [Interestingly, most GPS navigation systems technically differ from compasses:
with GPS, movement is typically required to accurately determine location/direction.] Or, in the
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context of grief, the navigator may seem to be suddenly, inexplicably speaking in a British rather
than North American dialect (or vice-versa), or seemingly be speaking in another language
altogether. In GPS-terms, these grief-related complicating factors may result in the navigation
device’s repeated refrain of “recalculating” and/or “make a U-turn as soon as possible.” Of
course, the recalculating may never resolve and/or the U-turn(s) may in the end be unhelpful,
making it sometimes seem as though the griever is “driving in circles.”
Estimated arrival times must likewise be recalculated, and—irrespective of actual trip
duration—on arrival it can seem like it took longer. The driver/griever may feel weary from what
once was an inconsequential journey, or the destination may simply be unreachable (at least for
the time being). As Jayson Greene (2019) recounted following on his young daughter Greta’s
death: “I only have to close my eyes and peer inside to find the repaved roads, the hazard cones
and blocked-off exits…” (p. 229). In short, with loss-impacted GPS navigation the griever can
sometimes (still) feel lost.
Several caveats are noteworthy here: 1) As mentioned in the previous chapter on
perception, in some circumstances (certain aspects of) the grieving individual’s sense of
orientation may seem to be enhanced following a loss. For example, this can be the case after
situations of a protracted and/or painful terminal illness, wherein relief from the (dis)stress(es) of
caregiving seems to improve the griever’s sense of orientation (i.e., “a weight has been lifted”).
2) It is possible that encountering objects or spaces associated with a deceased loved one may
serve to scramble a survivor’s perspective of the post-loss environment, often by prompting
intense remembering or “flooding.” Greene (2019) terms these objects the “physical facts of [the
decedent’s] life” (p. 36), and the experience of such spaces as being one of “terminal stillness”
(p. 50); after his daughter died, he noted: “Everywhere I look, I am blinded by her” (p. 55). And
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3) Although it is tempting to make more obvious analogous connections (which can be helpful),
viewing the decedent’s post-loss navigational role should also be considered in more complex
ways. For example, whereas thinking of the loss as “losing satellite signal” (which is essential to
orientation and navigation) can be useful, it is not the only way to consider it. It could be more
like a previously pivotal landmark is now missing; or, alternately, it may be worthwhile to think
of loss as having closed certain routes that were previously available but are now under
construction—or are perhaps now permanently closed. This is reflected in the allocentric and
egocentric spatial coding systems model: viewing the deceased as having been an integral
“object” in the allocentric perspective (which is now missing) is not necessarily complete. The
person who died may be a key part of the survivor’s sense of identity from an egocentric
viewpoint as well. Also, the decedent may or may not still be allocentrically represented as an
illusion, hallucination, or other post-death experience (PDE), and may be reflected in memoryladen physical objects and spaces (see, e.g., #2 above).
Furthermore, it must be noted that the use of the GPS navigation analogy for
understanding orientation/way-finding surrounding loss should not be limited to spatial and
temporal contexts. Just as there are social and emotional understandings of agnosia with respect
to perception, these components (as well as behavioral aspects) are potentially important and
should be considered with respect to orientation. For example, possible challenges and/or
changes following loss may leave survivors feeling socially and emotionally isolated or
otherwise unmoored. Navigating interactions at these intersections can be more difficult, and
possibly even more important, than physical locational way-finding. Of course, it also bears
noting that some social and emotional connections can be, and often are, enhanced following a
significant loss due to human death.
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Chapter 3 Summary
Returning to the threshold metaphor from the previous chapter summary (viewing the
death of a loved one as a doorway between the experience of life before and after loss, with grief
as the threshold of this door), not only can perceptions at this threshold seem unfamiliar, or even
unreal, but perspectives on the post-loss world from this threshold may also feel disorientingly
different. This chapter has therefore focused on orientation, which generally refers to the
collaborative way-finding processing of experience that occurs as grieving individuals (re)adjust
to and (re)acquire knowledge about the environment just beyond—and then further outside—the
range of their more immediate sensory perception.
More specifically, orientation designates possible shifts in perspective that can initially
result in an inability to accurately discern size (e.g., macro/micropsia). These shifts (may) relate
to ego/allocentric frames of reference, with landmarks being essential to both in order for
grieving individuals to appropriately interpolate distance(s) and subsequently “(re)map” or “find
their bearings” in a post-loss environment—both spatially and temporally.
The physical absence of their loved one can make the way-finding requisite to this
(re)mapping challenging. As Parkes (1970) notes: “Grief…is a complex and time-consuming
process in which a person gradually changes their view of the world and the places and habits by
means of which they orientate and relate to it” (p. 465). It may be helpful to liken the processing
involved to a loss-impacted GPS navigation system, one wherein the user must re-learn routes
(from an egocentric perspective) in order to (re)establish important landmarks (part of an
allocentric perspective) and subsequently (re)develop an integrated, functional, map-like
representation of their environment (what has been termed an exocentric perspective). In
exocentric space, “…spatial relations between objects within the environment, including the
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observer, are emphasized” (Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1999, p. 1614, italics added; see also Taylor
& Tversky, 1992).
The construal of this new, post-loss map of the world (or orientation) is not limited to
physical dimensionality (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Tolman, 1948), but can include social
(Jameson, 1988), emotional (Flatley, 2008), and behavioral (Ittelson et al., 1970) dimensions as
well. That being said, having (access to) a map and going somewhere are not the same: it is one
thing for someone to have an idea of where one is, and another to have a sense of where one
might want to go. Put another way, orientation is more like a frame of reference than a point of
view; this leads directly to a discussion of the third and final component of the loss-processing
framework, direction.
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Chapter 4. Direction
When we are no longer able to change a situation…we are challenged to change
ourselves. (Frankl, 1946/1984, p. 135)
Similar to meaning (re)construction in existing grief theory (e.g., Gillies & Neimeyer,
2006; Neimeyer, 2001a)—which has also been termed meaning(-)making (e.g., Neimeyer, 2005;
Uren & Wastell, 2002)—direction herein refers to post-loss processing that seeks, with the
prospect of finding, something positive and purposeful through grief. Meaning-making in loss
has previously been operationalized to include one or more of the following facets: making sense
of the loss, benefit-finding, identity change, purpose in life, and life significance (see, e.g.,
Hibberd, 2013; Nadeau, 2008; for additional summary, including alternate terminology and other
meaning-making mechanisms, see also Park, 2010, 2013).
As its operationalization with respect to meaning-making’s positive potential implies,
here the underlying mechanism of direction is termed perspective-seeking, which is analogous to
course-charting. Although technically any direction (with a negatively-, benignly-, or positivelyinterpreted course) may be charted, with perspective-seeking the direction is viewed as being
positively-valenced, since “perspective” often connotes an enhanced understanding, and what is
“sought” is typically considered desirable. Perspective-seeking therefore denotes the
multifaceted ways through which the loss of a loved one (a stressful event known to possibly
have adverse effects) may be construed as leading toward—and perhaps even aiding in—the
creation of positive meaning and sense of purpose after loss.
In addition, it may be helpful to view the first two components (perception and
orientation) as the X and Y axes of the loss-processing framework, with the third or Z axis being
that of direction. If perception and orientation represent a two-dimensional or cartographical

50

understanding of grief, then direction adds the third topographical (or “depth”) dimension (see
Figure 4). Whereas perception and orientation are indicative of where the grieving individual is
located, direction refers to what it is like there: how the bereaved person is experiencing the
environment in that precise location—including their stance/posture within it and their outlook
on the world from that vantage point. Do they view being there as having any potential for
positive, purposeful, directed movement following the loss or not? Put another way, what is their
post-loss sense of direction? Perspective-seeking potentiates this sense of direction.
Figure 4
Topographical Perceptual Space in the Loss-Processing Framework

Understood in this manner, direction with perspective-seeking does not necessarily
require a specified destination but indicates more of an attitude toward the (relative) desirability
(given the circumstances) of where one is (or how one finds oneself there) and whether or not
embarking on any sort of trip (literally or figuratively) might be welcomed—either at present or
in the future. Direction with perspective-seeking is therefore more akin to the conative trajectory
of a journey than the definitive destination of a quest. As such, it can possibly influence
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processing relative to perception and/or orientation, and vice-versa. This renders the three axes,
respectively, as being more perceptual, orientational, and motivational in nature.
Through perspective-seeking, then—and as previously operationalized in the meaning
(re)construction/meaning-making literature in the context of loss—there are at least 5 possible
pathways toward a meaningful, positive trajectory following the death of a significant other:
1) making sense of the loss through (an) explanation(s) of why it happened; 2) benefit-finding:
the identification of “silver linings” as a result of the loss; 3) identity change: a new and
improved view of oneself following loss; 4) purpose in life: finding reasons to live after losing a
loved one; and 5) life significance: assigning value to goals, relationships, and aspects of life in
the present and future after a loss (for summary see Hibberd, 2013; Park, 2010, 2013).
Given extant documentation with respect to meaning (re)construction/meaning-making,
including empirical support thereof (see, e.g., Davis et al., 1998; Hibberd, 2013; see also Davis,
2001; Gillies & Neimeyer, 2006; Neimeyer, 2001a, 2015b; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002;
Park, 2010, 2013), this discussion will focus on commonalities among these five pathways and
other perhaps-related mechanisms with possible positive potential following loss (e.g., resilience,
religiousness, spirituality, sense of coherence, forgiveness, and self-compassion) as well as
challenges to them. Key to what is common among them, and to what is commonly challenging
to each of them, is the concept of reconciling.
Reconciling
When the unimaginable occurs (such as is often the case following the death of a loved
one), how does one feel/think/act in response to it, and where does that feeling/thinking/acting
lead? Perhaps more important (or at least as much so), does how one feels/thinks/acts about the
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loss make a difference with respect to where one’s feeling/thinking/acting leads (e.g., toward
more or less adaptability going forward)?
In the context of grief, reconciling is herein defined as the ongoing processing of an
encounter with what may seem unencounterable, between what was and what is now no longer,
or the moment-to-moment engagement with the reality of significant loss due to human death.
As Shwartzberg (1992) notes, with loss “…old beliefs about how the world functions are no
longer valid; reality is no longer what it was” (p. 427). Here Worden’s (2009) first task of
mourning, “accepting the reality of the loss” should be noted—see also Kübler-Ross and
Kessler’s (2005) “acknowledging the reality of the loss” (adapted from Kübler-Ross, 1969; as
summarized in Kessler, 2019), Rando’s (1984, 1993) first of six “R” processes of mourning:
“recognizing the loss”, as well as Freud’s (1917/1957) and Klein’s (1940) focus on “reality
testing.” It also bears mentioning that this ongoing relationship to loss may track an oscillatory
course toward adaptation (or, put differently, toward adaptiveness; see next paragraph), such as
is posited in Stroebe and Schut’s (1999) dual process model (DPM) of coping with bereavement,
wherein the griever oscillates between loss- and restoration-oriented coping activities—or
between one of these and not coping at all (see also Stroebe & Schut, 2001, 2010).
What is perhaps more noteworthy to the current discussion, though, is that in the lossprocessing framework reconciling is used instead of resolution, restoration, or even
reconciliation, terms implying recovery from grief—that there is “closure,” i.e., an end-point or
specified terminus for the grieving process (e.g., Archer, 2001, 2008; Freud, 1916/1957,
1917/1957; Parkes & Weiss, 1983; Stroebe & Schut, 1999; Volkan & Zintl, 1993/2015; for a less
time-delimited elaboration on Freud, see Clewell, 2004; for further discussion, see also Pearce,
2018; Schwartzberg, 1992; Shapiro, 1996, 2001; Wolfelt, 1987; Woodward, 1990, 1993). When
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reconciling is perspective-seeking in nature, it is assumed to lead toward more creative and
adaptively-patterned feelings, thoughts, and actions over time (i.e., more toward adaptiveness
than adaptation—more toward growth than fit; see, e.g., Pike et al., 2010); thus, it is considered
to be leading in a positive direction, but does not have to lead toward a precise destination—and
it is ongoing (e.g., Attig, 2010/1996; Barthes, 1981; Cook & Dworkin, 1992; Eng & Kazanjian,
2003; Gaines, 1997; Hagman, 2001; McCabe, 2003; Pollock, 1981, 1987, 1989a; Schwartzberg,
1992; White, 2015; Woodward, 1990, 1993). For the purposes of this discussion, any/all
reconciling that is not perspective-seeking in nature is not assumed to necessarily lead in a
negative direction, or toward any particular diagnostically maladaptive destination (e.g.,
Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder or PCBD [APA, 2013] or Prolonged Grief Disorder
[World Health Organization, 2018b; see also Maercker et al., 2013; Maercker & Lalor, 2012;
Prigerson et al., 2009]).
Regrettably, a discussion of reconciling in relationship to meaning (re)construction vis-àvis direction/perspective-seeking does not fully address how “meaning” (also alternately termed
“meaningfulness,” “meaning in life,” and “will-to-meaning”) is exactly defined (for various
perspectives, see, e.g., Davis et al., 1998; Frankl, 1946/1984, 1955/1965; 1969/1988; Gillies &
Neimeyer, 2006; Hibberd, 2013; Holland et al., 2006; Klinger, 1977, 1998; Lichtenthal et al.,
2010; Nadeau, 2008; Neimeyer, 2000a, 2001a, 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002; Park,
2010, 2013; Thompson & Janigian, 1988; Uren & Wastell, 2002). Baumeister (1991) defined
meaning as “…shared mental representations of possible relationships among things, events, and
relationships,” further stating that “…meaning connects things” while also noting that defining
meaning is perhaps challenging because “…to define meaning is already to use it” (p. 15).
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As Hibberd (2013) further elaborates: “the terms meaning reconstruction and meaningmaking [herein jointly termed perspective-seeking]… refer to the process of mourners’ efforts to
find or construct meaning however it may be defined; meaning will be used as a shorthand for
the sociocultural, cognitive, and/or affective schemas, narratives, experiences, or values so
constructed” (p. 672; see also Davis et al., 1998; Neimeyer, 2001a; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis,
2002; Park, 2010, 2013). In other words, precisely what “meaning” means in the context of loss
may be of less import than that it is made—and how (see, e.g., Kessler, 2019). Here I would also
add that perspective-seeking does not necessarily have to be effortful, or at least it is perhaps best
for it not to be framed as such—so as to avoid being (mis)interpreted (exclusively) as “work” (or
trauerarbeit, Freud, 1917/1957; see also Lindemann, 1944/1994), or as a (set of) specified
“task(s)” (see, e.g., Gaines, 1997; Worden, 2009).
For the purposes of this discourse, then, suffice it to say that reconciling may lead in
multiple directions—positive, negative, and otherwise (i.e., in no particular direction at all).
Through perspective-seeking the direction is considered to be positive (i.e., toward
adaptiveness), and the trajectories or mechanisms of perspective-seeking are construed as being
similar to those of meaning (re)construction or meaning-making. These include, but are not
limited to, the aforementioned five pathways: making sense of the loss, benefit-finding, identity
change, purpose in life, and life significance (for summary see, e.g., Hibberd, 2013; see also
Park, 2010, 2013). A brief explication of each of these is as follows.
Perspective-Seeking
“The concept of meaning in the social sciences is, of course, a notoriously treacherous
one” (Entrikin, 1991, p. 19); as Gipe (2019) has asserted: “…meaning is complex and shifting
and difficult to state…” (p. 318). Much research in the field of meaning(-making) has been
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conducted more broadly than within the specific context of loss or trauma (for summary see
Baumeister, 1991; McDonald et al., 2012; Proulx et al., 2013; Wong, 2012, 2017; Wong & Fry,
1998a, b). For example, Dittmann-Kohli (1991) emphasizes the link between meaning and
functioning, stating that meaning “…is a cognitive map that orients the individual in steering
through the life course…” (as cited in McDonald et al., 2012, p. 358; Wong & Fry, 1998b, p.
368), and the construct’s original proponent, Viktor Frankl (1946/1984, 1955/1965, 1969/1988),
has underscored the ubiquity of meaning’s motivational dimension. In addition, Zittoun et al.,
(2008) have noted that in responding to a perceived significant break or rupture in one’s ordinary
experience, individuals typically “seek to make meaning—engaging in representational labor and
in efforts to regulate and integrate emotional and unconscious responses” (p. 164; see also
Zittoun et al., 2003).
Specifically with respect to grief, Neimeyer (1998) posits that “…meaning reconstruction
in response to a loss is the central process in grieving” (p. 110; 2001a, p. 4; see also, e.g., Gillies
& Neimeyer, 2006; Neimeyer, 2000a, 2005, 2015a, 2016), further delineating meaning
reconstruction following loss as a dynamic process spanning multiple levels of awareness—from
overt, conscious beliefs to the more subtle, deeper mechanisms utilized in construing complex
perceptions of the world and self (Neimeyer, 2000b, 2001a). Gillies and Neimeyer (2006)
articulate three perspective-seeking pathways (which they term contexts of meaning; see also
Currier et al., 2008; Neimeyer & Anderson, 2002) through grief: making sense of the loss,
benefit-finding, and identity change.
Making Sense of the Loss
Making sense has been more broadly been defined as “a motivated, continuous effort to
understand connections (which can be among people, places, [thoughts, feelings,] and events) in
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order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” (Klein et al., 2006, p. 71). Specifically
within the context of grief, making sense of the loss designates “both the process of searching for
understanding post-loss and the outcome of the searching process at any given moment in time”
(Currier et al., 2006, p. 404). As such, making sense of the loss is the ongoing development of
interpretations/explanations regarding the comprehensibility of stress-related (and typically
stress-inducing) adverse events—in this case due to loss as a result of human death. These
explanatory or interpretive construals may rely on existing assumptive schemas (Janoff-Bulman,
1989; Parkes, 1971, 1975)—also known as “senses” or “structures of meaning” (Frankl,
1946/1984; Marris, 1974; Yalom & Lieberman, 1991)—which are “often framed in
philosophical or spiritual terms” (Holland et al., 2006, p. 176; see also Wortman et al., 1993).
Meaning-making through making sense of the loss typically involves an explanation of why the
loss may have occurred in one of two ways: 1) in terms consistent with an individual’s preexisting worldview; or 2) by modifying the survivor’s worldview in order to accommodate the
reality of the loss (Wortman et al., 1993).
Benefit-Finding
Whereas making sense of the loss relates more to explaining “…how a particular event
fits into one’s conception of how the world is assumed to work” (Davis et al., 1998, p. 562),
benefit-finding is construed relative to the valuation or “worth” of the event for one’s life—
which has also been identified as “positive reappraisal” (Folkman, 2001; Janoff-Bulman, 1992).
Davis et al. (1998) note that the derivation of perceived benefits or “silver linings” from loss can
be pivotal in assigning positive value in terms of the life of the survivor (i.e., finding something
positive through the experience), even though this value originally stems from a negative life
event (the death of a loved one). Benefit-finding has alternately been termed “meaning-as-
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significance” and making sense of the loss “meaning-as-comprehensibility” (Janoff-Bulman &
McPherson-Frantz, 1997; see also Davis et al., 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002).
Some empirical evidence suggests improvements in grief’s duration (shorter) and acuity
(less severe) where benefit-finding was perceived (e.g., Davis et al., 1998; Michael & Snyder,
2005; Neimeyer et al., 2006). Davis (2001) asserted that perceived benefits following loss
normally fit into three categories: “that the event led to (1) a growth in character, (2) a gain in
perspective, and (3) a strengthening of relationships” (p. 145); relatedly, Tedeschi and Calhoun
(1996) posit three broad benefit categorizations: “…changes in self-perception, changes in
interpersonal relationships, and a changed philosophy of life” (p. 456).
Identity Change
Gillies and Neimeyer (2006) articulate a third pathway toward meaning reconstruction
through grief. When grieving individuals reconstruct meaning in their lives following loss, they
are reconstructing themselves—their self-identities (see also Neimeyer & Anderson, 2002;
Stroebe & Schut, 2001; Thompson & Janigian, 1988; Zittoun et al., 2008); this reconstructive
process has been termed identity change. Albeit typically a painful experience, positive changes
in identity following loss (or other stressful events) have also been referred to as “posttraumatic
growth” (Tedeschi, 1995; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Tedeschi, Cann, et al., 2017; Tedeschi,
Park, et al., 1998), which is “prevalent in those who respond to loss in adaptive ways” (Gillies &
Neimeyer, 2006, p. 37) but is not “…the polar opposite of grief distress” (p. 49). The anguish
associated with difficult losses may eventually lead to a new view of self as ‘‘sadder
but…wiser,’’ (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p. 175), or as being somehow gentler (i.e., more empathetic
and emotionally connected) but also simultaneously made stronger (sometimes via religious,
spiritual, and/or existential growth) through grief (Gillies & Neimeyer, 2006; Hibberd, 2013;
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Tedeschi, 1995; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Tedeschi, Cann, et al., 2017; Tedeschi, Park, et al.,
1998)—what Simon (2021) describes as “…the way personal loss can [both] stretch and
strengthen the human heart” (p. 1).
This is illustrated in the words of Greg Gibson, speaking for the first time directly to
Wayne Lo, who murdered Gibson’s son, Galen, 25 years earlier: "We've all suffered, we've all
grown wise from our suffering, and some people do it one way, some people do it another way, I
understand that" (Inskeep, 2017). Later, Mr. Gibson added: “Almost since the moment Galen
was killed it's been my constant meditation and focus to take this terrible thing and find some
good in it, because if we can't and it drags us down, [then] it wins. And that's not—you know—
that's [just] not supportable…” (Brooks, 2017).
The above illustration underscores the challenge of etiological discernment with respect
to meaning-making—also alternately termed “meaning(s) made” (Gillies et al., 2014, 2015;
Lancaster & Carlson, 2015; Park, 2010, 2013)—since the meaning reconstruction mechanism
underlying Greg Gibson’s words (here intended as an example of identity change) can plausibly
be traced back to the other two aforementioned perspective-seeking pathways (making sense of
the loss and benefit-finding), particularly the latter. Given their potential fungibility, adding more
pathways should serve a useful purpose—but this must be balanced by parsimony. As such, two
more are included in this discussion: purpose in life and life significance (see, e.g., Hibberd,
2013).
Purpose in Life
Purpose in life links the import of an ability to articulate reasons to live with positive
psychological outcomes following on stressful experiences (see, e.g., Frankl, 1946/1984). For
example, bereaved parents who lose only one of their children have reported higher purpose in
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life than those losing either an only child or all of their children (Wheeler, 1994), with the clear
implication being that these parents’ reason to live may relate to their surviving child(ren).
Life Significance
Life significance refers to an “…assignment of value to a goal, relationship, or aspect of
life experience that exists or is pursued in the present and future…. [and that] implies a
transcendent or ontological importance…” (Hibberd, 2013, p. 679). In this sense, life
significance can neither be assigned nor rationally defended and “does not depend entirely on
coherent belief systems—it must be ‘felt’” (p. 680). This would appear to bring one to the limit
of parsimonious utility with respect to possible perspective-seeking pathways, or does it?
First, it bears repeating that additional perspective-seeking pathways have been posited,
including several similar to those outlined in this paper—with some using alternate terminology
(for summary see, e.g., Park, 2010, 2013; Stroebe & Schut, 2001). As Hibberd (2013) notes:
“This explosion of constructs has…increased clarity as researchers develop a common language
to describe different aspects of meaning reconstruction, but also increased confusion as to the
conceptual relationships among these constructs and the conceptual boundaries of ‘meaning’
itself” (p. 671; see also Thompson & Janigian, 1988). For example, it is important to remember
that for some bereaved individuals, meaning “is” (and may remain) a matter of grieving.
Second, although perspective-seeking, or the ongoing search for something positive and
purposeful through the experience of loss, is considered beneficial—and has been empirically
supported as such (e.g., with respect to meaning-making, see Davis, 2001; Davis et al., 1998;
Gillies & Neimeyer, 2006; Hibberd, 2013; Neimeyer, 2001a, 2016)—more research is needed
regarding its possible structural antecedents and/or correlates (for summary see also Park, 2010,
2013). Whereas prior bereavement research has examined possible relationships between/among
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religiousness, spirituality, meaning-making, and loss (e.g., Braun & Berg, 1994; Davis et al.,
1998; Lichtenthal et al., 2011; McIntosh et al., 1993; Murphy et al., 2003; Pargament & Park,
1997; Park, 2005, 2010, 2013; Uren & Wastell, 2002; for summary see also Wortmann & Park,
2008), as well as considered meaning-making’s mediation of dispositional (optimism-pessimism)
and situational (age of decedent at death) antecedent factors on adjustment following loss (Davis
et al., 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2002); excavating other mechanisms that may align with
or predict perspective-seeking (e.g., resilience, sense of coherence, forgiveness, self-compassion,
as well as other meaning-generating well-being-related mechanisms that are typically studied
outside the context of loss) merits additional exploration (see also Huta, 2009; for research
regarding a resilient grief trajectory, see Bonanno, 2004; Bonanno, Papa, & O’Neill, 2002;
Bonanno et al., 2002; Bonanno, Wortman, & Neese, 2004; for research on grief acuity as a
function of attachment security [as operationalized by sense of coherence] and meaning, see
Uren & Wastell, 2002; for research on grief, forgiveness, and posttraumatic growth, see, e.g.,
Martinčeková & Klatt, 2017).
Thus, as previously noted, meaning-making constructs are numerous, complex, and
challenging to comprehensively identify and concisely define. Considering them too broadly
risks empirical imprecision, but construing them otherwise may risk omitting perspectiveseeking pathways of potential import for some grievers. Furthermore, the scope of this challenge
is not limited to loss-related meaning-making mechanisms; it can also extend to positive
psychology constructs (often researched primarily outside the context of loss response) that may
be important to (re)consider in relationship to grief, meaning, and well-being. These include not
only resilience, religiousness, spirituality, sense of coherence, forgiveness, and self-compassion
(as noted above), but could also include awe, communion, Eudaimonia (knowing yourself and
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becoming who you are; see, e.g., Ryff, 2014), flourishing, gratitude, (progressive) hope, personal
sense of uniqueness, poignancy, surrender, and other possibly-related well-being constructs.
Perhaps it is therefore preferable to consider the complexity in this area of meaningmaking research as one of both challenge and opportunity: opportune in the array of possiblyrelevant mechanisms available to aid in meaning reconstruction in the context of loss, but
challenging to discretely define them. An improved understanding of these types of meaningenhancing concepts (starting with the five considered here) could serve to better help the
bereaved—both in buffering against grief’s potential complications and in bolstering its
generative possibilities.
Chapter 4 Summary
Having discussed loss’s potential impact(s) on one’s sense of “what-ness,” “where-ness,”
and “when-ness” in the previous two chapters, this chapter has delved more into the “why-ness”
and “how-ness” of responding to significant loss. More generally: why do seemingly
meaningless things—such as death—happen, and, more specifically, how can meaningfulness
again be sought and discovered once they have?
Returning to the doorway analogy—with the door representing the transition between life
before and after the death of a loved one, and grief as its threshold—direction relates to finding
purposefulness beyond the threshold, in the post-loss world. Herein termed direction with
perspective-seeking, this meaning (re)constructing processing is pivotal to reconciling, or the
ongoing engagement with the reality of the loss. Reconciling is important because it represents
more of a removal of the door than a closing of it. Perspective-seeking, then, refers to an outlook
with meaning-generating potential, one that is progressively less dominated by the pre-loss side
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of the door (or what might have been) and more focused on what is possible, positive, and
purposeful—even absent (and possibly even because of) what might have been.
This sounds better/easier than it often is, however. Perhaps a more apt term than “better”
would be “less worse” regarding reconciling with perspective-seeking, especially initially.
Through perception and orientation processing, a sense of direction may (slowly) be
(re)developed. Meaning can again seem plausible, whereas previously such a “mending” was
viewed as impossible—or seemed unrealistic and ridiculous to even consider. In this way the
loss-processing framework represents potentially transforming and generative processes: from
“nowhere” (necessitating a focus on perception/sense-making) to “now here” (orientation/wayfinding) and then, as outlined in the current chapter, to “know where” (focusing on
direction/perspective-seeking).
That being said, there are no guaranteed, fail-safe short-cuts to these processes.
Perceiving again, learning how to (better) interpret and trust those perceptions, (re)orienting
oneself within and beginning to navigate one’s post-loss world, and finding and developing a
(re)new(ed) sense of purposeful direction are not check-boxes to be ticked off in a step-wise
progression, but how grief is understood may be important to how it is experienced (see, e.g.,
Granek, 2015), and “…who we are shapes how we grieve” (Neimeyer & Harris, 2011, p. 297).
As such, the loss-processing framework is perhaps an accessible, interpretive, translational way
to understand grief that can help to avoid grief’s possible complications while simultaneously
potentiating its life-enhancing impacts toward transformative personal growth.
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Figure 5
Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia: Another Point of View (Following a Rainfall)
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Chapter 5. Methods
Current Study
This research examines bereaved adults’ retrospective self-reports of their grief
experiences in relationship to the loss-processing framework. The present study focuses on
descriptive evidence relating to the first of the framework’s three dimensions, perception/sensemaking, and its subcomponents: shock-like symptomatology, intrasensory processing,
intersensory processing (a.k.a., multimodal integration or intersensory coordination),
extrasensory processing (hallucinations, illusions, and other post-death experiences of the
decedent; dreams; threshold consciousness; and transliminality), and time for the purpose of
initial validation of the construct.
Participants
Following receipt of Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval at East Tennessee State
University (ETSU), all data were collected via online survey. Data collection was managed using
Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap) technology. REDCap is a secure, web-based
software platform designed to support data capture for research studies, providing: 1) an intuitive
interface for validated data capture; 2) audit trails for tracking data manipulation and export
procedures; 3) automated export procedures for seamless data downloads to common statistical
packages; and 4) procedures for data integration and interoperability with external sources
(Harris et al., 2009, 2019).
Convenience sample recruitment for survey participants was conducted through:
1) purposive sampling outreach using social media and social news aggregation/discussion
websites (e.g., Facebook and Reddit), 2) snowball sampling methods via e-mail, and 3) ETSU’s
Department of Psychology online participant pool (hosted by Sona Systems; SONA).
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Advertising for the study targeted bereaved adults (see Appendix B). Ads for participation in the
study directly linked individuals to the survey in REDCap via the following URL link (see also
Appendix C): https://etsuredcap.etsu.edu/surveys/?s=RLAYYRD3MA.
Participation in the study was not incentivized except for students recruited through
ETSU’s Department of Psychology online participant pool (SONA) who were enrolled in
selected psychology courses. These students were eligible to receive ½ research participation
credit for taking part in the survey. For students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology, this ½
credit could be applied toward meeting the research requirement for the course; those students
not reaching a pre-specified threshold for study participation credits for the semester were
subject to point deductions from their final grade. It should be noted that students could
participate in other studies in order to reach the specified threshold, and that there was another
way to complete these credits without participating in any research studies. In most—if not all—
cases, students exceeding the participation credit threshold were eligible for extra credit in
Introduction to Psychology. Participation was also incentivized via extra credit for certain other
psychology courses at ETSU; the manner in which this was administered was determined at the
discretion of each instructor on a course by course basis (with some not offering extra credit).
Procedures
Eligible bereaved participants—aged 18+, currently physically present in the United
States, and who provided informed consent for the study—were given access to a secure, on-line
survey in REDCap (the Grief Experiences Survey; Appendix C) that included items assessing
socio-demographical; mental and physical health and well-being; as well as bereavement-,
mourning-, and grief-related information. Survey participation was anonymous and did not
require the completion of any/all items; participants were free to exit the survey at any time, or to
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return to it later via the provision of an anonymous link if they so desired. Links to grief resource
websites and information regarding how to reach study and/or ETSU IRB staff were provided.
Although the survey included extensive instrumentation measuring the grief experiences of
participants relating to all three dimensions of the loss-processing framework (perception/sensemaking, orientation/way-finding, and direction/perspective-seeking), only items addressing
perception/sense-making are examined in this paper.
Measures
A 143-item battery of self-report survey items (Appendix C) was developed and
administered in order to gather additional provisional information with respect to the lossprocessing framework. Since the framework is in an early stage of development, this preliminary
collection of data primarily sought to explore descriptive evidence relating to the framework’s
first dimension (perception/sense-making); as such, no a priori hypotheses were formally stated
before data collection was begun. In addition to perception/sense-making, socio-demographic,
self-reported overall mental and physical health and well-being, and information about
bereavement, grief, and mourning—as related to a specific death—were collected and are
described below.
All survey items were drawn from a combination of existing, psychometrically sound
instruments (some in part, others in their entirety); select, adapted individual items taken from
these types of instruments; and author-written questions. The rich descriptions of bereaved
individuals’ grieving experiences as well as qualitative loss response research were also utilized
in developing the final battery of measures. A full description of items/instruments—as well as a
rationale for their inclusion, follows; the complete survey is included in Appendix C.
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Socio-Demographics
Participant socio-demographical information was collected. This included: age, location
of residence (by zip code), population density of area of residence (urban, suburban, or rural),
gender identity, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, living situation, employment information,
socioeconomic status (SES), relationship status, education, student status, whether or not the
participant is a parent, religious or non-religious affiliation, and religious service attendance.
Overall Mental and Physical Health and Well-Being
Items indicating the overall mental and physical health and well-being of participants—
which, as previously noted, has been shown to be associated with bereavement responses (see,
e.g., Stroebe et al., 2007)—were included in the survey. Overall well-being was assessed using
the 5-item World Health Organization Well-being Index (WHO-5; Staehr Johansen, 1998;
Appendix D), a short questionnaire consisting of simple, non-invasive questions regarding how
the participant has felt during the last two weeks.
The WHO-5 Well-Being Index is a brief, generic, global rating scale measuring
subjective well-being. It is based upon the WHO-10, which was derived from a 28-item rating
scale originally utilized in WHO research across eight European countries. The WHO-10 was
developed by choosing the 10 most valid items from the 28-item rating scale, which was initially
created using Zung scales (for depression, distress, and anxiety) as well as the General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ) and the Psychological General Well-Being Scale (PGWB). Whereas the
28-item scale and the WHO-10 both include negatively-phrased items to reflect symptoms of
distress (e.g., Feeling downhearted and blue), the WHO-5 contains only positively worded
statements (see Appendix D). In the past, the WHO has considered the terms positive well-being
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and mental health synonymously (Topp et al., 2015); it should also be noted that the WHO-5
“reflects aspects other than just the absence of depressive symptoms” (Bech et al., 2003, p. 85).
As used in the current study, there was a slight change in verb tense (from present perfect
to present tense). This adjustment was made because most of the non-WHO-5 questions on the
Grief Experiences Survey ask questions about the more distant past, whereas the WHO-5
questions (as originally worded) are only asking specifically about the past two weeks (up to the
present). Example wording as used herein: “I feel calm and relaxed” rather than the WHO-5’s
original wording: “I have felt calm and relaxed.” Even in the (rare) instance where a participant
had experienced the death of a loved one very recently (e.g., in the past month), re-wording these
items from present perfect to present tense still seemed to make sense (see Appendix D).
Topp et al. (2015) conducted a systematic review of the WHO-5 literature, concluding
that it “…is a highly useful tool that can be applied in both clinical practice (for instance to
screen for depression) as well as in research studies in order to assess well-being over time or to
compare well-being between groups,” and noting that the WHO-5 “…has been applied
successfully as a generic scale for well-being across a wide range of study fields” (p. 174). It has
been translated into more than 30 languages and utilized in a variety of settings worldwide,
including, for example, with respect to coping strategies (Cole et al., 2013) and in assessing the
association between psychosocial conditions and well-being (Schütte et al., 2014). Whereas other
measures, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) Brief Quality of Life Scale
(WHOQOL-BREF; Bonomi et al., 2000; Skevington et al., 2004) were considered, the WHO-5
was chosen for its brevity and utility.
The following two additional items were included to address the perceived overall selfrated physical and mental health of participants:
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1. How would you rate your physical health? (poor, fair, good, very good, or excellent)
2. How would you rate your mental health? (poor, fair, good, very good, or excellent)

Self-rated health (SRH) is among the most widely used survey measures of subjective
health. Numerous studies have shown SRH to be consistently and strongly predictive of
mortality (DeSalvo et al., 2006; Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Mossey & Shapiro, 1982), which is
considered the most objective measure of individual health (Quesnel-Vallée, 2007).
SRH has also been shown to be a statistically significant predictor of functional health
declinations (e.g., Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Idler & Kasl, 1995; Idler, Russell, & Davis, 2000;
Lee, 2000; Martinez et al., 2010). More recently, Latham and Peek (2013) examined the
relationship between SRH and incident morbidity, expanding the connection between SRH and
physical health to include chronic disease—as well as finding evidence suggesting “…that the
relationship between SRH and physical health outcomes is evident in midlife as well as at older
ages” (p. 107).
According to Idler and Benyamini (1997), SRH’s predictive power with respect to health
declines (particularly mortality) has four possible interpretations: 1) SRH is more inclusive than
other health-rating measures because it captures preclinical/prodromal symptoms, accounts for
complex human judgments about the severity of illness, and reflects family history; 2) SRH not
only accounts for current health status, it also dynamically estimates health trajectory; 3) SRH
influences behaviors, thus subsequently impacting health status; and 4) SRH reflects the
availability of personal, economic, and social resources that have been shown to play a role in
determining health—irrespective of diagnostic specificity or other mechanisms involved (for
additional information about social conditions and health disparities see, e.g., Link & Phelan,
1995; Phelan et al., 2010).
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Bereavement-, Mourning-, and Grief-Related
Bereavement-related information was also gathered. This included the participant’s
relationship to the decedent (e.g., familial or other relation), time since death, approximate age of
the person when they died, cause of death, participant involvement in caring for the decedent
prior to death’s occurrence (if applicable), and whether or not the death followed palliative/
hospice care (i.e., was there foreknowledge of the death prior to its occurrence, and—if so—then
for approximately how long). Although all of these bereavement-related factors have been shown
to affect grief outcomes, the latter two (and particularly the last one) are often overlooked (for
review see Childress, 2016).
Mourning-related information items included those addressing: 1) whether or not the
participant viewed the body of their loved one after the death; 2) did a mourning ritual (funeral
ceremony or memorial service) take place following the death, and, if so, then did the participant
attend, and—if so—then did they find attending the service to be meaningful or not; and 3) was
their loved one’s body buried, cremated, or donated for scientific/research/medical purposes?
Here the paucity of research regarding the relationship between collective mourning rituals and
grief must be noted (for summary see Childress, 2015; Hoy, 2013; see also Hayslip et al., 2007);
not only are studies specifically addressing funerals sparse (Hoy, 2013), questions relating to
funerals are rarely included in grief-related research.
Grief-related information was assessed using a single item: “Did you seek professional
help for grief-related issues at any point following the death?” (yes, no, or do not recall; if
responding yes then from whom [e.g., a therapist, physician, counselor, pastor or spiritual
advisor, social worker, grief support group, etc.] and “In general did you find this help-seeking to
be beneficial” [yes, no, or do not recall]). This question emerged during discussions relating to
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the author’s preliminary project, a literature review investigating possible impacts of
foreknowledge of death on grief outcomes for survivors (Childress, 2016). The item was initially
suggested by preliminary project committee-member Dr. Peggy Cantrell as a concise way to
address possible grief-related complications.
Bereavement-, mourning-, and grief-related items were included to be used individually
and descriptively. As such, no scores related to these items have been calculated in this initial
analysis.
Perception/Sense-Making
Items assessing mechanisms relating to the perception/sense-making dimension of the
loss-processing framework included: 1) shock-like symptomatology; 2) intrasensory processing;
3) intersensory processing (a.k.a., multi-sensory or multimodal integration); 4) extrasensory
processing (including hallucinations, dreams, threshold consciousness, and transliminality); and
5) the subjective experience of time. Discretely addressing each of these five assessment areas
(and the sub-categorization within some of them) proved to be organizationally unwieldy. There
is significant overlap among several of these constructs (e.g., hallucinations, dreams, threshold
consciousness, and transliminality); however, all items included in the survey reflected at least
one aspect of the perception/sense-making dimension and were identified relative to the
construct to which they seemed most closely associated.
Given the retrospective nature of the questions, for most items respondents were asked to
address both the frequency of occurrence (never, rarely, occasionally, a moderate amount, a
great deal, or do not recall) as well as the possible change in the prevalence of each phenomenon
present over time (occurring less often, unchanged, occurring more often, no longer occurring,
or unsure) since the death. For an example item, in this case evaluating shock-like
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symptomatology, see Table 1. Note that the last two columns are annotations and do not appear
in the survey itself; for identification of the acronyms of sources in the final column, see
Appendix E.
Table 1
Sample Item Assessing Perception/Sense-Making

Think about the time
following the death of
your loved one.
Would you say:

I felt distant from my
own emotions

Response choices








Never
Rarely
Occasionally
A moderate
amount
A great deal
Do not recall

If selecting
“Rarely,
Occasionally, A
moderate amount”
or “A great deal,”
then how has this
changed over
time?






Occurring less
often
Unchanged
Occurring
more often
No longer
occurring
Unsure

Framework
dimension(s)
and assessed
aspect(s)

Item source
information

Perception
Shock-like
Symptoms

ASD, ASDS,
SASRQ

Many of the items in this section are author-written. Others, as mentioned previously, are
based on direct quotations of grieving individuals. Some were drawn verbatim or adapted from
previously published instruments. Although source instruments were subject to prior
psychometric evaluation, their reliability and validity have not been confirmed for the purposes
of this study.
The item development process was iterative. It began with material articulating aspects of
the loss-processing framework’s first dimension (Chapter 2). Possible items (e.g., those from
existing instruments measuring aspects of perception/sense-making and from the narrative selfreports of grieving individuals) were evaluated based on their alignment with each of the
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framework’s facets. In instances where these item sources were deemed insufficient, the material
was either adapted or author-written items were subsequently generated.
Examples of the information and instrumentation utilized in developing survey items
assessing the shock-like symptoms of the perception/sense-making dimension of the framework
included: 1) the Specific Symptoms of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD; APA, 2013; Appendix A);
2) the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS; Bryant et al., 2011; Bryant & Harvey, 2000; Bryant
et al., 2000; Appendix F); 3) the Stanford Acute Stress Reaction Questionnaire (SASRQ,
Cardeña et al., 2000; Appendix G); 4) the Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory (DDI; Cox
& Swinson, 2002; Appendix H); 5) the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES-II; Bernstein &
Putnam, 1986; Carlson & Putnam, 1993; Frischholz et al., 1990; Appendix I); and 6) the
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS; Sierra & Berrios, 1996, 2000; Sierra et al., 2005;
Appendix J). It should be noted that there were instances of significant overlap in these iteminclusion source materials (i.e., items across measures were worded quite similarly—if not
virtually identically).
Some of the intra-, inter-, and extrasensory items were also developed using the abovelisted resources; others were taken directly from the personal accounts of grievers, and some
were author-written. Troyer’s (2005, 2014) qualitative research was used in the development of
extrasensory items, particularly with respect to grief hallucinations—alternately termed post
death encounters or events (PDE’s; Nowatzki & Grant Kalischuk, 2009). The Revised
Transliminality Scale (RTS; Houran et al., 2003; Lange et al., 2000; Appendix K) was also
considered when developing extrasensory perception items, such as those relating to threshold
consciousness and transliminality. With some exceptions, time-perception-related items were
mostly author-written. As noted previously, significant overlap was found in the resources used
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to develop all items assessing perception/sense-making; for a complete listing of these items,
including source cross-referencing information, see Appendix E.
Data Cleaning
Prior to running analyses, data were cleaned to resolve potential problems related to
unacceptability, incompleteness, or inaccuracy. For example, 18 surveys were entirely blank and
unconsented, and some of the surveys were completed for the death of a pet, which was not the
focus of this study; as such, these were deleted. Participants who answered very few or no items,
or those who stopped responding to items before beginning the perception/sense-making portion
of the survey, were not included. Respondents who answered do not recall or never to all or to
the vast majority of items assessing perception/sense-making were retained—even though those
were the only response choices that did not prompt a follow-up item about change over time.
Before data cleaning, the study had an initial sample size of 550 potential survey
respondents. There were 103 participants whose data were removed because they did not respond
to any of the items or for one of the other reasons outlined above. This left 447 participants who
responded to items up to and inclusive of those relating to the primary focus of this study (items
assessing socio-demographics; overall mental and physical health and well-being; bereavement,
grief, and mourning; and perception/sense-making). Given the descriptive nature of the current
research, and considering that participants could skip any items that they did not want to answer,
results are reported based upon the number of participants that responded to each individual
item; the number or participants not answering an item are reported as “missing”.
Planned Data Analyses
All descriptive statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS (version 27.0) and
Microsoft Excel (2019) and are reported for: socio-demographical; mental and physical health
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and well-being-related; and bereavement-, grief-, and mourning-related data. REDCap’s internal
reports and stats software was used to confirm all analyses performed in SPSS and Excel. For
socio-demographical and bereavement-, grief-, and mourning-related data, frequencies and
percentages are reported for nominal variables and means and standard deviations are reported
for continuous variables. Scores are reported for the WHO-5 Well-Being Index; percentages and
frequencies are provided for self-rated physical and mental health (SRH).
Also reported are descriptive statistical analyses of data collected that relate to the lossprocessing framework’s perception/sense-making dimension and its subcomponents (shock-like
symptoms, intrasensory processing, intersensory processing, extrasensory processing, and time).
For this preliminary assessment, perception/sense-making items are reported by frequency and
endorsement percentage on an item by item basis. Endorsement was defined as any response
choice of: rarely, occasionally, a moderate amount, or a great deal. Responses of never or do
not recall were considered not endorsing of the item.
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Chapter 6. Results
Sample Characteristics
It must be noted from the onset that these data were collected from August through
December of 2020. COVID-19 is therefore a characteristic of this sample.
Also, as previously noted, only one group of participants was recruited with the provision
of any sort of incentivization—those students recruited to access the REDCap-managed survey
via SONA (ETSU’s Department of Psychology online participant pool). Thus, results are
reported for three groups: non-SONA, SONA, and those two groups combined.
Socio-Demographics
Diversity characteristics of the study sample and its two subgroups are reported in Table
2. These include: age, population density of area of residence, gender identity, sexual orientation,
race/ethnicity, living situation, employment information, socioeconomic status, relationship
status, education, student status, parental status, religious or non-religious affiliation, and
religious service attendance. Location of residence (by zip code) was collected but is not
reported; this item had the lowest response rate of all items included in the study, with 98
responses missing (21.9%, N = 447).
The combined sample (N = 447) was predominantly female (74.1%, n = 329),
heterosexual (83.3%, n = 370), white (89%, n = 395), Christian (70.7%, n = 316), and ranged in
age from 18 to 87 years (M = 38.27, SD = 21.56). The Christian affiliation datapoint for this
sample aligns with a Pew Research Center (2014) survey estimating that 70.6% of U.S. adults
report a Christian religious affiliation. Here it should also be noted that religious service
attendance survey responses were probably impacted by COVID-19—although respondents may
have reported based upon their pre-COVID-19 church attendance patterns (see Table 2).
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Table 2
Diversity Characteristics Across Samples
Characteristic

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

56.42
59
16.093
23
87
13 (5.8%)

20.11
19
3.198
18
45
12 (5.4%)

38.27
26
21.56
18
87
25 (5.6%)

198 (88.4%)
3 (1.3%)
23 (10.3%)

210 (94.2%)
1 (0.4%)
12 (5.4%)

408 (91.2%)
4 (1%)
35 (7.8%)

33 (14.7%)
113 (50.4%)
70 (31.3%)
6 (2.7%)
2 (0.9%)

29 (13%)
125 (56.1%)
45 (20.2%)
24 (10.8%)
0

62 (13.9%)
238 (53.5%)
115 (25.8%)
30 (6.7%)
2 (0.4%)

188 (83.9%)
32 (14.3%)
1 (0.4%)
3 (1.3%)

141 (63.2%)
78 (35%)
4 (1.8%)
0

329 (74.1%)
110 (24.8%)
5 (1.1%)
3 (0.7%)

2 (0.9%)
9 (4%)
3 (1.3%)
2 (0.9%)
3 (1.3%)
0
202 (90.2%)
0
3 (1.3%)

11 (4.9%)
25 (11.2%)
4 (1.8%)
4 (1.8%)
7 (3.1%)
3 (1.3%)
168 (75.3%)
1 (0.4%)
0

13 (2.9%)
34 (7.7%)
7 (1.6%)
6 (1.4%)
10 (2.3%)
3 (0.7%)
370 (83.3%)
1 (0.2%)
3 (0.7%)

2 (0.9%)
4 (1.8%)
1 (0.4%)
2 (0.9%)
0
0
215 (96%)
0
0
2 (0.9%)

1 (0.4%)
33 (14.8%)
6 (2.7%)
10 (4.5%)
2(0.9%)
2(0.9%)
180 (80.7%)
11 (4.9%)
0
0

3 (0.7%)
37 (8.3%)
7 (1.6%)
12 (2.7%)
2 (0.5%)
2 (0.5%)
395 (89.0%)
11 (2.5%)
0
3 (0.7%)

Age
Mean
Median
SD
Min
Max
Missing
Country of Residence
US
Non-US
Missing
Population Density of Area of Residence
Urban (100,000+ residents)
Suburban (10,000-100,000 residents)
Rural (less than 10,000 residents)
Unsure
Missing
Gender Identity
Female
Male
Other Gender Identity
Missing
Sexual Orientation
Asexual
Bisexual
Gay
Lesbian
Pansexual
Questioning or unsure
Straight (heterosexual)
Other Sexual Orientation
Missing
Race/Ethnicity
Alaska Native or Native American Indian
Black, Afro-Caribbean, or African American
East Asian or Asian American
Latino/a or Hispanic American
Middle Eastern or Arab American
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
White or Euro-American (Caucasian)
Multiracial
Other Race/Ethnicity
Missing
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Diversity Characteristics Across Samples (cont’d)
Characteristic
Living Situation
Live alone
Live with parents/guardian
Live with roommate(s)
Live with spouse/romantic partner
No permanent residence
Other
Missing
Employment Status
Not currently working for pay
Working part-time for pay
Working full-time for pay
Retired
Other
Missing
Personal Financial Situation
Low-income
Lower-middle income
Middle-income
Upper-middle income
Upper income
Missing
Current Relationship Status
Single never married
In a relationship; living separately
Cohabitating with a romantic partner
Married
Separated
Divorced
Domestic Partnership
Widowed
Other
Missing
Education
Some high school
Technical training
High school graduate or equivalent
Some college without receiving diploma
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Advanced degree
Other
Missing

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

56 (25%)
5 (2.2%)
6 (2.7%)
146 (65.2%)
0
10 (4.5%)
1 (0.4%)

21 (9.4%)
109 (48.9%)
59 (26.5%)
26 (11.7%)
4 (1.8%)
3 (1.3%)
1 (0.4%)

77 (17.2%)
114 (25.5%)
65 (14.5%)
172 (38.5%)
4 (0.9%)
13 (2.9%)
2 (0.4%)

17 (7.6%)
28 (12.5%)
84 (37.5%)
87 (38.8%)
6 (2.7%)
2 (0.9%)

72 (32.3%)
110 (49.3%)
34 (15.2%)
0
6 (2.7%)
1 (0.4%)

89 (19.9%)
138 (30.9%)
118 (26.4%)
87 (19.5%)
12 (2.7%)
3 (0.7%)

6 (2.7%)
40 (17.9%)
103 (46%)
63 (28.1%)
10 (4.5%)
2 (0.9%)

86 (38.6%)
55 (24.7%)
55 (24.7%)
25 (11.2%)
1 (0.4%)
1 (0.4%)

92 (20.6%)
95 (21.3%)
158 (35.3%)
88 (19.7%)
11 (2.5%)
3 (0.7%)

16 (7.1%)
2 (0.9%)
13 (5.8%)
132 (58.9%)
2 (0.9%)
22 (9.8%)
2 (0.9%)
32 (14.3%)
1 (0.4%)
2 (0.9%)

117 (52.5%)
70 (31.4%)
24 (10.8%)
8 (3.6%)
2(0.9%)
0
1 (0.4%)
0
1 (0.4%)
0

133 (29.8%)
72 (16.1%)
37 (8.3%)
140 (31.3%)
4 (0.9%)
22 (4.9%)
3 (0.7%)
32 (7.2%)
2 (0.4%)
2 (0.4%)

0
1 (0.4%)
5 (2.2%)
24 (10.7%)
14 (6.3%)
76 (33.9%)
99 (44.2%)
4 (1.8%)
1 (0.4%)

5 (2.2%)
2(0.9%)
90 (40.4%)
90 (40.4%)
16 (7.2%)
11 (4.9%)
1 (0.4%)
7 (3.1%)
1 (0.4%)

5 (1.1%)
3 (0.7%)
95 (21.3%)
114 (25.5%)
30 (6.7%)
87 (19.5%)
100 (22.4%)
11 (2.5%)
2 (0.4%)
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Diversity Characteristics Across Samples (cont’d)
Characteristic
Student Status
No
Yes, part time
Yes, full time
Missing
Parental Status
Yes
No
Missing
Religious Affiliation
Buddhist
Christian-Catholic
Christian-Protestant
Episcopalian/Anglican
Jehovah's Witness
Jewish
Hindu
Mormon/Latter Day Saints
Muslim
Sikh
Unitarian Universalist
Wiccan
Atheist
Agnostic
Humanist
Religious affiliation not specified
Other
Missing
Religious Service Attendance
Never
1-2 times per year
Every month
Every week
More than one time per week
Missing

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

211 (94.2%)
5 (2.2%)
6 (2.7%)
2 (0.9%)

1 (0.4%)
8 (3.6%)
214 (96%)
0

212 (47.4%)
13 (2.9%)
220 (49.2%)
2 (0.4%)

160 (72.3%)
60 (26.8%)
2 (0.9%)

13 (5.8%)
209 (93.7%)
1 (0.4%)

175 (39.1%)
269 (60.2%)
3 (0.7%)

2 (0.9%)
19 (8.5%)
128 (57.1%)
10 (4.5%)
0
1 (0.4%)
0
0
0
0
6 (2.7%)
1 (0.4%)
13 (5.8%)
12 (5.4%)
6 (2.7%)
13 (5.8%)
10 (4.5%)
3 (1.3%)

1 (0.4%)
30 (13.5%)
127 (57%)
2(0.9%)
2(0.9%)
0
0
0
1 (0.4%)
0
0
2(0.9%)
10 (4.5%)
22 (9.9%)
0
16 (7.2%)
9 (4%)
1 (0.4%)

3 (0.7%)
49 (11%)
255 (57%)
12 (2.7%)
2 (0.4%)
1 (0.2%)
0
0
1 (0.2%)
0
6 (1.3%)
3 (0.7%)
23 (5.1%)
34 (7.6%)
6 (1.3%)
29 (6.5%)
19 (4.3%)
4 (0.9%)

51 (22.8%)
47 (21%)
17 (7.6%)
101 (45.1%)
6 (2.7%)
2 (0.9%)

71 (31.8%)
55 (24.7%)
40 (17.9%)
46 (20.6%)
9 (4%)
2(0.9%)

122 (27.3%)
102 (22.8%)
57 (12.8)
147 (32.9%)
15 (3.4%)
4 (0.9%)

Although virtually identical in size, the non-SONA (n = 224) and SONA (n = 223)
samples differ in multiple ways. For example, the SONA sample is more than 36 years younger
(M =20.11, SD = 3.2) on average than the non-SONA sample (M = 56.42, SD = 16.09). As
expected, the SONA group was predominantly comprised of current full-time students (96%, n =
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214), and in the non-SONA sample 94.2% of participants were not students (n = 211)—but had
been previously (with 78.1% of the non-SONA group reporting having received a Bachelor’s or
Advanced degree in the past, n = 175).
Most of the socio-demographic and diversity characteristics appear to follow the pattern
one would anticipate for an older group of adults (38.8% of whom are retired, n = 87) as
compared to group of young students (of whom 49.3%, n = 110) are working part-time and
another 15.2% are working full-time (n = 34). This includes with respect to relationship status
(with the former more likely to be married and be a parent), financial and living situation (with
students reporting lower incomes—and almost ½ living with a parent or guardian), and the
younger group reporting somewhat greater racial/ethnic and sexual orientation diversity. Where
the difference between the two groups is strong, it is striking to see their contrast collapse in the
descriptive statistics for the total sample combining the two—albeit the inevitable statistical
resolution of their combination (see, e.g., live with spouse/romantic partner, single never
married, or advanced degree; Table 2).
Overall Mental and Physical Health and Well-Being
The average score on the WHO-5 Well-being Index for the non-SONA group was 75.15
(SD = 15.4, n = 221). This was more than five percentage points higher (indicating more positive
reported overall well-being) than the average for the SONA sample, which was 69.97 (SD =
17.41, n = 222). The combined average for both groups was 72.55 (SD = 16.63, N=443). Records
for participants who did not answer all of the WHO-5 items were removed prior to calculating
these scores. Please see Appendix D for additional information regarding the scoring of the
WHO-5 for this survey. Percentages for self-rated physical and mental health (SRH) across
samples are reported in Table 3.
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Table 3
Self-rated Physical and Mental Health Across Samples
Characteristic

Non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

4 (1.8%)

7 (3.1%)

11 (2.5%)

25 (11.2%)

47 (21.1%)

72 (16.1%)

Physical Health

poor
fair
good
very good
excellent
missing

112 (50%)

79 (35.4%)

191 (42.7%)

68 (30.4%)

69 (30.9%)

137(30.6%)

13 (5.8%)

21 (9.4%)

34 (7.6%)

2 (0.9%)

0

2 (.4%)

2 (0.9%)

29 (13%)

31 (6.9%)

31 (13.8%)

70 (31.4%)

101 (22.6%)

90 (40.2%)

77 (34.5%)

167 (37.4%)

73 (32.6%)

26 (11.7%)

99 (22.1%)

27 (12.1%)

20 (9%)

47 (10.5%)

1 (0.4%)

1 (0.4%)

2 (0.4%)

Mental Health

poor
fair
good
very good
excellent
missing

Although caution must be taken when interpreting these data, differences between the
two groups are apparent—particularly with respect to self-rated mental health. For example, the
percentage of self-rated poor or fair mental health for the SONA (student) sample is 44.4% (n =
99) as compared to 14.7% (n = 33) for the non-SONA sample; also, student percentages trail
those of the older group in each of the other three more positive categorizations (good, very
good, and excellent). These data would not appear to be misaligned with the WHO-5 scores
across samples.
Bereavement-, Mourning-, and Grief-Related
Bereavement-related characteristics are reported in Table 4. These data may reflect some
of the age-difference-based patterning seen in the socio-demographical and diversity
characteristics. For example, the three largest percentages for categories of relationship to the
decedent for the non-SONA sample are husband (17.4%, n = 39), father (18.3%, n = 41) and
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mother (23.2% 52); and for the SONA sample they are grandfather (22.1%, n = 49),
grandmother (24.8%, n = 55), and friend (16.2%, n = 36). Here it is possible that the friend
category may have served to lower the average age of the decedent for the student group (M =
56.67, SD = 27.52), which was almost 7 years younger than the age at death for the non-SONA
sample (M = 63.54, SD = 22.11). For the non-SONA group, ⅓ of the deaths were 10+ years ago.
Table 4
Bereavement-Related Characteristics Across Samples
Characteristic
Relationship to decedent
Husband
Wife
Partner
Grandfather
Grandmother
Father
Mother
Father-in-law
Mother-in-law
Brother
Sister
Brother-in-law
Sister-in-law
Son
Daughter
Son-in-law
Daughter-in-law
Uncle
Aunt
Nephew
Niece
Friend
Other
Missing
Approx. age of the person when they died
Mean
Median
SD
Min
Max
Missing

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

39 (17.4%)
2 (0.9%)
2 (0.9%)
12 (5.4%)
10 (4.5%)
41 (18.3%)
52 (23.2%)
1 (0.4%)
2 (0.9%)
13 (5.8%)
9 (4.0%)
0
0
11 (4.9%)
4 (1.8%)
0 (0.0%)
1 (0.4%)
2 (0.9%)
4 (1.8%)
1 (0.4%)
2 (0.9%)
14 (6.3%)
2 (0.9%)
0

0
0
0
49 (22.1%)
55 (24.8%)
17 (7.7%)
2 (0.9%)
0
1 (0.4%)
3 (1.4%)
4 (1.8%)
0
0
0
1 (0.4%)
0
0
14 (6.1%)
12 (5.4%)
1 (0.4%)
2 (0.9%)
36 (16.2%)
26 (11.7%)
1 (0.4%)

39 (8.7%)
2 (0.4%)
2 (0.4%)
61 (13.6%)
65 (14.5%)
58 (13%)
54 (12.1%)
1 (0.2%)
2 (0.4%)
16 (3.6%)
13 (2.9%)
0
0
11 (2.5%)
5 (1%)
0
1 (0.2%)
16 (3.6%)
16 (3.6%)
2 (0.4%)
4 (0.8%)
50 (11.2%)
28 (6.3%)
1 (0.2%)

63.54
68.5
22.11
0.33
98
4 (1.8%)

56.67
65
27.52
0
105
6 (2.7%)

60.13
67
25.15
0
105
10 (2.2%)
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Bereavement-Related Characteristics Across Samples (cont’d.)
Characteristic

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

How long ago did your loved one die?
< one month
8 (3.6%)
1-3 months
7 (3.1%)
4-6 months
6 (2.7%)
7-12 months
12 (5.4%)
13-18 months
9 (4%)
19-24 months
6 (2.7%)
2-3 years
25 (11.2%)
4-5 years
31 (13.8%)
5-10 years
41 (18.3%)
More than 10 years
79 (35.3%)
Missing
0
Cause of death
Natural causes (anticipated)
117 (52.2%)
Natural causes (sudden)
47 (21%)
Overdose
3 (1.3%)
Accident
20 (8.9%)
Suicide
13 (5.8%)
Homicide
6 (2.7%)
COVID-19
3 (1.3%)
Not known
2 (0.9%)
Other
13 (5.8%)
Missing
0
Were you (one of) the primary caregivers?
Yes
93 (41.5%)
No
129 (57.6%)
Do not recall
0
Missing
2 (0.9%)
Did the death follow palliative/hospice care?
Yes
84 (37.5%)
No
138 (61.6%)
1 (0.4%)
Unsure
1 (0.4%)
Missing
If yes, then how long in hospice care?
n = Yes from previous question
n = 84
Less than one week
23 (27.4%)
1-4 weeks
27 (32.1%)
5-8 weeks
9 (10.7%)
3-6 months
11 (13.1%)
7-12 months
11 (13.1%)
13-18 months
0
19-24 months
2 (2.4%)
1(1.2%)
More than 2 years
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SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

8 (3.6%)
13 (5.8%)
11 (4.9%)
17 (7.6%)
7 (3.1%)
11 (4.9%)
55 (24.7%)
36 (16.1%)
39 (17.5%)
23 (10.3%)
3 (1.3%)

16 (3.6%)
20 (4.5%)
17 (3.8%)
29 (6.5%)
16 (3.6%)
17 (3.8%)
80 (17.9%)
67 (15%)
80 (17.9%)
102 (22.8%)
3 (0.7%)

97 (43.5%)
51 (22.9%)
8 (3.6%)
23 (10.3%)
12 (5.4%)
6 (2.7%)
2 (0.9%)
11 (4.9%)
12 (5.4%)
1 (0.4%)

214 (47.9%)
98 (21.9%)
11 (2.5%)
43 (9.6%)
25 (5.6%)
12 (2.7%)
5 (1.1%)
13 (2.9%)
25 (5.6%)
1 (0.2%)

17 (7.6%)
199 (89.2%)
6 (2.7%)
1 (0.4%)

110 (24.6%)
328 (73.4%)
6 (1.3%)
3 (0.7%)

57 (25.6%)
131 (58.7%)
34 (15.2%0
1 (0.4%)

141 (31.5%)
269 (60.2%)
35 (7.8%)
2 (0.4%)

n = 57
13 (22.8%)
16 (28.1%)
8 (14%)
10 (17.5%)
4 (7%)
1 (1.8%)
0
5 (8.8%)

n = 141
36 (25.5%)
43 (30.5%)
17 (12.1%)
21 (14.9%)
15 (10.6%)
1 (.1)
2 (1.4%)
6 (4.2%)

The cause of death categories track more similarly between the two groups, with natural
causes (anticipated or sudden) and accidents being the top three categorizations (accounting for
more than ¾ of the causes of death across both groups). The more elderly non-SONA sample
reported a higher incidence of having experienced the death of a loved one more than 10 years
ago (35.3% [n = 79] versus 10.3% [n = 23]). Here it should be noted that given the average age
of the SONA group (M =20.11, SD = 3.2), up to 43.9% (n = 98) of these respondents may have
been younger than the age of 18 when they experienced the death of the loved one for whom
they are responding to this survey. The non-SONA sample was much more likely to have been
(one of) the primary caregivers for their loved one prior to their death—41.5% (n = 93) as
compared to only 7.6% (n = 17) for the SONA sample. Fifteen percent of SONA respondents (n
= 34) were unsure if the death of their loved one followed palliative/hospice care.
Results for mourning-related characteristics are reported in Table 5. Data for these
characteristics also indicate more similarity between the two groups than for previous measures.
Table 5
Mourning-Related Characteristics Across Samples
Characteristic

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

Did you view the body of your loved one?
Yes
151 (67.4%)
No
72 (32.1%)
Do not recall
1 (0.4%)
Missing
0
Was there a funeral or memorial
service?
Yes
211 (94.2%)
No
12 (5.4%)
Do not recall
0
Missing
1 (0.4%)
If so, then did you attend?
n = Yes from previous question
n = 211
Yes
198 (93.8%)
No
9 (4.3%)
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SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

125 (56.1%)
88 (39.5%)
10 (4.5%)
0

276 (61.7%)
160 (35.8%)
11 (2.5%)
0

207 (92.8%)
11 (4.9%)
5 (2.2%)
0

418 (93.5%)
23 (5.1%)
5 (1.1%)
1 (0.2%)

n = 207
173 (83.6%)
34 (16.4%)

n = 418
371 (88.8%)
43 (10.3%)

Mourning-Related Characteristics Across Samples (cont’d.)
Characteristic

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

If so, then did you attend? (cont’d.)
Do not recall
1 (0.5%)
Missing
3 (1.4%)
If so, then did you find it to be meaningful?
n = Yes from previous question
n = 198
Yes
162 (81.8%)
No
15 (7.6%)
Unsure
20 (10%)
Missing
1 (0.6%)
Was the body of your loved one?
Buried
91 (40.6%)
Cremated
123 (54.9%)
Donated for scientific/research
6 (2.7%)
Other
3 (1.3%)
Unsure
1 (0.4%)

SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

0
0

1 (0.2%)
3 (0.7%)

n = 173
152 (87.9%)
8 (4.6%)
11 ( 6.4%)
2 (1.1%)

n = 371
314 (84.6%)
23 (62%)
31 (8.4%)
0.8%)

156 (70%)
48 (21.5%)
3 (1.3%)
1 (0.4%)
15 (6.7%)

247 (55.3%)
171 (38.3%)
9 (2%)
4 (0.9%)
16 (3.6%)

When there was a funeral or memorial service, for those reporting having attended,
84.6% (n = 314) responded that it was meaningful to have done so. Also noteworthy among
these data is the declination in the of viewing the body of the decedent, which was 11.3
percentage points lower for the younger/student sample even though this group reported a 29.4
percentage point higher incidence of burial. Earth burial has been associated with “traditional”
funerals, which historically included a viewing of the body or wake (Childress, 2015)—
particularly within the South Central Appalachian region (for geographical area definition, see
Appalachian Regional Commission [ARC], 2021). These data may reflect a (continuing) shift
away from this particular mourning convention (for summary of possible changes in funeral
customs in northeast Tennessee, see Childress, 2015), and/or may also be indicative of the
greater geographical diversity of the non-SONA sample (rates of cremation are higher nationally
than in the region surrounding ETSU [Cremation Association of North America, 2021]—and the
SONA sample is an ETSU-student-based sample).
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Grief-related characteristics are reported in Table 6. The student sample was less likely to
have sought counsel following the death of their loved one, with 9.9% (n = 22) reporting having
done so as compared to 31.7% (n = 71) for the non-SONA sample. It is interesting to note that
although 22 students in the SONA group reported having had some sort of professional grief
support after the death of their loved one, five could not recall whether they had sought it or
not—and indicated do not recall rather than no. For the sample combining both groups, 81.7% (n
= 93) reported that professional grief counseling was helpful to them.
Table 6
Grief-Related Characteristics Across Samples
Characteristic

Yes
No
Do not recall
Missing
If so, then did you find it to be helpful?
n = Yes from previous question
Yes
No
Do not recall
Missing

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

SONA sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

71 (31.7%)
152 (67/9%)
0
1 (0.4%)

22 (9.9%)
196 (87.9%)
5 (2.2%)
0

93 (20.9%)
348 (78%)
5 (1.1%)
1 (0.2%)

n = 71
60 (84.5%)
10 (14.1%)
0
1 (1.4%)

n = 22
16 (72.7%)
6 (27.3%)
0
0

n = 93
76 (81.7%)
16 (17.2%)
0
1 (1.1%)

Perception/Sense-making
Items assessing perception/sense-making are reported as frequencies with percentage
endorsement across samples (see Table 7). As noted previously, item response choices of rarely,
occasionally, a moderate amount, or a great deal are considered endorsing of the item.
Responses of never or do not recall were calculated as not endorsing; here it should be noted that
not remembering is not necessarily the same as not having occurred.
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For these self-reports of grief experiences relating to perception/sense-making, the
average endorsement percentage among participants in the non-SONA sample (n = 224) was
13.13 points higher (SD = 10.07) than the SONA sample (n = 223). For the non-SONA sample
the average endorsement percentage was 43.16% (SD = 24.75) and it was 30.03% for the SONA
sample (SD = 21.47). For these two groups combined, the average was 36.59% (SD = 21.47, N =
447).
Table 7
Perception/Sense-Making Items Across Samples
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

I had difficulty concentrating/focusing attention
I felt restless
I felt numb
I felt distant from my own emotions
I felt as if I was in a daze
I felt like I was watching things happen...outside myself
Memories of the death kept entering my mind
My surroundings seemed strange or unreal
I felt like I was slow to respond to what was happening…
I looked in the mirror and felt...I did not recognize myself
I felt as if I might be losing my mind….
Smells seemed weaker or less noticeable than usual
Indoor lights seemed so bright...they bothered my eyes
Tastes seemed blander or less noticeable than usual
I felt as if the volume control...had been turned down
My vision seemed dulled
Things...looked different...than how...they really look
People and objects seemed more distant and unclear
Smells seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual
People and objects seemed closer and clearer
Colors seemed to appear dull or muted
Tastes seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual
I felt as if the volume control...had been turned up
Colors seemed to appear more vivid and vibrant
I felt like I was walking on shifting ground
I felt as if I was in a fog
I had a sinking feeling in the pit of my stomach
I felt like I was descending rapidly in an elevator
I had especially vivid memories of my loved one….
I sensed or felt the presence of the person who died
I saw, heard, smelled, or felt touched by my...loved one
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non-SONA
sample
(n=224)
215 (96%)
186 (83%)
174 (77.7%)
156 (69.6%)
171 (76.3%)
139 (62.1%)
208 (92.9%)
107 (47.8%)
150 (67%)
64 (28.6%)
78 (34.8%)
21 (9.4%)
45 (20.1%)
65 (29%)
88 (39.3%)
41 (18.3%)
55 (24.6%)
61 (27.2%)
32 (14.3%)
18 (8%)
37 (16.5%)
21 (9.4%)
53 (23.7%)
26 (11.6%)
108 (48.2%)
173 (77.2%)
184 (82.1%)
40 (17.9%)
211 (94.2%)
161 (71.9%)
103 (46%)

SONA sample
(n=223)
174 (78%)
159 (71.3%)
144 (64.6%)
134 (60.1%)
131 (58.7%)
89 (39.9%)
145 (65%)
84 (37.7%)
91 (40.8%)
45 (20.2%)
65 (29.1%)
36 (16.1%)
48 (21.5%)
34 (15.2%)
51 (22.9%)
35 (15.7%)
44 (19.7%)
37 (16.6%)
19 (8.5%)
18 (8.1%)
35 (15.7%)
16 (7.2%)
28 (12.6%)
20 (9%)
61 (27.4%)
90 (40.4%)
142 (63.7%)
39 (17.5%)
168 (75.3%)
93 (41.7%)
51 (22.9%)

Total Sample
(N=447)
389 (87%)
345 (77.2%)
318 (71.1%)
290 (64.9%)
302 (67.6%)
228 (51%)
353 (79%)
191 (48.5%)
241 (53.9%)
109 (24.4%)
143 (32%)
57 (12.8%)
93 (20.8%)
99 (22.1%)
139 (31.1%)
76 (17%)
99 (22.1%)
98 (21.9%)
51 (11.4%)
36 (8.1%)
72 (16.1%)
37 (8.3%)
81 (18.1%)
46 (10.3%)
169 (37.8%)
263 (58.8%)
326 (72.9%)
79 (17.7%)
379 (84.8%)
254 (56.8%)
154 (34.5%)

Perception/Sense-Making Items Across Samples (cont’d.)
Item
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

I thought I heard my deceased loved one's voice
I thought I saw my deceased loved one
I thought I felt my deceased love one beside me
I talked to my loved one even though (s)he is not here
Things around me felt unreal or dreamlike
It could be hard to tell if I was awake or asleep
I had more dreams
My dreams about my loved one were comforting
My dreams about my loved one were disturbing
I had fewer dreams
I had difficulty falling and/or staying asleep
I felt the presence of my loved one….
Thinking of my loved one made it easier to fall asleep
On waking I didn't remember that my loved one had died
My thoughts could come so fast I can't write them down
Thinking of my loved one made it harder to fall asleep
I experienced an altered state of consciousness….
I had...a heightened awareness of sights and sounds….
I felt like I had mystical experiences
Time seemed to pass very slowly
Events seemed to happen in slow motion
Time seemed to go by quickly
Events seemed to speed up
Time seemed to stand still
I had difficulty keeping track of time
It was challenging for me to...gauge the passage of time
I felt that my sense of time didn't work the way it used to

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)
85 (37.9%)
55 (37.9%)
81 (36.2%)
171 (76.3%)
154 (68.8%)
28 (12.5%)
110 (49.1%)
124 (55.4%)
69 (30.8%)
42 (18.8%)
172 (76.8%)
104 (46.4%)
71 (31.7%)
115 (51.3%)
63 (28.1%)
138 (61.6%)
51 (22.8%)
26 (11.6%)
45 (20.1%)
123 (54.9%
84 (37.5%)
99 (44.2%)
53 (23.7%)
75 (33.5%)
111 (50.2%)
89 (39.7%)
78 (34.8%)

SONA sample
(n=223)
47 (21.1%)
41 (18.4%)
41 (18.4%)
84 (37.7%)
93 (41.7%)
34 (15.2%)
68 (30.5%)
78 (35%)
34 (15.2%)
34 (15.2%)
102 (45.7%)
48 (21.5%)
39 (17.5%)
93 (41.7%)
42 (18.8%)
87 (39%)
35 (15.7%)
30 (13.5%)
21 (9.4%)
88 (39.5%)
66 (29.6%)
59 (26.5%)
42 (18.8%)
71 (31.8%)
67 (30%)
58 (26%)
56 (25.1%)

Total Sample
(N=447)
132 (29.5%)
96 (21.5%)
122 (27.3%)
255 (57%)
247 (55.3%)
62 (13.9%)
178 (39.8%)
202 (45.2%)
103 (23%)
76 (17%)
274 (61.3%)
152 (34%)
110 (24.6%)
208 (46.5%)
105 (23.5%)
225 (50.3%)
86 (19.2%)
56 (12.5%)
66 (14.8%)
211 (47.2%)
150 (33.6%)
158 (35.3%)
284 (63.5%)
146 (32.7%)
178 (39.8%)
147 (32.9%)
134 (30%)

Note. Missing records < 5 for all items; the average number of missing records was 1.52 (SD = 1.2). Items
#38 and #41 (I had more/fewer dreams) do not include a follow-up item (How has this changed over
time?) for those endorsing, as this would not have made sense. All other items do feature this follow-up.
As it appears in this table, wording of some items has been altered slightly; see Appendix C for exact
wording.

In Chapter 2, the perception/sense-making dimension of the loss-processing framework
was described using the following subcomponents: shock-like symptoms, intrasensory
processing, intersensory processing, extrasensory processing, and time. Extrasensory processing
was further subdivided into hallucinations, dreams, threshold consciousness, and transliminality.
Chapter 5 outlined the process used for researching, selecting, and developing items assessing
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each of these categorizations. Challenges in separating these constructs and appropriately
assigning items to assess each of them has been noted previously; data summarizing their
percentage endorsement (by category) across samples is presented in Table 8.
Table 8
Perception/Sense-Making Percentage Endorsement by Category Across Samples
Category (item numbers)

Shock-like symptoms (1-11)
Intrasensory processing (12-24)
Intersensory processing (25-28)
Extrasensory processing (29-50)
Hallucinations (29-35)
Dreams (36-41)
Threshold consciousness (42-47)
Transliminality (48-50)
Time (51-58)

non-SONA
sample
(n=224)

SONA
sample
(n=223)

Total Sample
(N=447)

66.88%
19.33%
56.36%
40.50%
55.29%
39.21%
49.33%
18.16%
39.73%

51.41%
14.52%
37.22%

59.14%
16.93%
46.79%

25.68%

33.09%

33.63%
25.49%
30.72%
12.86%
28.42%

44.46%
32.35%
40.02%
15.51%
34.08%

Note. See Table 7 for a numbered listing of all Perception/Sense-Making items.

As summarized for the combined sample of both groups (in the third column above),
these data indicate lower endorsement for items designated to assess intrasensory processing
(16.93%) and the transliminality subcategory of extrasensory processing (15.51%). Higher
endorsement percentages were reported for intersensory processing (46.79%), the hallucinations
subcomponent of extrasensory processing (44.46%), and shock-like symptoms (59.14%). The
latter two categories exhibit the greatest differences between the non-SONA and SONA samples,
with the younger/SONA group’s percentage being 19.14 points lower for intersensory processing
and 21.66 points lower for hallucinations. Findings offer initial support for the validity of the
construct of grief-related sensory perceptions (perception/sense-making). Many of the proposed
perceptions were endorsed, however there was wide variation among them (e.g., the highest
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endorsed category was Shock-like symptoms [59.14%] and the lowest was Intrasensory
processing [16.93%]).
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Chapter 7. Discussion
Analysis
Results from this preliminary survey of self-report items assessing aspects of the lossprocessing framework’s first dimension (perception/sense-making) indicate provisional support
across its subcomponents, with participants endorsing some aspects of the dimension more than
others. The lower endorsement percentage for intrasensory processing assessment items may
relate to the agnosia-like qualities of this particular component of perception/sense-making. With
respect to agnosia-like symptoms in bereavement, it is important to recall (as outlined in Chapter
2) that with agnosia no single sense is actually impaired—only its perception—and there is no
major memory loss (see, e.g., Joseph, 2018; Puente & Tonkonogy, 2009). This could mean that
(mild,) grief-related agnosic symptoms are not recalled because they are not remembered by the
person who had them—not necessarily because they did not occur. This feature of agnosia could
make recalling them in retrospect difficult. The assessment of agnosia in non-grief contexts can
also be challenging (see, e.g., Bauer, 2006; Burns, 2004). For example, diagnosing visual
agnosia may require participants to view a photograph and then to draw or describe it—with
diagnostic criteria relying on discrepancies between the two. Retrospectively detecting this type
of intrasensory disruption using Likert-scale items may not be possible. That being said, agnosialike symptoms relating to the tracking of time were more endorsed in this survey (34.08%, n =
152). Thus, including time-related items could benefit the assessment of intrasensory processing
in relationship to grief.
Another possible factor in the lower endorsement of intrasensory processing is the
bidirectionality of several of the items (e.g., see item numbers: 12 & 19, 14 & 22, 15 & 23, 18 &
20, and 21 & 24; Appendix C). Although perhaps consistent with the oft-reported wave-like
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patterning of the experience of grief—possibly similar to the oscillation described in Stroebe and
Schut’s (1999, 2001, 2010) dual process model (DPM) of coping in grief—including items
asking respondents to consider endorsing (or not) pairs of “opposites” could have been
problematic. For example, including the two items smells seemed weaker or less noticeable than
usual and smells seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual may have served to dampen the
endorsement of both (this could have also impacted other portions of the survey, e.g., with
respect to dreams). During survey development a disclaimer was considered to address this
concern. This would have been a brief statement (provided prior to starting the survey) indicating
that discrepant items could both be endorsed (or not), since grief is often experienced in a wavelike manner—with certain of its characteristics seeming to ebb and flow over time. In the end
such a statement was not included due to concerns that it could be too confusing for participants.
An over-valuing of the meaning assigned to sensory stimuli (included as an agnosia-like
characteristic in the section on intrasensory processing in Chapter 2) could be an alternative way
to better assess this duality. For example, these items could be constructed using more nuanced
language addressing the potential meaningfulness and/or enhancement of sensory-perceptual
experiences through grief, rather than merely confirming whether or not specific senses seemed
stronger or weaker (than usual). Such an approach could help with items assessing another of the
lesser-endorsed constructs included in the current survey, transliminality. It is important to
remember, however, that lower item endorsement does not preclude an item’s potential utility—
possibly as an indication of grief complications or of a growth/learning opportunity. Exploring
alexithymia as well as expressive and affective agnosia as potential sources for items relating to
emotional perception could also be beneficial to intrasensory item development.
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Thelen and Smith’s (1994) assertion that “…there is little or no learning or development
that is strictly within modality” (p. 194) also bears mentioning with respect to challenges in
measuring intrasensory processing. Experiencing the world multimodally may make it harder to
remember those experiences unimodally. This could be (one of) the reason(s) intersensory
processing was the second most endorsed component of perception/sense-making (46.79%).
The percentage endorsement for hallucinations (a subcategory of extrasensory
processing) was close to that of intersensory processing for the combined sample (44.46%);
recall that these two categories also feature the greatest disparity in percentages between the two
groups, with the SONA sample being 21.66 points lower for hallucinations and 19.14 points
lower for intersensory processing (threshold consciousness was third at 18.61 points lower). The
language used for the hallucination-related items could perhaps aid in teasing this apart in the
future. For example, item 30 (I sensed or felt the presence of the person who died) could be used
with either sensed or felt the presence of (rather than both) along with my loved one instead of of
the person who died to see if this would be more similarly endorsed by both the SONA and nonSONA samples. As noted previously, the stigma associated with reporting having had
hallucinatory experiences may have played a role in endorsement levels for these items. It could
also be that these are age- or other sample characteristic-related differences that are not
language-dependent.
Shock-like symptoms was the most endorsed category for both groups of participants,
with the combined sample endorsing these 11 items averaging 59.14%. It is possible that this
was influenced by the fact that these were the first non-socio-demographical items to be
presented in the survey, and participants were ready to get started (thus perhaps attending to
these initial items more than to those that followed). Other possibilities include, but are not
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limited to: 1) shock is typically considered a temporary physiological state and is therefore
possibly more endorsable than (some of the) other characteristics outlined in the
perception/sense-making dimension—which could be viewed as potentially more permanent,
psychological in nature, and therefore also more subject to stigmatization. The word shock was
not, however, used in any of these items, and several of them related to dissociative symptoms of
severe (dis)stress (e.g., items 4, 6, 8, and 10). 2) The author’s past experiences as a funeral
director could have served to somehow aid in the selection of shock-like symptom-related items,
since most often a funeral director is with families during the period of time immediately after
the death of their loved one (which is known to feature shock-like symptoms). This may have
influenced the selection of more authentic or resonant items assessing shock-like symptoms for
those remembering their grief. These items were also closely aligned with those from existing
scales with items assessing acute (dis)stress, dissociation, depersonalization, and derealization,
which were valuable tools in developing assessment items for shock-like symptoms relating to
grief (see Appendices A and E – J). 3) Participants possibly endorsed these items more often
because they included more general descriptions (e.g., I had difficulty concentrating/focusing
attention; I felt restless; I felt numb; I felt as if I was in a daze) that were therefore more
endorsable. 4) These items resonated more with the grief experiences of participants; thus, they
were more endorsed by those participating in the survey. Or, 5) A combination of the
aforementioned factors.
Implications
This study articulates a new approach to the understanding of grief, the loss-processing
framework. While there is existing support for the framework’s three dimensions:
perception/sense-making, orientation/way-finding, and direction/perspective-seeking (as
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articulated in Chapters 2-4), extant support is strongest for the framework’s third dimension,
direction/perspective-seeking (or meaning-making). Thus, this preliminary study examined the
self-reported retrospective survey responses of bereaved adults containing items selected or
developed to assess what is perhaps the least-well studied dimension of the framework,
perception/sense-making—and its subcomponents.
The current project added descriptive detail regarding how grief is understood in
relationship to sensory-perceptual processing. Results confirmed some support for selected
aspects of the perception/sense-making dimension (e.g., shock-like symptoms, intersensory
processing, and the extrasensory processing subcomponents of hallucinations and threshold
consciousness) but found less support for items assessing other facets of the dimension (e.g.,
intrasensory processing and the extrasensory processing subcomponent of transliminality).
Challenges regarding the assessment of perception/sense-making may relate to how some
aspects of this dimension of the framework have been categorized. For example, including
possible agnosia-like impacts on the intrasensory processing of the perception of time and
emotions during grief may be helpful in future development of assessment items. Also, altering
items to avoid bidirectionality could aid in better assessing intrasensory processing and dreams
in perception/sense-making.
The primary aim of collecting and examining these data was to conduct an initial
empirical investigation of the first dimension of the loss-processing framework. Doing so
underscores the import of the item development process. For example, item 28 (I felt like I was
descending rapidly in an elevator) was extrapolated from the feeling described by Handler
(1999) when: “…thinking there is one more stair than there is. Your foot falls down, through the
air, and there is a sickly moment of dark surprise as you try and readjust the way you thought of
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things” (p. 97). An item relating to this feeling Handler describes might be endorsed differently
than the elevator item that was included in the current survey (which received the fewest
endorsements of all items assessing intersensory processing). Similarly, of the eight items
relating to the perception of time, two (51 and 56) were endorsed more often; thus, only these
could be used in the future to avoid redundancy.
An important implication of the current study, then, is that although it indicates some
preliminary support for the loss-processing framework’s first dimension, much additional work
is needed. Going forward, some of this work will rely upon continued data collection (which is
ongoing). A thorough investigation of socio-demographical, bereavement, mourning, grief, and
health-related data in association with the perception/sense-making dimension’s components is
warranted. These analyses will be done in tandem with an assessment of survey data collected
regarding the framework’s other two dimensions, orientation/way-finding and
direction/perspective-seeking, as well as data regarding the trajectory of each item’s change over
time. Direction/perspective-seeking includes psychometrically validated instrumentation
assessing meaning-making, and orientation/way-finding includes items that potentially overlap
with those assessing perception/sense-making.
Limitations
Data collection during COVID-19 is a potential limitation of this study. Retrospective
self-reports of the experience of loss response during a time of such exceptional loss(es) was
possibly problematic. Five participants reported having experienced the loss of a loved one due
to the pandemic in their survey responses. It was unfortunate to be assessing grief when
attending collective mourning rituals was, for the most part, not possible. Lockdowns, closures,
and isolation related to the pandemic may have increased the likelihood of online survey
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participation, but trust in (and participation on) the social media platforms used to promote the
survey to potential participants was tenuous during this time of upheaval. The reported mental
and physical health and well-being of participants was also likely impacted by COVID-19.
Some characteristics of the SONA sample are also limiting, including a lack of
geographic and age diversity (constricting the generalizability of these findings), as well as
incentivized participation. The SONA studies that were available on-line (and needed in order to
achieve the required research credits to avoid grade degradation) were few in number; it is
difficult to imagine—but hard to know—how this would not have resulted in participation
outside of study guidelines (i.e., students taking the survey who were not bereaved). Opening the
survey to SONA in the first place was due to another limitation of the study, finding participants.
In this case SONA enabled outreach to and procurement of as many participants in a few weeks
as had been previously enlisted in as many months—but their data remains marginally suspect
due to the incentivization of their participation.
There were gender identity, race, sexual orientation, and religious affiliation diversity
deficiencies for both the SONA and non-SONA samples. The ETSU/SONA sample did exhibit
more diversity than the non-SONA sample in terms of race/ethnicity and sexual orientation. The
non-SONA group provided greater geographical and age diversity.
Limitations regarding research involving individuals who have experienced loss due to
the death of a loved one are well documented (see, e.g., Cassileth & Lusk, 1989; Grande &
Todd, 2000; Hudson et al., 2005; Hudson & Hayman-White, 2006). Doing so by anonymous
online survey may appear to alleviate some of these concerns, but not altogether. Selecting and
wording items for inclusion in the survey was particularly difficult; efforts to “do no harm” in the
process of probing for meaningful information regarding the grief experiences of individuals

98

proved both challenging and limiting. For example, the age of decedent at time of death item did
not allow for deaths under the age of 1, which resulted in some participants selecting “0” or
using decimal points in response to this item. And for the final mourning-related characteristic,
burial and cremation are not mutually exclusive; the former can follow the latter. Also, the
ordering of items in the survey was limiting—whereas randomizing them would have been
preferred, to avoid possible order effects, doing so could have made the participants’ experience
potentially more taxing. Item ordering was therefore not randomized.
Future Directions
Having described the loss-processing framework and subsequently designed and
implemented a preliminary survey of self-report items assessing aspects of its dimensional
components (one of the three of which is reported herein), a future research direction will be to
finalize data collection for this assessment and to further analyze it. This includes data regarding
the framework’s three dimensions, their possible relationship(s) to one another, and the potential
associations between/among them and mental and physical health and well-being; specified
characteristics of bereavement, grief, and mourning; and socio-demographical factors. Follow-up
items regarding the trajectory of change over time (occurring more often, occurring less often,
unchanged, or no longer occurring) will be important to consider, as these trajectories may aid in
possibly predicting other constructs assessed in the survey (e.g., those addressing health and
well-being, grief, and/or meaning-making). Further refinement of the items/instruments assessing
the framework will be a natural outgrowth of this line of research and will be requisite to further
examination of the relationships outlined above.
The framework may have utility as an applied, interpretive model of grief as well. This
was the reason for its initial conception, to perhaps serve as a modular tool to help individuals
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better apprehend their grief in order to grow both through and with it. For example, might it be
possible to create an environment for survivors where awareness of dimensional aspects of the
loss-processing framework (perception/sense-making, orientation/way-finding, and
direction/perspective-seeking) is cultivated for individuals prior to death’s occurrence (in preloss bereavement—during palliative/hospice care for their loved one), so as to better leverage the
experience of loss (which is inevitable) toward positive personal growth for survivors in its
wake? Or might a post-loss intervention more fully articulating and encouraging awareness of
the loss-processing framework’s dimensions suffice? Or would a combination of both of these
approaches be preferred? And, as noted at the end of Chapter 4, more research is needed
regarding the possible underlying relationship(s) between and among potential constructs such as
resilience, religiousness, spirituality, sense of coherence, forgiveness, and self-compassion (as
well as awe, communion, Eudaimonia, flourishing, gratitude, [progressive] hope, personal sense
of uniqueness, poignancy, surrender, and other meaning-making-related concepts) and the
components of the loss-processing framework.
Conclusion
The current study articulated a novel approach to framing our understanding of response
to loss due to human death, the loss-processing framework. Fifty-eight preliminary items
assessing the framework’s first dimension, perception/sense-making, were developed and
administered to a group of 447 participants; initial support for the framework was indicated in
the survey responses from this sample.
A better understanding of grief through the loss-processing framework may serve to
identify and possibly alleviate (or even prevent) complications due to bereavement, improve

100

interventions when such complications are indicated, and enhance the adaptive and generative
potential for personal growth in response to loss.
Considering the provisional nature of the current study, further inquiry is necessary. First,
additional work is warranted regarding the framework’s other two dimensions (orientation/wayfinding and direction/perspective-seeking). These data have been—and are continuing to be—
collected as of the completion of this paper, and their analysis is forthcoming. Future research,
perhaps also using qualitative and/or mixed methods approaches, may be needed to provide
additional descriptive detail regarding the range of grief experiences relating to the proposed
framework. These added empirical techniques could aid in adapting and creating measurement
instrumentation (possibly using items included herein) to better leverage the loss-processing
framework as a possibly predictive, interpretive, and functional tool for enhancing grief, mental
and physical health, and quality of life outcomes.
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Kübler-Ross, E. & Kessler, D. (2005). On grief and grieving: Finding the meaning of grief
through the five stages of loss. Scribner.
LaGrand, L. E. (2005). The nature and therapeutic implications of the extraordinary experiences
of the bereaved. Journal of Near-Death Studies, 24, 3–20.
Lancaster, S. L., & Carlson, G. C. (2015). Meaning made, distress, and growth: An examination
of the integration of stressful life experiences scale. International Journal of Stress
Management, 22(1), 92-110. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038296
Lane, R. D., Weihs, K. L., Herring, A., Hishaw, A., & Smith, R. (2015). Affective agnosia:
Expansion of the alexithymia construct and a new opportunity to integrate and extend
Freud's legacy. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 55, 594-611.
Lange, Thalbourne, Houran, & Storm. (2000). The revised transliminality scale: Reliability and
validity data from a Rasch top-down purification procedure. Consciousness and
Cognition, 9(4), 591-617. https://doi.org/10.1006/ccog.2000.0472

123

Latham, K., & Peek, C. W. (2013). Self-rated health and morbidity onset among late midlife US
adults. Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social
Sciences, 68(1), 107-116. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbs104
Latham, A. E., & Prigerson, H. G. (2004). Suicidality and bereavement: Complicated grief as
psychiatric disorder presenting greatest risk for suicidality. Suicide and Life Threatening
Behavior, 34(4), 350-362. https://doi.org/10.1521/suli.34.4.350.53737
Layne, C. M., Kaplow, J. B., Oosterhoff, B., Hill, R. M., & S Pynoos, R. (2017). The interplay
between posttraumatic stress and grief reactions in traumatically bereaved adolescents:
When trauma, bereavement, and adolescence converge. Adolescent Psychiatry, 7(4), 266285.
Le Poidevin, R. (2011) The experience and perception of time. In Zalta, E. N. (Ed.): The
Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/
Lichtenthal, W. G., Burke, L. A., & Neimeyer, R. A. (2011). Religious coping and meaningmaking following the loss of a loved one. Counseling and Spirituality, 30, 113–136.
Lichtenthal, W. G., Currier, J. M., Neimeyer, R. A., & Keesee, N. J. (2010). Sense and
significance: A mixed methods examination of meaning making after the loss of one’s
child. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 66(7), 791–812.
Lindemann, Erich. (1994/1994). Symptomatology and management of acute grief. American
Journal of Psychiatry, 151(6), 155-160. (Original work published in 1944)
Lindstrøm, T. C. (2002). "It ain't necessarily so"... challenging mainstream thinking about
bereavement. Family & Community Health, 25(1), 11-21.
Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. (1995). Social conditions as fundamental causes of disease. Journal of
Health and Social Behavior, 35, 80–94

124

Lissauer, H. (1890). Ein Fall von seelenblindheit nebst einem beitrage zur theorie
derselben. Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten, 21(2), 222-270.
Maercker, A., Brewin, C. R., Bryant, R. A., Cloitre, M., Reed, G. M., van Ommeren, M.,
Humayun, A., Jones, L. M., Kagee, A., Llosa, A. E., Rousseau, C., Somasundaram, D. J.,
Souza, T., Suzuki, Y., Weissbecker, I., Wessely, S. C., First, M. B., & Saxena, S. (2013).
Proposals for mental disorders specifically associated with stress in the ICD-11. Lancet,
381, 1683-1685. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)62191-6
Maercker, A., Lalor, J. (2012). Diagnostic and clinical considerations in prolonged grief
disorder. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 14(2): 167–176.
Maciejewski, P., Zhang, B., Block, S., & Prigerson, H. (2007). An empirical examination of the
stage theory of grief. JAMA, 297(7), 716-723.
Marris, P. (1958/2004). Widows and their families. London, England, UK: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Marris, P. (1974). Loss and change. Anchor Press.
Martin, E. (Ed.) (2015) Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary (9th Edition). Oxford University
Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780199687817.001.0001
Martinčeková, L., & Klatt, J. (2017). Mothers’ grief, forgiveness, and posttraumatic growth after
the loss of a child. OMEGA-Journal of Death and Dying, 75(3), 248-265.
Martinez, D. J., Kasl, S. V., Gill, T. M., & Barry, L. C. (2010). Longitudinal association between
self-rated health and timed gait among older persons. Journals of Gerontology Series B:
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 65(6), 715-719.

125

Maury, A. Des hallucinations hypnagogiques ou des erreurs des sens dans 1'etat intermidiare
entre la veille et le sommeil. Annales Medico-Psychologiques du Systeme Nerveux, 1848,
11, 26-40.
Mavromatis, A. (Ed.). (1987). Hypnagogia: The unique state of consciousness between
wakefulness and sleep. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
McCabe, M. (2003). The paradox of loss: Toward a relational theory of grief. Praeger
Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group.
McCarthy-Jones, Barnes, Hill, Marwood, Moseley, & Fernyhough. (2011). When words and
pictures come alive: Relating the modality of intrusive thoughts to modalities of
hypnagogic/hypnopompic hallucinations. Personality and Individual Differences, 51(6),
787-790.
McDermott, O., Prigerson, H. G., & Reynolds, C. F. (1997). EEG sleep in complicated
grief and bereavement-related depression: A preliminary report. Biological Psychology,
41, 710–716.
McDonald, M. J., Wong, P. T. R., & Gingras, D. T. (2012). Meaning-in-life measures and
development of a brief version of the Personal Meaning Profile. In P. T. P. Wong
(Ed.), The human quest for meaning: Theories, research, and applications., 2nd ed. (pp.
357–382). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
McEvers, R. (Narrator). (2013, May 10). Former Air Force pilot has cautionary tales about
drones [Radio broadcast episode]. In E. McDonnell (Producer), Morning Edition.
Washington, DC: National Public Radio.

126

McHill, A. W. (2020). Utilizing the National Basketball Association’s COVID-19 restart
“bubble” to uncover the impact of travel and circadian disruption on athletic
performance. Scientific Reports, 10, 21827. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-78901-2
McIntosh, D. N., Silver, R. C., & Wortman, C. B. (1993). Religion’s role in adjustment to a
negative life event: Coping with the loss of a child. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 65, 812–821.
Michael, S. T., & Snyder, C. R. (2005). Getting unstuck: The roles of hope, finding meaning, and
rumination in adjustment to bereavement among college students. Death Studies, 29(5),
435-458.
Middleton, W., Raphael, B., Burnett, P., & Martinek, N. (1998). A longitudinal study comparing
bereavement phenomena in recently bereaved spouses, adult children and parents.
Australasian Psychiatry, 32(2), 235-241.
Miles, M. S., & Crandall, E. K. B. (1983). The search for meaning and its potential for affecting
growth in bereaved parents. Health Values, 7, 19-23.
Mental Imagery and Human-Computer Interaction Lab (2021)
http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/mkozhevnlab/?page_id=308
Munk, H. (1960). Über die Funktionen der Grosshirnrinde. 3te Mitteilung. Berlin, Germany: A.
Hirschwald. In G. Von Bonin (Ed) Some papers on the cerebral cortex. [Translated as
“On the functions of the cortex”] from the French and German (pp. 97-117). Charles C.
Thomas. (Original work published in 1881)
Moon, J., Kondo, N., Glymour, M., Subramanian, S., & Hartling, L. (2011). Widowhood and
mortality: A meta-analysis. PLoS ONE, 6(8), E23465.

127

Morris, S. E., & Block, S. D. (2015). Adding value to palliative care services: The development
of an institutional bereavement program. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 18(11), 915922. https://doi.org/10.1089/jpm.2015.0080
Moss, R. (2005). The dreamer’s book of the dead. Rochester, Vermont, US: Destiny Books.
Mossey, J. M., & Shapiro, E. (1982). Self-rated health: A predictor of mortality among the
elderly. American Journal of Public Health, 72(8), 800-808.
Müller, J. (1848). The physiology of the senses. Taylor, Walton, & Mayberry,
Müller, J. (1967). Ueber die phantastischen gesichtserscheinungen: Einephysiologische
untersuchung [On fantastic visual phenomena: A physiological investigation]. W. Fritsch.
(Original work published in 1826)
Murphy, S. A., Clark Johnson, L., & Lohan, J. (2003). Finding meaning in a child’s violent
death: A five-year prospective analysis of parents’ personal narratives and empirical data.
Death Studies, 27(5), 381-404.
Myers, F. W. H. (1918). Human personality and its survival of bodily death. Longmans, Green,
and Co. (Original work published in 1903)
Nadeau, J. W. (2008). Meaning-making in bereaved families: Assessment, intervention, and
future research. In M. S. Stroebe, R. O. Hansson, H. Schut & W. Stroebe (Eds.),
Handbook of bereavement research and practice: Advances in theory and intervention.
(pp. 511-530). American Psychological Association
https://doi.org/10.1037/14498-024
Nakajima, Y., ten Hoopen, G., & van der Wilk, R. (1991). A new illusion of time perception.
Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 8(4), 431-448.
Neary, L. (Narrator). (2019, May 14). In ‘Once More We Saw Stars:’ Grief and love together.

128

[Radio broadcast episode]. In T. Cole (Producer), All Things Considered. Washington,
DC, US: National Public Radio.
Neimeyer, R. A. (1998). Lessons of loss: A guide to coping. McGraw-Hill
Neimeyer, R. A. (2000a). Searching for the meaning of meaning: Grief therapy and the process
of reconstruction. Death Studies, 24, 541-558.
Neimeyer, R. A. (2000b). Narrative disruptions in the construction of self. In R. A. Neimeyer &
J. Raskin (Eds.), Constructions of disorder (pp. 207–242). American Psychological
Association.
Neimeyer, R. A. (2001). Meaning reconstruction & the experience of loss. American
Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10397-000
Neimeyer, R. A. (2001). The language of loss: Grief therapy as a process of meaning
reconstruction. In R. A. Neimeyer (Ed.), Meaning reconstruction & the experience of loss
(pp. 261-292). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10397-014
Neimeyer, R. A. (2005). Grief, loss, and the quest for meaning: Narrative contributions to
bereavement care. Bereavement Care, 24, 27-30.
Neimeyer, R. A. (2006). Complicated grief and the quest for meaning: A constructivist
contribution. OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying, 52(1), 37-52.
Neimeyer, R. A. (2014). The changing face of grief: Contemporary directions in theory,
research, and practice. Progress in Palliative Care, 22(3), 125-130.
Neimeyer, R. A. (Ed.). (2015a). Techniques of grief therapy: Assessment and intervention.
Routledge.

129

Neimeyer, R. A. (2015b). Treating complicated bereavement: The development of grief therapy.
In. J. M. Stillion & T. Attig (Eds.). Death, dying, and bereavement: Contemporary
perspectives, institutions, and practices (pp. 307 – 320). Springer Publishing Company.
Neimeyer, R. A. (2016). Meaning reconstruction in the wake of loss: Evolution of a research
program. Behaviour Change, 33(2), 65-79. https://doi.org/10.1017/bec.2016.4
Neimeyer, R. A. & Anderson, A. (2002). Meaning reconstruction theory. In N. Thompson (Ed.),
Loss and grief: A guide for human services practitioners (pp. 45–64). Palgrave
Macmillan.
Neimeyer, R. A., Baldwin, S. A., & Gillies, J. (2006). Continuing bonds and reconstructing
meaning: Mitigating complications in bereavement. Death studies, 30(8), 715-738.
Neimeyer, R. A. & Harris, D. L. (2011). Building bridges in bereavement research and practice:
Some concluding reflections. In R. A. Neimeyer, D. L. Harris, H. R. Winokuer, & G. F.
Thorton (Eds.) Grief and bereavement in contemporary society: Bridging research and
practice (pp. 291-301). Routledge.
Nesse, R. M. (2000). Is grief really maladaptive? [Review of the book The nature of grief:
The evolution and psychology of reactions to loss]. Evolution and Human Behavior,
21,59-61.
Nesse, R. M. (2005) An evolutionary framework for understanding grief. In C. B. Wortman, R.
M. Nesse, & D. S. Carr (Eds.), Spousal bereavement in late life (195-226). Springer
Publishing Company.
Nicholson, N. L. (2016). When mourning comes: A phenomenological exploration of dreams of
the bereaved parent (Order No. 10182195). Available from ProQuest Dissertations &
Theses Global. (1850901139).

130

Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Davis, C. G. (2002) Positive responses to loss: Perceiving benefits and
growth. In C. Snyder, & S. Lopez, (Eds.), Handbook of Positive Psychology. (pp. 598607) Oxford University Press.
Noronha, K. (2014). Dream work in grief therapy. Indian Journal of Psychological Medicine,
36(3), 321-323.
Nowatzki, N. R., & Grant Kalischuk, R. (2009). Post-death encounters: Grieving, mourning, and
healing. OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying, 59(2), 91-111.
https://doi.org/10.2190/OM.59.2.a
Ohayon, M. M., Priest, R. G., Caulet, M., & Guilleminault, C. (1996). Hypnagogic and
hypnopompic hallucinations: Pathological phenomena?. The British Journal of
Psychiatry, 169(4), 459-467.
O'Leary, V., & Ickovics, J. (1995). Resilience and thriving in response to challenge: An
opportunity for a paradigm shift in women's health. Womens Health, 1(2), 121-142.
Olsen, M. R., Schredl, M., & Carlsson, I. (2016). People’s views on dreaming: Attitudes and
subjective dream theories, with regard to age, education, and sex. Dreaming, 26(2), 158168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/drm0000020
Olson, P., Suddeth, J., Peterson, P., & Egelhoff, C. (1985). Hallucinations of Widowhood.
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 33(8), 543-547.
Osterweis, M., Solomon, F. and Green, M. (1984). Bereavement: Reactions, consequences and
care. National Academy Press.
Papa, A., Lancaster, N. G., & Kahler, J. (2014). Commonalities in grief responding across
bereavement and non-bereavement losses. Journal of Affective Disorders, 136-143.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2014.03.018

131

Pargament, K. I., & Park, C. L. (1997). In times of stress: The religion-coping connection. In B.
Spilka & D. M. McIntosh (Eds.), Psychology of religion: Theoretical approaches (pp.
43753). US-Westview Press.
Park, C. L. (2005). Religion as a meaning-making framework in coping with life stress. Journal
of Social Issues, 61, 707–729.
Park, C. L. (2010). Making sense of the meaning literature: An integrative review of meaning
making and its effect on adjustment to stressful life events. Psychological Bulletin, 136,
257–301.
Park, C. L. (2013). Trauma and meaning making: Converging conceptualizations and emerging
evidence. In J. A. Hicks, C. Routledge, J. A. Hicks, C. Routledge (Eds.), The experience
of meaning in life: Classical perspectives, emerging themes, and controversies (pp. 6176). Springer Science + Business Media. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6527-6_5
Parker, J. S. (2005). Extraordinary experiences of the bereaved and adaptive outcomes of grief.
OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying, 51, 257–283
Parkes, C. (1970). The first year of bereavement†: A longitudinal study of the reaction of
London widows to the death of their husbands. Psychiatry, 33(4), 444–467.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00332747.1970.11023644
Parkes, C. M. (1971). Psycho-social transitions: A field of study. Social Science and Medicine, 5,
101-115.
Parkes, C. M. (1972). Bereavement: Studies of grief in adult life. International Universities Press.
Parkes, C. M. (1975). What becomes of redundant world models? A contribution to the study of
adaptation to change. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 48, 131-137.
Parkes, C. M., and Weiss, R. S. (1983). Recovery from Bereavement. Basic Books.

132

Pearce, C. (2018). Negotiating recovery in bereavement care practice in England: A qualitative
study. Bereavement Care, 37(1), 6-16.
Pew Research Center. (2014). Religious landscape study:
https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/
Phelan, J., Link, B. G., & Tehranifar, P. (2010). Social conditions as fundamental causes of
health inequalities: Theory, evidence, and policy implications. Journal of Health and
Social Behavior, 51(1 Suppl.), S28–S40.
Phillips, I. (2010). Perceiving temporal properties. European Journal of Philosophy, 18(2), 176202. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00299.x
Pike, A., Dawley, S., & Tomaney, J. (2010). Resilience, adaptation and adaptability. Cambridge
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 3(1), 59-70.
Pollock, G. H. (1981). Aging or aged: Development or pathology. In S. I. Greenspan & G. H.
Pollock (Eds.), The course of life: Psychoanalytic contributions toward understanding
personality development, Vol. 3, (pp. 549-585). National Institute of Mental Health.
Pollock, G. H. (1987). The mourning-liberation process in health and disease. The Psychiatric
Clinics of North America, 10(3), 345-54.
Pollock, G. H. (1989a). The mourning-liberation process, Vols. 1 & 2. International Universities
Press, Inc.
Pollock, G. H. (1989b). The mourning process, the creative process, and the creation. In D. R.
Dietrich & P. C. Shabad (Eds.), The problem of loss and mourning: Psychoanalytic
perspectives. (pp. 27–59). International Universities Press, Inc.
Prieto-González, L., Stantchev, V., & Colomo-Palacios, R. C. (2014). Applications of ontologies
in knowledge representation of human perception. IJMSO, 9(1), 74-80.

133

Prigerson, H. G., Bierhals, A. J., Kasl, S. V., Reynolds, C. F., Shear, M. K., Day, N., Beery, L.,
Newsom, J., & Jacobs, S. (1997). Traumatic grief as a risk factor for mental and physical
morbidity. American Journal of Psychiatry, 154(5), 616-623.
https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.154.5.616
Prigerson, H., Horowitz, M., Jacobs, S., Parkes, C., Aslan, M., Goodkin, K., Raphael, B.,
Marwit, S., Wortman, C., Neimeyer, R., Bonanno, G., Bonanno, G., Block, S., Kissane,
D., Boelen, P., Maercker, A., Litz, B., Johnson, J., First, M., & Maciejewski, P. (2009).
Prolonged grief disorder: Psychometric validation of criteria proposed for DSM-V and
ICD-11. PLoS Medicine, 6(8), e1000121–e1000121.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000121
Prigerson, H. G., & Jacobs, S. C. (2001). Traumatic grief as a distinct disorder: A rationale,
consensus criteria, and a preliminary empirical test. In M. S. Stroebe, R. O. Hansson, W.
Stroebe, & H. Schut (Eds.), Handbook of bereavement research (pp. 613–645). American
Psychological Association.
Prigerson, H. G., & Maciejewski, P. K. (2008). Grief and acceptance as opposite sides of the
same coin: Setting a research agenda to study peaceful acceptance of loss. The British
Journal of Psychiatry, 193(6), 435-437.
Prigerson, H., Maciejewski, P., Reynolds, C., Bierhals, A., Newsom, J., Fasiczka, A., Frank, E.,
Doman, J., & Miller, M. (1995). Inventory of complicated grief: A scale to measure
maladaptive symptoms of loss. Psychiatry Research, 59(1), 65–79.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1781(95)02757-2
Prigerson, H., Shear, M., Jacobs, S., Reynolds, C., Maciejewski, P., Davidson, J., Rosenheck, R.,
Pilkonis, P., Wortman, C., Williams, J., Widiger, T., Frank, E., Kupfer, D., & Zisook, S.

134

(1999). Consensus criteria for traumatic grief. A preliminary empirical test. British
Journal of Psychiatry, 174(1), 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.174.1.67
Proulx, T., Markman, K. D., & Lindberg, M. J. (2013). Introduction: The new science of
meaning. In K. D. Markman, T. Proulx, M. J. Lindberg (Eds.), The psychology of
meaning (pp. 3-14). Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.
https://doi.org/10.1037/14040-001
Puente, A. E., & Tonkonogy, J. M. (2009). Localization of clinical syndromes in
neuropsychology and neuroscience. Springer Publishing Company.
Quesnel–Vallée, A. (2007). Self-rated health: Caught in the crossfire of the quest for ‘true’
health?. International Journal of Epidemiology, 36(6), 1161-1164.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dym236
Rando, T. A. (1984). Grief, dying, and death: Clinical interventions for caregivers. Research
Press.
Rando, T. (1988). Grieving: How to go on living when someone you love dies. Lexington
Books—Rowan and Littlefield Publishing Group
Rando, T. A. (1993). Treatment of complicated mourning. Research Press.
Raphael, B. (1993). Preface. In S. Jacobs (Author). Pathologic grief: Maladaptation to loss. (pp.
xi – xv). American Psychiatric Association.
Rees, W. D. (1971a). The hallucinatory reaction of bereavement (unpublished doctoral thesis),
University of London (King’s College), London, England, UK.
Rees, W. D. (1971b). The hallucinations of widowhood. British Medical Journal, 4(5778), 3741.

135

Rees, W. D., & Lutkins, S. G. (1967). Mortality of bereavement. British Medical Journal,
4(5570), 13-16.
Robinaugh, D., Mauro, C., Bui, E., Stone, L., Shah, R., Wang, Y., Skritskaya, N., Reynolds, C.,
Zisook, S., O’Connor, M., Shear, K., & Simon, N. (2016). Yearning and its measurement
in complicated grief. Journal of Loss & Trauma, 21(5), 410–420.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15325024.2015.1110447
Rochlin, G. (1965). Griefs and discontents: The forces of change. J. & A. Churchill Ltd.
Rosen, C. S., Drescher, K. D., Moos, R. H., Finney, J. W., Murphy, R. T., & Gusman, F. (2000).
Six- and ten-item indexes of psychological distress based on the Symptom Checklist–90.
Assessment, 7, 103–111.
Rosenblatt, P. C. (2001). A social constructionist perspective on cultural differences in grief. In
Stroebe, M. S., Hansson, R. O., Stroebe, W. E., & Schut, H. E. (Eds.), Handbook of
bereavement research: Consequences, coping, and care (pp. 285-300) American
Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10436-012
Rothaupt, J. W., & Becker, K. (2007). A literature review of Western bereavement theory: From
decathecting to continuing bonds. The Family Journal, 15(1), 6-15.
Rubin, S. S. (1993). The death of a child is forever: The life course impact of child loss. In M. S.
Stroebe, W. Stroebe, & R. O. Hansson (Eds.), Bereavement: A sourcebook of research
and intervention (pp. 285-299). Cambridge University Press.
Ryff, C. D. (2014). Psychological well-being revisited: Advances in the science and practice of
eudaimonia. Psychotherapy and psychosomatics, 83(1), 10-28.
https://doi.org/10.1159/000353263

136

Sack, R., Auckley, D., Auger, R., Carskadon, M., Wright, K., Vitiello, M., & Zhdanova, I.
(2007). Circadian rhythm sleep disorders: Part I, basic principles, shift work and jet lag
disorders. Sleep., 30(11), 1460-1483.
Sacks, O. (2012). Hallucinations. Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House.
Sanders, C. M. (1980). A comparison of adult bereavement in the death of spouse, child, and
parent. OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying, 10, 303-322.
Sandler, I., Balk, D., Jordan, J., Kennedy, C., Nadeau, J., Shapiro, E. R., & Grp, B. W. (2005).
Bridging the gap between research and practice in bereavement: Report from the center
for the advancement of health. Death Studies, 29(2), 93-122.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07481180590906138
Schacter, D. L., Gilbert, D. T., Wegner, D. M. (2012) Psychology, Palgrave Macmillan
Schacter, D. L., & Hernstein, R. J. (1976). The hypnagogic state: A critical review of the
literature. Psychological Bulletin,83(3), 452-481.
Schaefer, J. A., & Moos, R. H. (2001). Bereavement experiences and personal growth. In M. S.
Stroebe, R. O. Hansson, W. Stroebe & H. Schut (Eds.), Handbook of bereavement
research: Consequences, coping, and care; handbook of bereavement research:
Consequences, coping, and care. (pp. 145-167). American Psychological Association.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10436-006
Schnell, L. J. (2004) Learning how to tell. Literature and Medicine, 23(2), 265-279.
Schultze-Florey, C. R., Martínez-Maza, O., Magpantay, L., Breen, E. C., Irwin, M. R., Gündel,
H., & O’Connor, M. F. (2012). When grief makes you sick: Bereavement induced
systemic inflammation is a question of genotype. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 26(7),
1066-1071.

137

Schütte, S., Chastang, J. F., Malard, L., Parent-Thirion, A., Vermeylen, G., & Niedhammer, I.
(2014). Psychosocial working conditions and psychological well-being among employees
in 34 European countries. International Archives of Occupational and Environmental
Health, 87(8), 897-907. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00420-014-0930-0
Schwartzberg, S. S. (1992). AIDS-related bereavement among gay men: The inadequacy of
current theories of grief. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 29(3),
422-429.
Schwartzberg, S. S. (1993). Struggling for meaning: How HIV-positive gay men make sense of
AIDS. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 24(4), 483-490.
Shahar, D. R, Schultz, Richard, Shahar, Avner, & Wing, Rena R. (2001). The effect of
widowhood on weight change, dietary intake, and eating behavior in the elderly
population. Journal of Aging and Health, 13(2), 186-199.
Shapiro, E. R. (1996). Grief in Freud’s life: Reconceptualizing bereavement in psychoanalytic
theory. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 13(4), 547–566. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0079710
Shapiro E. R. (2001). Grief in interpersonal perspective: Theories and their implications. In M. S.
Stroebe, R. O. Hansson, W. Stroebe, & H. Schut (eds). In M. S. Stroebe, R. O. Hansson,
W. Stroebe & H. Schut (Eds.), Handbook of bereavement research: Consequences,
coping, and care (pp. 301-327). American Psychological Association.
https://doi.org/10.1037/10436-013
Shear, M., Simon, N., Wall, M., Zisook, S., Neimeyer, R., Duan, N., Reynolds, C., Lebowitz, B.,
Sung, S., Ghesquiere, A., Gorscak, B., Clayton, P., Ito, M., Nakajima, S., Konishi, T.,
Melhem, N., Meert, K., Schiff, M., O’Connor, M., … Keshaviah, A. (2011). Complicated

138

grief and related bereavement issues for DSM‐5. Depression and Anxiety, 28(2), 103–
117. https://doi.org/10.1002/da.20780
Sherwood, S. (2000). A comparison of the features of psychomanteum and
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences. Journal of Parapsychology, 64(3), 251-252.
Shahane, A., Fagundes, C., & Denny, B. (2018). Mending the heart and mind during times of
loss: A review of interventions to improve emotional well-being during spousal
bereavement. Bereavement Care, 37(2), 44-54.
Shuchter, S.R. and Zisook, S. (1993). The course of normal grief. In: M. S. Stroebe, W. E.,
Stroebe, & R. O. Hansson (Eds.), Handbook of bereavement: Theory, research, and
intervention (pp. 23-43). Cambridge University Press.
Shontz, F. C. (1965). Reactions to crisis. Volta Review, 67(5), 364-370.
Shontz, F. C. (1975) The psychological aspects of physical illness and disability. Macmillan.
Sierra, M., Berrios, G. E., (1996). A case of depersonalization. History of Psychiatry, 7, 451-461.
Sierra, M. & Berrios, C. E. (2000). The Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale: A new instrument
for the measurement of depersonalisation. Psychiatry Research, 93(2), 153-164.
Sierra, M., Baker, D., Medford, N., & David, A. (2005). Unpacking the depersonalization
syndrome: An exploratory factor analysis on the Cambridge Depersonalization
Scale. Psychological Medicine,35(10), 1523-1532.
Sifneos, P. E. (1972). Short-term psychotherapy and emotional crisis. Harvard University Press.
Sifneos, P. (1973). The prevalence of “alexithymic” characteristics in psychosomatic
patients. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics., 22(2), 255–262.
https://doi.org/10.1159/000286529

139

Silver, R. C., & Wortman, C. B. (1980). Coping with undesirable life events. In J. Garber & M.
Seligman (Eds.), Human helplessness: Theory and applications (pp. 279–375). Academic
Press.
Silver, R. C., & Wortman, C. B. (2007). The stage theory of grief. The Journal of the American
Medical Association, 297(24), 2692-2694. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.297.24.2692-a
Silverman, G. K., Jacobs, S. C., Kasl, S. V., Shear, M. K., Maciejewski, P. K., Noaghiul, F. S., &
Prigerson, H. G. (2000). Quality of life impairments associated with diagnostic criteria
for traumatic grief. Psychological Medicine, 30(04), 857-862.
Simon-Buller, S., Christopherson, V., & Jones, R. (1989). Correlates of sensing the presence of a
deceased spouse. Omega: Journal of Death and Dying, 19(1), 21–30.
https://doi.org/10.2190/4QV9-186V-JXTC-4N0B
Skevington, S., Lotfy, M., & O'Connell, K. (2004). The World Health Organization's
WHOQOL-BREF quality of life assessment: Psychometric properties and results of the
international field trial. A Report from the WHOQOL Group. Quality of Life Research,
13(2), 299-310.
Sobol, J. (2017, September 20). I dream. https://www.facebook.com/joseph.sobol.5
Soffer-Dudek, & Shahar. (2009). What are sleep-related experiences? Associations with
transliminality, psychological distress, and life stress. Consciousness and Cognition,
18(4), 891-904.
Solms, M. (2014). The neuropsychology of dreams: A clinico-anatomical study.
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. (Original work published in 1997)

140

Staehr Johansen, K. (1998). The use of well-being measures in primary health care–the Dep-Care
project. World Health organization, regional office for Europe: well-being measures in
primary health care–the DepCare project. Geneva: World Health Organization, E60246.
Stahl, S. T., Arnold, A. M., Chen, J., Anderson, S., & Schulz, R. (2016). Mortality after
bereavement: The role of cardiovascular disease and depression. Psychosomatic
Medicine, 78(6), 697-703.
Starr, M. (2012). God of love: A guide to the heart of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Monkfish
Book Publishing Company.
Steffen, E., & Coyle, A. (2010). Can “sense of presence” experiences in bereavement be
conceptualised as spiritual phenomena?. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 13(3), 273291.
Steffen, E., & Coyle, A. (2011). Sense of presence experiences and meaning-making in
bereavement: A qualitative analysis. Death Studies, 35(7), 579–609.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07481187.2011.584758
Steffen, E., & Coyle, A. (2012). "'Sense of presence' experiences in bereavement and their
relationship to mental health: A critical examination of a continuing controversy". In C.
Murray (Ed.). Mental health and anomalous experience. Nova Science Publishers.
Streit-Horn, J. (2011). A systematic review of research on after-death communication (ADC).
(unpublished Doctoral dissertation), University of North Texas, Denton, TX, US.
Stevenson, I. (1983). Do we need a new word to supplement “hallucination”. American Journal
of Psychiatry, 140(12), 1609-11.

141

Stroebe, M. S., & Schut, H. E. (1999). The dual process model of coping with bereavement:
Rationale and description. Death Studies, 23(3), 197-224.
https://doi.org/10.1080/074811899201046
Stroebe, M. S., & Schut, H. E. (2001). Meaning making in the dual process model of coping with
bereavement. In R. A. Neimeyer (Ed.), Meaning reconstruction and the experience of
loss (pp. 55-73). American Psychological Association.
Stroebe, M. S., & Schut, H. E. (2005). To continue or relinquish bonds: A review of
consequences for the bereaved. Death Studies, 29(6), 477-494.
Stroebe, M. S., & Schut, H. E. (2010). The dual process model of coping with bereavement: A
decade on. OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying, 61(4), 273-289.
Stroebe, M. S., Schut, H., & Boerner, K. (2017). Cautioning health-care professionals: Bereaved
persons are misguided through the stages of grief. OMEGA—Journal of Death and
Dying, 74(4), 455–473. https://doi.org/10.1177/0030222817691870
Stroebe, M. S., Schut, H. E., & Stroebe, W. E. (2007). Health outcomes of bereavement. The
Lancet, 370(9603), 1960-1973. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(07)61816-9
Stroebe, M. S. & Stroebe, W. E. (1993). The mortality of bereavement. In M. S. Stroebe, W. E.,
Stroebe, & R. O. Hansson (Eds.), Handbook of bereavement: Theory, research, and
intervention (pp. 175-195). Cambridge University Press.
Stroebe, M. S., Stroebe, W. E., & Hannson R. O. (1993). Bereavement research and theory: An
introduction to the handbook. In M. S. Stroebe, W. E. Stroebe, & R. O. Hansson (Eds.),
Handbook of bereavement: Theory, research and intervention (pp. 3-22). Cambridge
University Press.

142

Stroebe, M. S., Stroebe, S., Schut, H. E., Zech, E., & van den Bout, J. (2002). Does disclosure of
emotions facilitate recovery from bereavement? Evidence from two prospective studies.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 70(1), 169-178.
https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-006x.70.1.169
Stroebe, M. S., van den Bout, J., & Schut, H. E. (1994). Myths and misconceptions about
bereavement: The opening of a debate. OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying, 29(3),
187-203.
Tartt, D. (2013). The goldfinch. Hachette UK.
Tassi, & Muzet. (2000). Sleep inertia. Sleep Medicine Reviews, 4(4), 341-353.
Taylor, H. A., & Tversky, B. (1992). Spatial mental models derived from survey and route
descriptions. Journal of Memory and Language, 31(2), 261-292.
Teasdale, W. (2019, August 5). Transformative spirituality. In R. Rohr (Ed.) Interspiritual
Mysticism. https://cac.org/transformative-spirituality-2019-08-05/
Tedeschi, R. G. (1995). Trauma & transformation: Growing in the aftermath of suffering. Sage.
Tedeschi, R. G., & Calhoun, L. G. (1996). The posttraumatic growth inventory: Measuring the
positive legacy of trauma. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 9, 455–471.
Tedeschi, R. G., Park, C. L., & Calhoun, L. G. (1998). Assessment of posttraumatic growth.
In Posttraumatic growth: Positive changes in the aftermath of crisis (pp. 31-50).
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
Thalbourne. M. A. & Houran, J. (2000). Transliminality, the Mental Experience Inventory and
tolerance of ambiguity. Personality and Individual Differences, 28(5), 853-863.
Thalbourne, M.A. & Maltby, J. (2008). Transliminality: Thin boundaries, unusual experiences,
and temporal lobe lability. Personality and Individual Differences, 44, 1617–1623.

143

Thelen, E. (1992). Development as a dynamic system. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 1(6), 189-193.
Thelen, E. & Smith, L. B. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition
and action. MIT Press.
Thelen, E. Ulrich, B., & Niles, D. (1987). Bilateral coordination in human infants: Stepping on a
split-belt treadmill. Journal of Experimental Psychology., 13(3), 405–410.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.13.3.405
Thelen, E., & Ulrich, B. (1991). Hidden skills: A dynamic systems analysis of treadmill stepping
during the first year. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development, 56(1), i-103. https://doi.org/10.2307/1166099
Thompson, S. C., & Janigian, A. S. (1988). Life schemes: A framework for understanding the
search for meaning. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 7(2-3), 260-280.
Titelman, D., Nilsson, A., Svensson, B., Karlsson, H., & Bruchfeld, S. (2011). Suicide-nearness
assessed with PORT, the percept-genetic object-relation test: A replication and a
reliability study. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 75(4), 295-314.
https://doi.org/10.1521/bumc.2011.75.4.295
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55(4), 189-208.
Topp, C. W., Østergaard, S. D., Søndergaard, S., & Bech, P. (2015). The WHO-5 Well-Being
Index: A systematic review of the literature. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 84(3),
167-176. https://doi.org/10.1159/000376585
Troyer, J. M. (2005). Post-bereavement experiences of older widowers: A qualitative
investigation (unpublished doctoral dissertation), University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS,
US. Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (UMI Number: 3185237).

144

Troyer, J. (2014). Older widowers and postdeath encounters: A qualitative investigation. Death
Studies, 38(10), 1-11.
Troyer, J. M. (2018). Grief: It’s complicated. Presentation at the Millenium Center, ETSU.
Sponsored by Morris-Baker Funeral Home. September 18, 2018.
Tyhurst, J. S. (1958). The role of transition states—including disasters—in mental illness.
In Symposium on preventive and social psychiatry (pp. 149-172). National Academies.
Uren, T., & Wastell, C. (2002). Attachment and meaning-making in perinatal
bereavement. Death Studies, 26(4), 279-308.
Vaitl, D., Birbaumer, N., Gruzelier, J., Jamieson, G., Kotchoubey, B., Kübler, A., Lehmann, D.,
Miltner, W., Ott, U., Pütz, P., Sammer, G., Strauch, I., Strehl, U., Wackermann, J., &
Weiss, T. (2005). Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness. Psychological
Bulletin, 131(1), 98–127. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.98
Van der Ham, I., Martens, M., Claessen, M., & Van den Berg, E. (2017). Landmark agnosia:
Evaluating the definition of landmark-based navigation impairment. Archives of Clinical
Neuropsychology, 32(4), 472-482.
Vihvelin, H. (1948) On the differentiation of some typical forms of hypnagogic hallucinations.
Ada Psychiatrica et Neurologica, 23, 359-389.
Volkan, V. (1974). The recognition and prevention of pathological grief. In J. Ellard, V. Volkan,
& N. Paul (Eds.), Normal & pathological responses to bereavement. (pp. 22-35). MSS
Information Corporation.
Volkan, V. D., & Zintl, E. (2015). Life after loss: The lessons of grief. Karnac Books. (Original
work published in 1993 by Charles Scribner’s Sons – Macmillan Publishing Company)

145

Walsh, F., & McGoldrick, M. (Eds.). (2004). Living beyond loss: Death in the family. W. W.
Norton & Company. (Original work published in 1991)
Ware, J. E. (2004). SF-36 Health Survey update. In M. E. Maruish (Ed.), The use of
psychological testing for treatment planning and outcome management (pp. 693–718).
Erlbaum.
Warner, L. R., & Shields, S. A. (2013). The intersections of sexuality, gender, and race: Identity
research at the crossroads. Sex Roles, 68(11-12), 803-810.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11199-013-0281-4
Warren, Jeff (2007). "The Hypnopompic". The head trip: Adventures on the wheel of
consciousness. Vintage Canada
Waters, F., Blom, J., Dang-Vu, T., Cheyne, A., Alderson-Day, B., Woodruff, P., & Collerton, D.
(2016). What is the link between hallucinations, dreams, and hypnagogic–hypnopompic
experiences? Schizophrenia Bulletin, 42(5), 1098-1109.
Watson, D. (2001). Dissociations of the night: Individual differences in sleep-related experiences
and their relation to dissociation and schizotypy. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110,
526–535.
Weiner, J. S. (2007). The stage theory of grief. The Journal of the American Medical
Association, 297, 2692–2693. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.297.24.2692-b
Wheeler, I. (1994). The role of meaning and purpose in life in bereaved parents associated with a
self-help group: Compassionate Friends. OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying, 28(4),
261-270.
White, R. (2015). Dialectics of mourning. Angelaki, 20(4), 179-192.

146

Wolbers, T., & Hegarty, M. (2010). What determines our navigational abilities? Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 14, 138–146.
Wolfelt, A. (1987). Resolution versus reconciliation: The importance of semantics.
Thanatos, 12(4), 10-13.
Wong, P. T. P. (2012). The human quest for meaning: Theories, research, and application (2nd
ed.). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
Wong, P. T. P. (2017). A decade of meaning: Past, present, and future. Journal of Constructivist
Psychology, 30(1), 82-89.
Wong, P. T. P., & Fry, P. S. (1998a). The human quest for meaning. Journal of Adult
Development, 7, 187-188.
Wong, P. T, P., & Fry, P. S. (1998b). The human quest for meaning: A handbook of
psychological research and clinical applications. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates—
Routledge.
Woodward, K. (1990). Freud and Barthes: Theorizing mourning, sustaining grief.
Discourse, 13(1), 93.
Woodward, K. (1993). Late theory, late style: Loss and renewal in Freud and Barthes. In A. M.
Wyatt Brown & J. Rossen (Eds.), Aging and gender in literature: Studies in creativity
(pp. 82-101). University Press of Virginia.
Worden, J. W. (2009). Grief counseling and grief therapy: A handbook for the mental health
practitioner (4th ed.). Springer Publishing Company.
World Health Organization (2018a). Depression Fact Sheet Number 369 (updated 2018)
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs369/en/

147

World Health Organization. (2018b). International statistical classification of diseases and
related health problems (11th Revision). Official release anticipated in January, 2022.
https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en
Wortman, C. B., & Silver, R. C. (1989). The myths of coping with loss. Journal of consulting
and clinical psychology, 57(3), 349-357.
Wortman, C. B., & Silver, R. C. (2001). The myths of coping with loss revisited. In M. S.
Stroebe, R. O. Hansson, W. E. Stroebe, & H. E. Schut, (Eds.), Handbook of bereavement
research: Consequences, coping, and care (pp. 405-429). American Psychological
Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10436-017
Wortman, C. B., Silver, R. C., & Kessler, R. C. (1993). The meaning of loss and adjustment to
bereavement. In M. S. Stroebe, W. Stroebe, & R. O. Hansson (Eds.), Handbook of
bereavement: Theory, research, and intervention (pp. 349-366). Cambridge University
Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664076.024
Wortmann, J. H., & Park, C. L. (2008). Religion and spirituality in adjustment following
bereavement: An integrative review. Death Studies, 32(8), 703-736.
Wray, T., & Price, A. (2005). Grief dreams: How they help heal us after the death of a loved
one. Jossey-Bass / Wiley.
Yalom, I. D., & Lieberman, M. A. (1991). Bereavement and heightened existential awareness.
Psychiatry, 54, 334–345.
Zisook, S., Paulus, M., Schuchter, S. R., & Judd, L. L. (1997). The many faces of depression
following spousal bereavement. Journal of Affective Disorders, 45, 85–95.
Zisook, S., & Shuchter, S. R. (1986). The first four years of widowhood. Psychiatric Annals, 15,
288-294.

148

Zittoun, T., Duveen, G., Gillespie, A., Ivinson, G., & Psaltis, C. (2003). The use of symbolic
resources in developmental transitions. Culture & Psychology, 9(4), 415-448.
Zittoun, T., Gillespie, A., Cornish, F., & Aveling, E. L. (2008). Using social knowledge: A case
study of a diarist’s meaning making during World War II. In T. Sugiman, K. J. Gergen,
W. Wagner, & Y. Yamada (Eds.), Meaning in action (pp. 163-179). Springer Science +
Business Media. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-74680-5
Zusne, L. (1985). Magical thinking and parapsychology. In P. Kurtz (Ed.). A skeptic’s handbook
of parapsychology (pp. 685-700). Prometheus Books.
Zusne, L., & Jones, W. H. (1989/2014). Anomalistic psychology: A study of magical thinking.
Psychology Press. (Original work published in 1989 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.)

149

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Specific Symptoms of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD: APA, 2013)
Acute stress disorder is most often diagnosed when an individual has been exposed to a
traumatic event in which both of the following were present:
•

•

The person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with (e.g., can include learning of)
an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to
the physical integrity of self or others.
Though not required, the person’s response is likely to involve intense fear, helplessness,
or horror.

Either during or following the distressing event, the individual has 3 or more of the following
dissociative symptoms:
•
•
•
•
•

A subjective sense of numbing, detachment, or absence of emotional responsiveness
A reduction in awareness of his or her surroundings (e.g., “being in a daze”)
Derealization
Depersonalization
Dissociative amnesia (i.e., inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma)

The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the following ways: recurrent
images, thoughts, dreams, illusions, flashback episodes, or a sense of reliving the experience; or
distress when exposed to reminders of the traumatic event.
Acute stress disorder is also characterized by significant avoidance of stimuli that arouse
recollections of the trauma (e.g., avoiding thoughts, feelings, conversations, activities, places,
people). The person experiencing acute stress disorder also has significant symptoms of anxiety
or increased arousal (e.g., difficulty sleeping, irritability, poor concentration, hypervigilance,
exaggerated startle response, motor restlessness).
For acute stress disorder to be diagnosed, the problems noted above must cause clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning
or impairs the individual’s ability to pursue some necessary task, such as obtaining necessary
assistance or mobilizing personal resources by telling family members about the traumatic
experience.
The disturbance in an acute stress disorder must last for a minimum of 3 days and a maximum of
4 weeks, and must occur within 4 weeks of the traumatic event. Symptoms also cannot be the
result of substance use or abuse (e.g., alcohol, drugs, medications), caused by or an exacerbation
of a general or preexisting medical condition, and cannot be better explained by a brief psychotic
disorder.
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Appendix B: Advertisements and Other Participant Recruitment Materials
Snowball e-mail template (and Facebook/Reddit ad):
As part of my research to better understand the experience of grief, I am collecting data via an
online survey.
If you have experienced grief in response to loss due to human death, then I invite you to take
the survey.
Please also forward this e-mail invitation to others and share the ad below through your social
media.
The link to the survey is here: Grief Experience Survey
(https://etsuredcap.etsu.edu/surveys/?s=RLAYYRD3MA or http://tinyurl.com/griefexperiencesurvey)
Thank you!
Larry
_______________________
Larry Childress, M.A.
Doctoral Student
Translational Experimental Psychology
East Tennessee State University
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SONA Ad Description
This study seeks to better understand the experience of grief in response to loss due to human
death. Participants will be asked to complete an online survey regarding their personal experience
of loss, their overall health/well-being, and meaning in their lives. Although times will vary, it
should take approximately 30 minutes to complete the survey, which also includes some questions
collecting demographic information. Participation in this research is completely voluntary and may
be discontinued at any time; all responses are anonymous.
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Appendix C: The Grief Experiences Survey
Age:
Country of residence (US, non-US):
What is your zip code?
If non-US country, what is your country of residence?
Please indicate the type of area you currently live in (urban, suburban, rural):
Gender identity (female, male, other):
Sexual orientation (asexual, bisexual, gay, lesbian, pansexual, questioning or unsure, straight, other):
Race/Ethnicity (please select all that apply; Alaska native, Black, East Asian, Latino/a or Hispanic,
Middle Eastern, Native Hawaiian, White, Multiracial, other):
Which of the following best describes your living situation (live alone, with parents, roommate,
spouse/romantic partner, no permanent residence, other)?
Please describe your current employment status (not working, working part-time, working full-time,
retired, other):
How would you classify your personal financial situation (low-income, lower-middle income,
middle-income, upper-middle income, upper income)?
Please describe your current relationship status (single never married, in a relationship living
separately, cohabitating with a romantic partner, married, separated, divorced, domestic
partnership, widowed, other):
Education (please select one; some high school, technical training, high school grad or equivalent,
some college no diploma, associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, advanced degree, other ):
Are you a student (no, yes part time, yes full time)?
Are you a parent (yes, no)?
Religious or non-religious affiliation (please select one; Buddhist, Christian-Catholic, ChristianProtestant, Episcopalian/Anglican, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Hindu, Mormon, Muslim, Sikh,
Unitarian, Wiccan, Atheist, Agnostic, Humanist, Religious affiliation not specified, other):
How often do you go to religious services (never, 1-2 time/year, every month, every week?
I feel calm and relaxed (WHO-5 Q1; at no time, some of the time, less than ½ of the time, more
than ½ of the time, all of the time—see Appendix D for additional information re. responses)
I feel cheerful and in good spirits (WHO-5 Q2)
I feel active and vigorous (WHO-5 Q3)
I wake up feeling fresh and rested (WHO-5 Q4)
My daily life is filled with things that interest me (WHO-5 Q5)
How would you rate your physical health (poor, fair, good, very good, excellent):
How would you rate your mental health? (poor, fair, good, very good, excellent):
Please complete the following statement describing your relationship to the person who died:
he or she was my (husband, wife, partner, grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, father-in-law
mother-in-law, brother, sister, brother-in-law, son, daughter, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, friend,
other)?
Approximately how long ago did your loved one die (< 1 month, 1-3 months, 4-6, 7-12, 13-18,
19-24 months, 2-3 years, 4-5, 5-10, more than 10 years):
Approximate age of the person when they died
Cause of death (natural causes-anticipated; natural causes-sudden, overdose, accident, homicide,
COVID-19, Not known, Do not recall):
Were you (one of) the primary caregiver(s) for your loved one prior to their death (yes, no, do not
recall)?
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Did the death of your loved one follow palliative/hospice care (yes, no, do not recall)?
If yes then approximately how long was your loved one in palliative/hospice care (1-4 weeks,
5-8 weeks, 3-6 months, 7-12, 13-18, 19-24, more than 2 years)?
Did you view the body of your loved one after the death (yes, no, do not recall)?
Was there any type of funeral ceremony or memorial service for your loved one (yes, no, do not
recall)?
If so, then did you attend (yes, no, do not recall)?
If so, then did you find attending the service to be meaningful (yes, no, do not recall)?
Was the body of your loved one (cremated, buried, donated for scientific/medical/research purposes,
other):
Did you seek professional help for grief-related issues at any point following this death (yes, no,
do not recall)?
If so, then from whom did you seek help (such as, a therapist, physician, counselor, pastor or spiritual
advisor, social worker, grief support group, etc.)?
In general, did you find this help-seeking to be beneficial to you (yes, no, do not recall)?
Response options for 1-66: never, rarely, occasionally, a moderate amount, a great deal or do not recall.
If responding never, rarely, occasionally, a moderate amount, or a great deal, then followed by:
How has this changed over time?: less often, unchanged, more often, no longer occurring, or unsure.
NOTE: Items #38 and #41 (I had more/fewer dreams) do not include a follow-up item (How has this changed over
time?), as this would not have made sense.
I had difficulty concentrating/focusing attention
I felt restless
I felt numb
I felt distant from my own emotions
I felt as if I was in a daze
I felt like I was watching things happen from outside myself
Memories of the death kept entering my mind
My surroundings seemed strange or unreal
I felt like I was slow to respond to what was happening around me
I looked in the mirror and felt as though I did not recognize myself
I felt as if I might be losing my mind, but I was reluctant to share this with others
Smells seemed weaker or less noticeable than usual
Indoor lights seemed so bright that they bothered my eyes
Tastes seemed blander or less noticeable than usual
I felt as if the volume control on my world had been turned down
My vision seemed dulled
Things I saw looked different to me than how I know they really look
People and objects seemed more distant and unclear
Smells seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual
People and objects seemed closer and clearer
Colors seemed to appear dull or muted
Tastes seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual
I felt as if the volume control on my world had been turned up
Colors seemed to appear more vivid and vibrant
I felt like I was walking on shifting ground
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26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

I felt as if I was in a fog
I had a sinking feeling in the pit of my stomach
I felt like I was descending rapidly in an elevator
I had especially vivid memories of my loved one who died
I sensed or felt the presence of the person who died
I saw, heard, smelled, or felt touched by my deceased loved one
I thought I heard my deceased loved one's voice
I thought I saw my deceased loved one
I thought I felt my deceased love one beside me
I talked to my loved one even though (s)he is no longer living
Things around me felt unreal or dreamlike
It could be hard to tell if I was awake or asleep
I had more dreams
My dreams about my loved one were comforting
My dreams about my loved one were disturbing
I had fewer dreams
I had difficulty falling and/or staying asleep
I felt the presence of my loved one, but could not see, hear, touch, or smell anyone there
Thinking of my loved one made it easier to fall asleep
When I first woke up, sometimes initially I didn't remember that my loved one had died
My thoughts could come so quickly that I couldn't seem to write them down fast enough
Thinking of my loved one made it harder to fall asleep
I experienced an altered state of consciousness in which I felt that I became more enlightened
I had such a heightened awareness of sights and sounds that I felt I could not shut them out
I felt like I had mystical experiences
Time seemed to pass very slowly
Events seemed to happen in slow motion
Time seemed to go by quickly
Events seemed to speed up
Time seemed to stand still
I had difficulty keeping track of time
It was challenging for me to accurately gauge the passage of time
I felt that my sense of time didn't work the way it used to
I felt challenged in navigating the world around me
I misplaced things
It seemed to take me longer to accomplish tasks-- to get from A to B-- than usual for me
I felt as if my internal compass stopped working
There have been times when it seemed harder for me to gauge the distance between things
I've felt lost
I had difficulty remembering things
I felt as if I just woke up in an unfamiliar place
Response options for 67-76: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or
strongly disagree.
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67 Since the death, I don't know where to go next in my life
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

86
87
88
89
90
91

92
93

94
95
96
97

I don't understand myself anymore since the death
The death has made me feel less purposeful
I have difficulty integrating the death into my understanding about the world
This death is incomprehensible to me
I am perplexed by what happened
I'm more creative
I've grown as a person
I'm better able to adapt to different and changing situations
I'm more able to find meaning in life
Response options for 77-85: Does not describe me at all, Does not quite describe me, Describes me
fairly well, Describes me well, or Describes me very well
I have learned to cope better with life
I feel as though I am a better person
I have a better outlook on life
I have more compassion for others
I am stronger because of the grief I have experienced
I am a more forgiving person
I am more tolerant of myself
I am having more good days than bad
I care more deeply for others
Response options for 86-91: I did not experience this change as a result of the death, I experienced
this change to a very small degree as a result of the death, I experienced this change to a small
degree as a result of the death, I experienced this change to a moderate degree as a result of the
death, I experienced this change to a great degree as a result of the death, or I experienced this
change to a very great degree as a result of the death
I have greater clarity about life's meaning
I feel better able to face questions about life and death
I feel more connected with all of existence
I have a greater sense of harmony with the world
I have a better understanding of spiritual matters
I have a stronger religious faith
Response options for 92-93: never true of me, occasionally true of me, fairly often true of me, very
often true of me, always true of me, or not applicable
When my understanding of a problem conflicts with God's revelation, I will submit to
God's definitions
Although I may not see results from my labor, I will continue to implement God's plans
as long as God directs me to do so.
How much sense would you say you have made of the loss of your loved one?
no sense, slight sense, some sense, a moderate amount of sense, or a great deal of sense
Despite the loss, have you been able to find any benefit from your experience of the loss?
no benefit, slight benefit, some benefit, moderate amount of benefit, or a great deal of benefit
Do you feel that you are different--that your sense of identity has changed--as a result of this loss?
not at all different, slightly different, somewhat different, moderately different, or a great deal different
What has been the direction in this difference in your sense of how your identity has changed?
for the better, mixed, or for the worse
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98
99
100
101

How have you searched for meaning in your loved one's death?
How have you searched for meaning in your own life since your loved one's death?
What additional support did you need following the death of your loved one that you did not receive?
If you could send a message to your deceased loved one, what would it be?
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Appendix D: The Who-5 Well-Being Index (Staehr Johansen, 1998; Topp et al., 2015)

The wording was changed from present perfect to present tense for these items in the
current study. This was because much of the survey’s content asks questions about the more
distant past, and these questions are ascertaining participant feelings regarding the past two
weeks. The new item wording is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I feel cheerful and in good spirits
I feel calm and relaxed
I feel active and vigorous
I wake up feeling fresh and rested
My daily life is filled with things that interest me
Due to an entry error, one of the response choices (Most of the time) was not included in

the WHO-5 in the Grief Experiences Survey; as such, the possible responses were:

The response At no time received 0 points, other responses were scored as follows: 2 = 2⅓;
3 = 3⅓; 4 = 4⅓, 5 = 5. The sum of these was multiplied by 4.
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Appendix E: Sources Used in Developing Perception/Sense-Making Items
Key:
ASD = Specific Symptoms of Acute Stress Disorder (Appendix A)
ASDS = the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (Appendix F)
SASRQ = Stanford Acute Stress Reaction Questionnaire (Appendix G)
DDI = Depersonalization/Derealization Inventory (Appendix H)
DES-II = Dissociative Experiences Scale (Appendix I)
CDS = Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (Appendix J)
RTS = Revised Transliminality Scale (Appendix K)
Perception/Sense-Making Items included in the Grief Experiences Survey
Item
[All items are introduced with: Think about the time
following the death of your loved one. Would you say:]
1) I had difficulty concentrating/focusing attention

Subcategory of
Perception/
Sense-making
Shock

2) I felt restless

Shock

3) I felt numb
4) I felt distant from my own emotions

Shock
Shock

5) I felt as if I was in a daze

Shock

6) I felt like I was watching things happen from outside
myself
7) Memories of the death kept entering my mind

Shock

8) My surroundings seemed strange or unreal
9) I felt like I was slow to respond to what was happening
around me
10) I looked in the mirror and felt as though I did not
recognize myself.

Shock
Shock

11) I felt as if I might be losing my mind, but I was
reluctant to share this with others
12) Smells seemed weaker or less noticeable than usual

Shock

13) Indoor lights seemed so bright that they bothered my
eyes
14) Tastes seemed blander or less noticeable than usual
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Shock

Shock

Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing

Item Source(s)

ASD; ASDS: 16; SASRQ: 9
anxiety—62% endorsed, .40
Item-Scale corr.; DDI: 1,3,21,24;
DES-II: 2
SASRQ: 2; anxiety—62%
endorsed, .40 Item-scale corr.
ASD; DDI: 6; ASDS: 1; DDI: 6
ASD; ASDS, 1; SASRQ:
dissoc.—28% endorsed, .54 Itemscale corr.; DDI: 8,13; CDS: 9
ASD; ASDS: 2; DDI: 26,28;
DES-II: 20; CDS: 1
ASD; ASDS: 4; DDI: 10; DESII: 7,13; CDS: 3,6,15,23
ASD; ASDS: 6; SASRQ:
anxiety—26% endorsed, .38
Item-scale correlation
DDI: 1, 7; ASDS: 3; DES-II: 12
SASRQ: dissoc.—25% endorsed,
.53 Item-scale correlation
SASRQ: 10 dissoc.—10%
endorsed, .57 Item-scale
correlation; DES-II: 11
Larry Childress
CDS: 25
RTS: 13
CDS: 7

Item
[All items are introduced with: Think about the time
following the death of your loved one. Would you say:]
15) I felt as if the volume control on my world had been
turned down
16) My vision seemed dulled
17) Things I saw looked different to me than how I know
they really look
18) People and objects seemed more distant and unclear
19) Smells seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual
20) People and objects seemed closer and clearer
21) Colors seemed to appear less dull or muted
22) Tastes seemed stronger or more noticeable than usual
23) I felt as if the volume control on my world had been
turned up
24) Colors seemed to appear more vivid and vibrant

25) I felt like I was walking on shifting ground
26) I felt as if I was in a fog
27) I had a sinking feeling in the pit of my stomach
28) I felt like I was descending rapidly in an elevator.
29) I had especially vivid memories of my loved one who
died
30) I sensed or felt the presence of the person who died

31) I saw, heard, smelled, or felt touched by my deceased
loved one

32) I thought I heard my deceased loved one’s voice.

Subcategory of
Perception/
Sense-making
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intrasensory
Processing
Intersensory
Processing
Intersensory
Processing
Intersensory
Processing
Intersensory
Processing
Extrasensory
Processing
Hallucinations
Extrasensory
Processing
Hallucinations
Extrasensory
Processing
Hallucinations
Extrasensory
Processing
Hallucinations
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Item Source(s)

Alfred Wilson (see King, 2018)
DDI: 18
SASRQ: 11% endorsed; .51 ItemScale Correlation; DDI: 11;
DES-II: 12
DDI: 9; DES-II: 28; CDS: 19
Andrea Clements; RTS: 19
Opposite of #18 (above)
Opposite of #24 (below)
Opposite of #14 (above)
Opposite of #15 (above)
Elizabeth Feldstein (see
Deerwester, 2019)
DDI: 19
DDI: 26,28; DES-II: 28; CDS: 1
DDI: 3
adapted from Handler, 1999
Common across multiple sources
see e.g., Castelnovo et al., 2015

see, e.g., Troyer, 2005, 2014; see
also Durham Hypnagogic and
Hypnopompic Questionnaire: 1,
14 (Jones et al., 2009)
see e.g., Sacks, 2012

Item
[All items are introduced with: Think about the time
following the death of your loved one. Would you say:]
33) I thought I saw my deceased loved one.

34) I thought I felt my deceased loved one beside me

35) I talked to my loved one even though (s)he is no
longer living
36) Things around me felt unreal or dreamlike

37) It could be hard to tell if I was awake or asleep

38) I had more dreams

39) My dreams about my loved one were comforting

40) My dreams about my loved one were disturbing

41) I had fewer dreams

42) I had difficulty falling and/or staying asleep

43) I felt the presence of my loved one, but could not see,
hear, touch, or smell anyone there

44) Thinking of my loved one made it easier to fall asleep

45) When I first woke up, sometimes initially I didn’t
remember that my loved one had died
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Subcategory of
Perception/
Sense-making
Extrasensory
Processing
Hallucinations
Extrasensory
Processing
Hallucinations
Extrasensory
Processing
Hallucinations
Extrasensory
Processing
Dreaming
Extrasensory
Processing
Dreaming
Extrasensory
Processing
Dreaming
Extrasensory
Processing
Dreaming
Extrasensory
Processing
Dreaming
Extrasensory
Processing
Dreaming
Extra-sensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness
Extrasensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness
Extrasensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness
Extrasensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness

Item Source(s)

Sacks, 2012; Durham
Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic
Questionnaire: 7
Bare, 2020

see e.g., Troyer, 2005, 2014

ASDS: 3; DDI: 5; DES-II: 12,16;
CDS: 13

DES-II: 15
Opposite of 41 (below)

Opposite of #40 (below)

ASD; ASDS: 7; SASRQ: 6

Opposite of 38 (above)

ASDS: 14; SASRQ: 1; anxiety—
39%, .43 Item-scale correlation

Durham Hypnagogic and
Hypnopompic Questionnaire: 1
(Jones et al., 2009); Note
similarity to items 28-33
assessing hallucinations
Opposite of 47 (below)

see e.g., Bare, 2020; Bowler,
2018

Item
[All items are introduced with: Think about the time
following the death of your loved one. Would you say:]
46) My thoughts could come so quickly that I couldn’t
seem to write them down fast enough

47) Thinking of my loved one made it harder to fall
asleep

48) I experienced an altered state of awareness which I
believe utterly transformed the way I looked at myself
49) I had such a heightened awareness of sights and
sounds that I felt I could not shut them out
50) I felt like I had mystical experiences

51) Time seemed to pass very slowly
52) Events seemed to happen in slow motion
53) Time seemed to go by quickly
54) Events seemed to speed up
55) Time seemed to stand still
56) I could not keep track of time
57) It was challenging for me to accurately gauge the
passage of time
58) I felt that my sense of time didn’t work the way it
used to

Subcategory of
Perception/
Sense-making
Extrasensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness
Extrasensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness
Extrasensory
Processing
Transliminality
Extrasensory
Processing
Transliminality
Extrasensory
Processing
Transliminality
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
Time

Item Source(s)

DDI: 2
DDI: 12
Opposite of #’s 51 & 52 (above)
Opposite of #’s 51 & 52 (above)
e.g., Neimeyer & Anderson, 2002
Greene, 2019
Greene, 2019

Time

Larry Childress

DDI: 11; RTS: 9

Opposite of 44 (above)

RTS: 16

RTS: 25

RTS: 18

Perception/Sense-Making Items considered but not included in the Grief Experiences Survey
Subcategory of
Perception/
Sense-making
Shock

Item (considered but NOT included)
I’ve felt irritable and/or had outbursts of anger

I’ve felt distant from my “normal” self [OR I’ve not had
the usual sense of who I am]

Shock

I’ve felt isolated from the world

Shock

My thoughts have seemed blurred

Shock
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Item Source(s)

ASD; ASDS: 15; SASRQ: 10
anxiety—21% endorsed, .49
Item-scale correlation
ASDS: 4; SASRQ: dissoc.—16%
endorsed, .55 Item-scale
correlation
DDI; 10; SASRQ: dissoc.—21%
endorsed, .53 Item-Scale corr.
DDI: 11

Item (considered but NOT included)
I’ve been unable to recall important aspects of the death

I’ve tried not to think about the death
The distance between close and distant has seemed
blurred
My vision seemed sharpened

Subcategory of
Perception/
Sense-making
Shock

Shock

My sensations were more overwhelming than usual
I’ve experienced things as if they were doubly real
My surroundings appeared as if covered with a haze
I’ve felt off balance
I’ve found myself acting as if my loved one was still
alive
I’ve been unsure if things really happened to me or if I
just dreamed that they did
I’ve felt like I was waking up in a room unfamiliar to me

I’ve had the sense of the invisible presence of my loved
one watching me while I sleep
I’ve seen the blurry figure of my loved one in my room

I’ve experienced an altered state of consciousness in
which I felt that I became cosmically enlightened
I’ve behaved in a much more impulsive or uninhibited
way than is usual for me
I thought I really knew what some people mean when
they talk about mystical experiences
I’ve felt unaware of the passage of time
I felt a sense of timelessness
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Intra-sensory
Processing
Intra-sensory
Processing
Intra-sensory
Processing
Intra-sensory
Processing
Inter-sensory
Processing
Inter-sensory
Processing
Extra-sensory
Processing
Hallucinations
Extra-sensory
Processing
Dreaming
Extra-sensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness
Extra-sensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness
Extra-sensory
Processing
Threshold
Consciousness
Extra-sensory
Processing
Transliminality
Extra-sensory
Processing
Transliminality
Extra-sensory
Processing
Transliminality
Time
Time

Item Source(s)

ASDS: 5; SASRQ: dissoc.—2%
endorsed, .37 Item-scale
correlation
ASDS: 10
DDI: 23
Opposite of #16 (above)
Exact source(es) not recalled
Exact source(es) not recalled
DDI: 17
Similar to #28 (above)
see e.g., Didion, 2005

DES-II: 15

Greene, 2019

Durham Hypnagogic and
Hypnopompic Questionnaire: 4
(Jones et al., 2009)
Durham Hypnagogic and
Hypnopompic Questionnaire: 3
(Jones et al., 2009)
RTS: 3, 16

RTS: 6

RTS: 18
DES-II: 20
SASRQ: 3; 48% endorsed, .43
Item-Scale Correlation

Appendix F: Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS)
Name:

Date:

Briefly describe your recent traumatic experience:
Did the experience frighten you? Yes or No
Please answer each of these questions about how you have felt since the event. Circle one
number next to each question to indicate how you have felt.
1 Not at all
2 Mildly
3 Medium
4 Quite a bit
5 Very much
1.
2.
3.
4.

During or after the trauma, did you ever feel numb or distant from your emotions?
During or after the trauma, did you ever feel in a daze?
During or after the trauma, did things around you ever feel unreal or dreamlike?
During or after the trauma, did you ever feel distant from your normal self or like you
were watching it happen from outside?
5. Have you been unable to recall important aspects of the trauma?
6. Have memories of the trauma kept entering your mind?
7. Have you had bad dreams or nightmares about the trauma?
8. Have you felt as if the trauma was about to happen again?
9. Do you feel very upset when you are reminded of the trauma?
10. Have you tried not to think about the trauma?
11. Have you tried not to talk about the trauma?
12. Have you tried to avoid situations or people that remind you of the trauma?
13. Have you tried not to feel upset or distressed about the trauma?
14. Have you had trouble sleeping since the trauma?
15. Have you felt more irritable since the trauma?
16. Have you had difficulty concentrating since the trauma?
17. Have you become more alert to danger since the trauma?
18. Have you become jumpy since the trauma?
19. When you are reminded of the trauma, do you sweat or tremble or does your heart beat
fast?
(Bryant et al., 2000)
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Appendix G: Stanford Acute Stress Reaction Questionnaire (SASRQ)
(Cardeña et al., 2000)
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Appendix H: Depersonalization-Derealization Inventory (DDI)
(Cox & Swinson, 2002)
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Appendix I: Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES-II)
(Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Carlson & Putnam, 1993)
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Dissociative Experiences Scale (continued)
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Dissociative Experiences Scale (continued)

(Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Carlson & Putnam, 1993)
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Appendix J: Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS)
(Sierra & Berrios, 1996, 2000; see also Sierra et al., 2005)
Responses are for Frequency: 0 = never, 1 = rarely, 2 = often, 3 = very often, 4 = all the time
and for Duration: 1 = a few seconds, 2 = few minutes, 3 = few hours, 4 = about a day, 5 = more
than a day, 6 = more than a week
1.
2.
3.
4.

Out of the blue, I feel strange, as if I were not real or as if I were cut off from this world.
What I see looks ‘flat’ or ‘lifeless’, as if I were looking at a picture.
Parts of my body feel as if they didn’t belong to me.
I have found myself not being frightened at all in situations normally I would find
frightening or distressing
5. My favourite activities are no longer enjoyable.
6. Whilst doing something I have the feeling of being a ‘detached observer’ from myself.
7. The flavour of meals no longer gives me a feeling of pleasure or distaste.
8. My body feels very light, as if it were floating on air.
9. When I weep or laugh, I do not seem to feel any emotions at all.
10. I have the feeling of not having any thoughts at all, so that when I speak it feels as if my
words were being uttered by an ‘automaton’.
11. Familiar voices (including my own) sound remote and unreal.
12. I have the feeling that my hands or my feet have become larger or smaller.
13. My surroundings feel detached or unreal, as if there were a veil between me and the
outside world.
14. It seems as if things that I have recently done had taken place a long time ago. For
example, anything which I have done this morning feels as if it were done weeks ago.
15. Whilst fully awake, I have ‘visions’ in which I can see myself outside, as if I were
looking at my image in a mirror.
16. I feel detached from memories of things that have happened to me—as if I had not been
involved in them.
17. When in a new situation, it feels as if I have been through it before.
18. Out of the blue, I find myself not feeling any affection towards my family and close
friends.
19. Objects around me seem to look smaller and further away.
20. I cannot feel properly the objects that I touch with my hands for it feels as if it were not
me who were touching it.
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Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (continued)

21. I am unable to picture things in mind.
22. I feel detached from pain.
23. I have the feeling of being outside my body
24. When I move it doesn’t feel as if I were in charge of the movements, so that I feel
‘automatic’ and mechanical as if I were a ‘robot’.
25. The smell of things no longer gives me a feeling of pleasure or dislike.
26. I feel so detached from my thoughts that they seem to have a ‘life’ of their own.
27. I have to touch myself to make sure that I have a body or a real existence.
28. I seem to have lost some bodily sensations (e.g., of hunger and thirst) so that when I eat
or drink, it feels an automatic routine.
29. Previously familiar places look unfamiliar, as if I had never seen them before.

(Sierra & Berrios, 1996, 2000; see also Sierra et al. 2005)
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Appendix K: Revised Transliminality Scale (RTS)
(Houran et al., 2003; Lange et al., 2000)
Your Date of Birth: —/—/— Your Age: — Your Sex: M/F
1. Horoscopes are right too often for it to be a coincidence.
2. At times I perform certain little rituals to ward off negative influences.
3. I have experienced an altered state of consciousness in which I felt that I became cosmically
enlightened.
4. At the present time, I am very good at make-believe and imagining.
5. I have felt that I had received special wisdom, to be communicated to the rest of humanity.
6. I have sometimes behaved in a much more impulsive or uninhibited way than is usual for me.
7. I am fascinated by new ideas, whether or not they have practical value.
8. I have sometimes sensed an evil presence around me, although I could not see it.
9. My thoughts have sometimes come so quickly that I couldn’t write them all down fast enough.
10. If I could not pretend or make-believe anymore, I wouldn’t be me I wouldn’t be the same
person.
11. Sometimes I experience things as if they were doubly real.
12. It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and to feel as if
my whole state of consciousness has somehow been temporarily altered.
13. Often I have a day when indoor lights seem so bright that they bother my eyes.
14. I am convinced that I have had at least one experience of telepathy between myself and
another person.
15. I am convinced that I am psychic.
16. I have experienced an altered state of awareness which I believe utterly transformed (in a
positive manner) the way I looked at myself.
17. I am convinced that I have had a premonition about the future that came true and which (I
believe) was not just a coincidence.
18. I think I really know what some people mean when they talk about mystical experiences.
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Appendix K: Revised Transliminality Scale (continued)
19. I have gone through times when smells seemed stronger and more overwhelming than usual.
20. I can clearly feel again in my imagination such things as: the feeling of a gentle breeze, warm
sand under bare feet, the softness of fur, cool grass, the warmth of the sun and the smell of
freshly cut grass.
21. A person should try to understand their dreams and be guided by or take warnings from
them.
22. While listening to my favorite music, in addition to feeling calm, relaxed, happy, etc., I often
have a feeling of oneness with the music, or of being in another place or time, or vividly
remembering the past.
23. At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there.
24. I am convinced that it is possible to gain information about the thoughts, feelings or
circumstances of another person in a way that does not depend on rational prediction or
normal sensory channels.
25. For several days at a time I have had such a heightened awareness of sights and sounds that I
cannot shut them out.
26. I sometimes have a feeling of gaining or losing energy when certain people look at me or
touch me.
27. Now that I am grown up, I still in some ways believe in such beings as elves, witches,
leprechauns, fairies, etc.
28. Sometime people think Im a bit weird because my ideas are so novel.
29. When listening to organ music or other powerful music, I sometimes feel as if I am being
lifted up into the air.
(Houran et al., 2003; Lange et al., 2000)
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